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Question to patient. ‘In what year was Elvis elected as the president 
of the United States of America?’
Patient. ‘That was in 1972’.
Question to patient. ‘What did you do yesterday?’
Patient. ‘I sat in the garden and did some gardening’.
Obviously, Elvis Presley was never elected as the president of the US, and the second 
patient went to therapy that day and watched television instead of gardening. These 
answers are examples of what is referred to as confabulations, one of the clinical features 
of Korsakoff’s syndrome. In the introduction of this thesis I will first describe Korsakoff’s 
syndrome and the role of confabulations in this syndrome. Second, I will address the 
concept of confabulation; this includes content, definitions, classifications, and theories on 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying confabulations. Third, I will focus on the assessment 
of confabulations in clinical practice and research settings. Finally, I will give an outline of 
the studies presented in the chapters of this thesis. 
Korsakoff’s syndrome
Korsakoff’s syndrome is an irreversible, neuropsychiatric disorder, typically resulting from 
nutritional (thiamine) depletion following years of chronic alcohol abuse. It is characterized 
by disproportionate learning and memory impairments, relative to other features of 
cognitive functioning (Cermak, Butters, & Goodglass, 1971; Kopelman, Thomson, Guerrini, 
& Marshal, 2009; Squire, 1982). Commonly, executive function deficits are also present (Van 
Oort & Kessels, 2009). The syndrome is named after the Russian psychiatrist Sergei 
Korsakoff. He raised awareness for the syndrome, describing at least 30 alcohol-induced 
cases of the amnesic syndrome (Korsakoff, 1887, 1889). However, Lawson (1878) was the 
first to describe the syndrome.
Anterograde and retrograde amnesia
Both Lawson and Korsakoff described striking memory impairments seen in their patients. 
Korsakoff noted that ‘the memory of recent events […] is chiefly disturbed’ (Victor & 
Yakovlev, 1955, p. 397) and Lawson (1878) described an ‘almost absolute loss of memory 
for recent events’ (p. 191). These statements describe anterograde memory impairments, 
that is, the inability to encode and retrieve information encountered after the onset of the 
illness (Cermak et al., 1971; Squire et al., 1982). This is the most salient symptom of the 
syndrome. Patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome also demonstrate deficits in remote 
memory; the memory for events acquired before the onset of the disease (Race & Verfaellie, 
2012). It has been demonstrated that the loss of memories in patients with Korsakoff’s 
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syndrome can extend back years, sometimes even several decades (Kopelman, 1989; 
Moscovitch, Nadel, Winocur, Gilboa, & Rosenbaum, 2006). This relative sparing of old 
memories and a disproportionate loss of more recent ones has been referred to as the 
temporal gradient. A temporal gradient has been documented for non-personal information, 
such as news events and famous faces, and autobiographical information. 
Confabulations in Korsakoff’s syndrome
So far, the focus has been on the forgetting of events, but this patient group is also known 
for remembering incorrect events. This is referred to as confabulations. Early researchers, 
such as Korsakoff (1891) and Bonhoeffer (1901) already mentioned confabulations as a 
symptom of the Korsakoff’s syndrome, but it has only recently been incorporated in the 
clinical diagnostic guidelines. The ICD-10 (World-Health-Organization, 1994) mentioned 
confabulations as a probable, but not an obligatory, symptom for diagnosing an ‘Alcohol- 
Induced Amnesic Syndrome’ (F10.6), and the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) did not include confabulations in its guidelines for diagnosing the ‘Alcohol-Induced 
Amnesic Syndrome’ (291.1). However, in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013), confabulations are 
incorporated in the diagnosis of Korsakoff’s syndrome, as the diagnosis is changed to 
 ‘Alcohol-induced major neurocognitive disorder, amnestic confabulatory type’ (291.1) 
(see also Walvoort, Wester, Doorakkers, Kessels, & Egger, 2016). The non-amnestic- 
confabulatory type replaces the DSM-IV diagnosis ‘Alcohol-induced persisting dementia’. 
Spontaneous confabulations may be noted especially during the early stages of an 
amnestic disorder, and tend to disappear with time (Schnider, 2008). Moreover, provoked 
confabulations are present even years after the onset of the syndrome. The screening of 
confabulatory tendencies may provide supplementary information about the cognitive 
profile of Korsakoff’s syndrome patients, and should be included to the neuropsychological 
examination (Borsutzky, Fujiwara, Brand, & Markowitsch, 2008).
Confabulations and other etiologies
Confabulations have also been described in a variety of other patients with memory 
disorders, next to Korsakoff’s syndrome. This includes patients with ruptured aneurysms 
of the anterior communicating artery (ACoA), traumatic brain injury, Alzheimer’s disease, 
and encephalitis (Baddeley & Wilson, 1986; Cooper, Shanks, & Venneri, 2006; Nahum, Ptak, 
Leemann, Lalive, & Schnider, 2010; Talland, Sweet, & Ballantine, 1967; Weinstein & Lyerly, 
1968; for a review see Schnider, 2008). In a review, Schnider (2008) concludes that there is 
no cause of brain damage and no known lesion area that always induces confabulations. 
However, the strongest lesion overlap between etiologies producing spontaneous 
confabulations was the ventromedial prefrontal area (posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex 
and the basal forebrain, see Figure 1). Moreover, Schnider (2008) noted that spontaneous 
confabulations are usually transient (lasting days, weeks, months), but the amnesia often 
persists in the different patient groups described above. Provoked confabulations do not 
11
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1
seem to have a specific anatomical basis (Schnider, 2008), and persist even years after the 
onset of the disease.
Confabulations
Content
Confabulations often relate to events from episodic autobiographical memory. In addition, 
the content of confabulations often, but not exclusively, consists of personal semantic 
information, habits and routines, and overlearned information (Dalla Barba, Nedjam, & 
Dubois, 1999; La Corte, Serra, Attali, Boissé, & Dalla Barba, 2010). This has also been referred 
to as “habits confabulations” (Serra et al., 2014). Serra et al. (2014) reported that habit 
confabulations are mostly plausible and often indistinguishable from true memories, 
unless one is familiar with the patient’s history, background, present, and future situations. 
This is demonstrated by the following example: ‘I was at the office, doing the year-end 
inventory’, a former office worker replied, when asked about what he did yesterday, even 
though he has been retired for 20 years (Hirstein, 2009). 
Definitions 
Confabulations have long been thought to serve the purpose of “gap-filling” (Bonhoeffer, 
1901, 1904; Pick, 1905; van der Horst, 1932). It was believed that confabulations resulted 
Figure 1   Superimposition of 14 spontaneous confabulators following rupture of an 
aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery. As indicated by the shades 
of gray, maximal lesion overlap was in the posterior medial orbitofrontal area. 
Image from Schnider (2008).
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from a “conscious” and “deliberate” effort to avoid embarrassment (for reviews see Berrios, 
1998; Whitlock, 1981). More recent definitions of confabulations focus on the association 
with memory deficits. For example, the popular definition by Berlyne (1972) states that 
confabulation can be defined as ‘a falsification of memory occurring in clear consciousness 
in association with an organically derived amnesia’ (p. 38). The definition by Kopelman 
(2015) states that ‘confabulation refers to false or erroneous memories arising involuntarily 
(i.e. not deliberately) in the context of a neurological amnesia.’ (p. 51). An important 
addition to these definition is that the production of these ‘false memories’ happens 
involuntary and unconscious. Therefore, confabulations have also been referred to as 
“honest lying” (Moscovitch, 1989). 
Classifications
Several classifications of confabulations have been proposed, for example the classical 
distinction between momentary and fantastic confabulations (Bonhoeffer, 1901, 1904). 
Momentary confabulations are typically produced in response to questions (probably as 
a strategy to fill ‘memory gap’ or out of embarrassment) and are always plausible. Fantastic 
memories on the other hand are implausible statements relating to unreal, imaginary 
events (Berlyne, 1972; Bonhoeffer, 1901, 1904). An important problem with this distinction 
is that it takes factors into account which are not necessarily related. Momentary 
confabulation refers to the mode of elicitation, whereas fantastic confabulation refers to 
the content of the confabulations (Heidler & Eling, 2015; Kopelman, 1987). Kopelman (1987) 
proposed to focus attention upon the one central feature: The evocation of the 
confabulations. Therefore, he distinguishes provoked and spontaneous confabulations. This 
distinction is now widely used. A provoked confabulation shares with momentary 
confabulations that it is considered to be an incorrect response to a question or a situation 
in which a person feels compelled to say something. Provoked confabulations resemble 
the errors produced by healthy individuals when they are confronted with leading 
questions (Heidler & Eling, 2015). Hence, provoked confabulations seem to be a normal 
response to a faulty memory (Kopelman, 1987). Spontaneous confabulations on the other 
hand, occur without any obvious trigger. This is a rare, pathological phenomenon, often 
occurring in the context of an amnesic syndrome (Kopelman, 1987).
 Several researchers have suggested that spontaneous and provoked confabulations 
are different expressions of the same cognitive deficit, with spontaneous confabulations 
covering the more severe end of the continuum (Dalla Barba, 1993; Dalla Barba et al., 1999). 
However, there is evidence suggesting that these concepts concern two different deficits, 
each with its own neurocognitive mechanisms, for example, from a study reporting a 
dissociation between provoked and spontaneous confabulations on learning and 
memory tests (Schnider, von Daniken, & Gutbrod, 1996). 
 More recently, Schnider (2008) argued that dichotomies might not cover all aspects 
of confabulations and proposed a classification system that distinguishes between four 
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forms of confabulation: (Simple) Provoked confabulations are intrusions on memory tests; 
momentary confabulations are false verbal statements produced in a discussion or a 
situation eliciting a person to respond; behaviorally spontaneous confabulations emphasize 
the combination of confusion in reality and acting upon these false ideas, which occurs in 
patients with amnesia and disorientation, and fantastic confabulations have no basis in 
reality and are implausible. 
Theories of confabulation
It has been suggested that confabulations arise from the combination of memory 
impairments and frontal, executive failures (Fischer, Alexander, D’Esposito, & Otto, 1995; 
Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Shapiro, Alexander, Gardner, & Mercer, 1981; Stuss, Alexander, 
Lieberman, & Levine, 1978). Fischer et al. (1995) even suggested that the extent of executive 
dysfunction, in addition to the presence of memory deficits, determines the severity of 
confabulation behavior. However, several studies failed to demonstrate significant 
correlations between confabulations and the performance on neuropsychological tests 
that measure executive functions (Cooper et al., 2006; Dalla Barba et al., 1999; Kessels, 
Kortrijk, Wester, & Nys, 2008). Although the relation between confabulations and executive 
dysfunction remains unclear, aspects of executive functions (such as monitoring, inhibition 
of inappropriate representations, and specifying appropriate cues) are included in theories 
of confabulation. Current theories explaining the mechanisms of confabulation can be 
divided into three categories: (1) source and reality monitoring theories, (2) temporal-con-
text theories, and (3) strategic retrieval theories. 
Source and reality monitoring theories: A prominent theory interprets confabulations 
as a problem of source monitoring or reality monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993). Source monitoring refers to all processes involved in making attributions about the 
origins of memories, knowledge, and beliefs. In confabulators, the sourcing of memories 
– where or when the event happened – may be confused or incorrect, and consequently 
may lead to the production of confabulations. Reality monitoring refers to the processes 
of distinguishing real events from thoughts and imaginations. It has been suggested that 
people can decide whether a retrieved memory is real based on their qualitative nature. 
Real memories tend to include more perceptual (sound, colour), contextual (spatial and 
temporal), and affective (emotional reactions) features than, for example, imaginations. 
Confabulating patients are reported to have impaired access to these qualitative characteristic, 
thus clouding whether a memory is real or not (Johnson, O’Connor, & Cantor, 1997). 
 An explanation for spontaneous confabulations due to disturbed source and reality 
monitoring has been presented by Schnider and Ptak (1999). They stated that spontaneous 
confabulation reflects the failure to recognize the order of stored information. This has 
been referred to as temporal context confusion (TCC). TCC might result from an inability to 
suppress previously activated, but currently irrelevant, memory traces (Schnider & Ptak, 
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1999). For example, results from their study demonstrated that spontaneous confabulators 
experienced information encountered 30 minutes ago as if it had just been presented in 
the ‘now’. 
Temporal-context theory: The Temporal-context theory (Dalla Barba, 1993) explains the 
finding that confabulations are often inappropriate in time. It was suggested that 
confabulators are aware of their personal past, present, and future, but might only use the 
most stable elements of their autobiographical memory when making personal temporal 
judgements. As a result, the content of confabulations often consists of personal semantic 
information, habits, and routines (Dalla Barba et al., 1999; La Corte et al., 2010). Evidence for 
this hypothesis comes from a single case study of a 52-year old woman, who had a 
ruptured aneurysm of the ACoA (Dalla Barba, Cappelletti, Signorini, & Denes, 1997). 
She confabulated when asked about her recent doings, her whereabouts, and her plans 
for the next day. However, she was able to correctly answer questions concerning the 
semantic past (e.g., ‘What happened to lady Diana?’), the semantic present (e.g., ‘Who is 
currently the president of the United States?’), and the semantic future (e.g., ‘What will be 
one of the most important breakthroughs in the medical domain in the next ten years?’) 
(Serra et al., 2014). Hence, confabulations were restricted to the autobiographical domain 
and only occurred when subjective temporality was involved. The temporal-context 
theory does not provide a failing retrieval mechanism explaining the occurrence of 
confabulations, it merely notes that confabulation reflects a pathological awareness of 
personal temporality.
Strategic retrieval: Another model attempting to explain confabulations is the Strategic 
retrieval model (Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002). This model proposes two routes of retrieval 
processes: A direct, associative route, and an indirect, strategic route. This theory states 
that confabulations are the result of a failure in several controlled aspects of memory 
retrieval (the indirect route). This includes difficulties with formulating the memory 
strategy, specifying appropriate cues, guiding search, and monitoring and evaluation of 
retrieved memories. These processes depend on executive functions. The direct route, 
which is independent of executive processes, is relatively spared (Gilboa et al., 2006; 
Metcalf, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2010; Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002).
 It should be noted that the theories described above show (partial) overlap, and 
none of these theories can explain all types of confabulations. Temporal-context 
confusions, for example, may be a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for confabulation 
(Gilboa et al., 2006). In turn, a source monitoring deficit might be a feature of confabulation, 
but is probably not its cause (Schnider, 2008).This has also been noted by the authors of 
the various theories. For example, Johnson (one of the founders of the source and reality 
monitoring framework) noted that ‘the framework should not be considered as an all- 
encompassing theory for confabulation’. 
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False memories in healthy participants
Memory distortions can also occur in healthy participants. These are then often referred 
to as false memories. There is a great deal of research on the manipulation of memories in 
healthy participants, and several methods have been developed to induce this 
phenomenon in research settings. For example, Loftus and Pickrell (1995) planted false 
childhood memories in healthy patients by informing them that they were once lost at a 
shopping mall when they were young. Relatives confirmed this story. A couple of days 
later, about 25 percent of the participants believed that this memory was real. Another 
(easier applicable) method is the Deese Roediger McDermott Paradigm (DRM paradigm) 
(Deese, 1959; Roediger and McDermott, 1995). Here, participants study a list of words, all 
associated with an overlapping common theme (words as eye, sewing, sharp, pain, haystack, 
all associated with needle). Later on, people often falsely recognize the lure word needle, 
even though this word was not actually presented but merely ‘primed’ by the list of words. 
Participants might have thought about the lure word during the presentation of the list, 
and later misattributed the memory of the lure to the presented list instead of to their own 
thoughts. 
 The tendency to produce false memories seems to increase as a function of age 
(McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, & Balota, 2009). A study using the DRM paradigm demonstrated 
that older adults are more susceptible for false memories than younger adults (Balota et al., 
1999). Older adults produce or recognize non-studied information more often than 
younger adults on memory tests (Norman & Schacter, 1997; Schacter, Koutstaal, & Norman, 
1997). This might be the result of spreading activation in an associative network, reliance on less 
distinctive gist traces, and because of a failure to monitor the source of the information.
 False memories seem to be a by-product of the way our error-prone memory works 
(Heidler & Eling, 2015). Anyone may retrieve false memories about previous events. 
Confabulations and false memories share that they are false statements about past events. 
However, there are important differences between these types of incorrect statements. 
False memories in healthy participants are often the result of manipulation of material. 
Suggestive questioning might lead to the production of false statements, but asking 
neutral questions does not normally induce false recall in healthy participants (Schnider, 
2008). In contrast, neutral questioning is the safest way to obtain reliable responses from 
healthy subjects (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Loftus 1979/1996). This is different from provoked 
confabulations in patients with memory disorders, in whom neutral questioning may 
already provoke confabulations. This is demonstrated by the example at the beginning of 
this chapter, where we asked a Korsakoff patient the neutral question: ‘What did you do 
yesterday?’. The patient answered that he did some gardening, while he actually went to 
therapy and watched television instead. 
 Interestingly, although the concepts of false memories and confabulations are closely 
related, studies on false memories rarely refer to confabulations (Brained & Reyna, 2005), 
and vice versa. The bridge between the two fields has yet to be built.
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Assessment of confabulations
Current assessment methods 
So far, only two assessment tools have been developed for assessing confabulation in 
clinical practice: The confabulation battery (Dalla Barba, 1993) and the Provoked 
Confabulation Test (PCT, Cooper et al, 2006). The confabulation battery was initially 
developed to study the pattern of confabulations in two patients, one having dementia 
and the other recovering from traumatic brain injury (Dalla Barba, 1993). The confabulation 
battery is a semi-structured interview. Questions are divided into seven different 
categories: Personal semantic memory, episodic memory, general semantic memory, 
prospective memory, orientation in time and place, and ‘I don’t know semantic’ and ‘I don’t 
know episodic’. These latter two categories consist of questions that have been constructed 
to receive an ‘I don’t know’ response; for example ‘‘Do you remember what you did on March 
13, 1985?’. Instead of giving an ‘I don’t know’ response, confabulating patients often provide 
an incorrect answer in reply to these questions (Dalla Barba, 1993). 
 The PCT asks the participant to name five picture cards (see Figure 2). Next, the 
participant is asked to construct a short story based on these five pictures. After a short 
interval, the participant freely recalls the story they had constructed. This is followed by a 
recognition task, which consisted of twenty questions about the five pictures. These 
questions are divided into four categories: Very specific questions, specific questions, 
general questions, and ‘I don’t know’ questions. ‘I don’t know’ questions could not be 
answered with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response, the only correct response is ‘I don’t know’ as 
participants would not have any pictorial information to respond correctly. For example: 
“What ward does the doctor work on?” or “What was the final football score?” An answer other 
than ‘I don’t know’ is considered a provoked confabulation. 
 The confabulation battery and PCT are mostly being used for research purposes, yet 
little is known about the validity of these assessments for predicting specific confabulatory 
behavior (Schnider, 2008). Moreover, the confabulation battery and PCT do not cover 
some important aspects of (spontaneous) confabulation, such as the content of 
Figure 2  Example of the PCT picture cards (Cooper et al., 2006).
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confabulation or acting upon false ideas. Observations by professional caregivers or 
relatives may offer a potentially valid addition to the assessment of confabulatory behavior. 
However, to date, standardized observation scales that also aim to include spontaneous 
confabulation behavior are not available.
Intrusions on memory tests
So far, we discussed that confabulations occur in patients with brain damage, and false 
memories are also be observed in healthy participants. In addition, another type of 
incorrect response must be described. That is, when non-presented information is 
produced in a test situation, this is referred to as ‘intrusions’. This memory error can occur 
in both patients with brain damage and healthy individuals. Intrusions on memory tests 
and confabulations show great resemblance and their definitions are not clearly 
demarcated. Several studies attempted to quantify confabulation behavior using 
intrusions on word and story recall tasks (De Anna et al., 2008; Kopelman, 1987; Schnider et 
al., 1996). Although confabulation behavior has been quantified by counting intrusions on 
word-list and story recall tasks in some studies (Kopelman, 1987; Schnider et al., 1996), the 
relation between confabulations and intrusions remains under debate. So far, studies 
failed to find significant correlations between (the total number of) intrusions on word-list 
recall and confabulations as determined by clinical reports, confabulation batteries or 
observation scales (Kessels et al., 2008; Nahum, Bouzerda-Wahlen, Guggisberg, Ptak, & 
Schnider, 2012). It has been suggested that errors in the retrieval of complex narratives 
(e.g., stories), rather than intrusions on word-list recall, resemble confabulations in the 
personal domain (Attali, De Anna, Dubois, & Dalla Barba, 2009). However, this suggestion 
is not supported with empirical evidence. So far, the relation between intrusions on story 
recall tasks and clinical confabulations has never been examined. The results from studies 
on word-recall tests indicate that intrusions and confabulations might represent 
dissociated phenomena, possibly with different underlying cognitive mechanisms.
 In addition, results from several studies showed that distinguishing between types of 
intrusions, instead of examining the number of intrusions, might disclose clearer 
relationships with confabulations (Gilboa et al., 2006; Kan, LaRocque, Lafleche, Coslett, & 
Verfaellie, 2010). These studies demonstrated that semantically unrelated (or idiosyncratic) 
intrusions, in addition to semantically related intrusions, distinguishes confabulating 
patients from non-confabulating patients. An example of an unrelated intrusion produced 
when telling a fairy tale as described in Gilboa et al. (2006) is: “Hansel and Gretel lived with 
their grandmother, and they took a basket of food to the field for lunch for the people 
who were growing the wheat”. (p. 1407). In contrast, only examining the total number of 
intrusions might obscure this relation, possibly explaining the non-significant correlations 
found in previous studies.
 In conclusion, different concepts of confabulation have been used in the literature, 
including intrusions on memory tests and provoked confabulations, as well as spontaneous 
18
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confabulations and fantastic confabulations. Authors might use similar terms with different 
meanings, and conclusions on one form of confabulations might be extended to other 
forms of confabulatory behavior. The usage of varying definitions and classifications, 
which might even not be related, complicate the communication on confabulation. 
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Thesis outline
This thesis describes assessment of confabulations and topics that are closely related 
to confabulations, such as autobiographical memory and intrusions in patients with 
Korsakoff’s syndrome. 
 In Chapter 2 the presence of a temporal gradient in semantic and episodic auto-
biographical memory in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome is examined. 
 Chapter 3 describes and validates an observation scale for quantifying confabulation 
behavior, including spontaneous confabulations, in clinical practice. Until this study, no 
instruments had been developed to quantify spontaneous confabulation.
 Chapter 4 examines (a) the relation between (different types of) intrusions on 
word-list recall and confabulations in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and (b) whether 
different measures of executive functions and memory performance are related to 
provoked and spontaneous confabulation. 
 Chapter 5 presents a study that examines the relation between (different types of) 
intrusions produced on story recall and confabulations in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. 
Moreover, it is examine whether the nature of presented stories (newly acquired and 
premorbidly acquired) influences the production of intrusions.
 Chapter 6 focuses on intrusions and confabulations in healthy younger and older 
adults, and patients with Alzheimer’s disease on a story recall paradigm, comparable to 
the one administered to patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, described in Chapter 5. 
 Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes and discusses the main results of the reported studies, 
and directions for future research are suggested. Finally, a conclusion paragraph presents 
the key message of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
Abstract
Objective: The temporal gradient in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome has been of 
particular interest in the literature, as many studies have found evidence for a steep 
temporal gradient, but others have observed more uniform remote memory impairments 
across all past time periods. Inconsistencies might be the result of the nature of remote 
memory impairment under study (i.e., non-personal or autobiographical memory) and of 
methodological differences in the examination of remote memory loss. The aim of this 
study was to examine whether differences between Autobiographical Memory Interview 
(AMI) and Autobiographical Interview (AI) procedures influenced the presence of a 
temporal gradient in semantic and episodic autobiographical memory in patients with 
Korsakoff’s syndrome.
Method: The procedure used in the present study combined the AMI and AI into one 
study session. We compared the performance of 20 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome 
and 27 healthy controls. First, participants were asked to recall knowledge from different 
life periods. Second, participants were asked to recall memories from five life periods. 
Thirdly, participants were asked to rate their subjective experience of each event recalled 
on a 5-point scale. Finally, we analysed the findings in terms of all the memories recalled 
versus the first memory from each life-period only. 
Results: Both the AMI and the AI showed a temporally graded retrograde amnesia in the 
Korsakoff patients for personal semantic and episodic autobiographical memories. The 
pattern of amnesia in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome was not affected by examining 
only one event per life-period. Subjective ratings of recalled memories were largely 
comparable between the groups.
Conclusions: The findings were generally consistent across the AMI and AI. Varying the 
number of events did not affect the pattern of the gradient. Hence, the temporal gradient 
in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome is not an artefact of either the AMI or AI method.
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Introduction
Korsakoff’s syndrome is a chronic neuropsychiatric disorder, typically resulting from 
nutritional (thiamine) depletion following years of chronic alcohol abuse. It is characterized 
by severe learning and memory impairments (Cermak, Butters, & Goodglass, 1971; 
Kopelman, Thomson, Guerrini, & Marshal, 2009; Squire, 1982). The most prominent 
symptom is anterograde amnesia, but remote memory is affected as well. This includes 
non-personal information (public information, such as news events and famous faces) 
and events from autobiographical memory (Albert, Butters, & Brandt, 1981; Kopelman, 
1989; Kopelman, Stanhope, & Kingsley, 1999; Zola-Morgan, Cohen, & Squire, 1983). The loss 
of memories in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome can extend back years, sometimes 
even several decades (Kopelman, 1989; Moscovitch, Nadel, Winocur, Gilboa, & Rosenbaum, 
2006). This relative sparing of early memories and a disproportionate loss of more recent 
ones is commonly referred to as a ‘temporal gradient’. The temporal gradient in patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome has been of particular interest in the literature, as the majority 
of studies have found evidence for a steep temporal gradient, but others have observed 
more uniform remote memory impairments across all past time periods (see Race & 
Verfaellie, 2012, for a review). Inconsistencies might be the result of the nature of remote 
memory impairment under study (i.e., non-personal or autobiographical memory) and of 
methodological differences in the examination of remote memory loss (Race & Verfaellie, 
2012). 
 Early studies examining remote memory loss for non-personal information in patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome sometimes showed a steep temporal gradient (Albert, Butters, & 
Brandt, 1981; Seltzer & Benson, 1974), and sometimes a flat gradient (Mair, Warrington, & 
Weiskkrantz, 1979; Sanders & Warrington, 1971). The absence of a gradient in these studies 
has been explained by the low levels of performance of the patients across all time periods 
(i.e., floor effects; Race & Verfaellie, 2012). The temporal gradient for autobiographical 
memories has been examined to a lesser extent than the gradient for non-personal 
information. Autobiographical memory is typically divided into semantic and episodic 
components (Tulving, 1972). The semantic component refers to “facts” that are not tied to 
a single event, for example knowing that you used to go camping on holidays. The 
episodic component refers to personal events that a person is able to re-experience in a 
detailed spatial and temporal context. Previous studies mainly examined personal 
semantic memory (sometimes known as semantic autobiographical memory), and a 
temporal gradient for personal semantic information has been repeatedly demonstrated 
(Kopelman, 1989; Kopelman et al., 1999, 2009). To the authors’ knowledge only relatively 
few studies have investigated patients’ ability to remember episodic events from their 
personal past. These studies used a Crovitz procedure and Autobiographical Memory 
Interview (AMI) (Butters & Cermak, 1986; Kopelman, 1989; Kopelman et al., 1999; 
Zola-Morgan et al., 1983). Although the results of these studies suggested that the 
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temporal gradient extends to episodic autobiographical memory, more research is 
needed because the findings may relate to the particular technique used. 
 Assessment of autobiographical memory is more complicated than assessment of 
remote memory for publically available knowledge, as this latter type can be tested using 
information that is widely available and is easily verifiable (Squire & Cohen, 1982). Few 
methods have been proposed to assess autobiographical memory. Crovitz and Shiffman 
(1974) developed a task which required participants to retrieve a specific memory of a past 
incident in response to a cue-word. This method is still used to date, but a number of 
limitations have been pointed out. First, the design might be problematic for use in 
patients with severe memory deficits, as it asks participants to generate events from the 
cues, hence, placing large executive demands on them. Second, the procedure does not 
wholly distinguish between episodic and semantic autobiographical recall (Dritschel, 
Williams, Baddeley, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992; Rabbit & Winthorpe, 1988). Third, the results 
might reflect a person’s predisposition to recall from a certain life period (or periods), 
although in some studies, participants were asked to recall from specific life periods 
(Graham & Hodges, 1997; Levine, 2004; Philippi et al., 2015).
 Kopelman, Wilson, and Baddeley (1989) developed the AMI to overcome these 
limitations. The AMI samples recall for autobiographical incidents (episodic memory) and 
personal semantic facts (semantic memory), specifically from three different life periods 
(childhood, young adulthood, and recent life). This provides an evaluation of the temporal 
gradient for episodic and personal semantic memory, irrespective of any bias to respond 
from particular life periods. Moreover, the interview requires participants to recall 
memories concerning commonly experienced events, rather than to respond to a list of 
cue words (Kopelman et al., 1989). An apparent advantage of the AMI is that, by including 
schedules for both episodic and semantic memory, these memory processes can be 
directly compared. On the other hand, it has been argued that separating episodic and 
semantic memory might be somewhat artificial, as these processes often operate in 
tandem (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, & Winocur, 2002). It has also been noted that the two 
schedules of the AMI were unmatched in terms of task difficulty, content, and sensitivity 
(Levine, 2004; Murphy, Troyer, Levine & Moscovitch, 2008; Piolinio, Desranges, Benali, & 
Eustache, 2002). 
 Levine et al. (2002) developed an Autobiographical Interview (AI) which extracted 
indices of semantic and episodic autobiographical information from each recollected 
memory. Participants were asked to recall memories from five life periods. A detailed 
scoring method was used: All recalled elements were categorized as “internal” details 
(episodic recollection) or “external” details. It should be noted that “external” details 
included personal semantic memories, But they also included a number of different 
components: Semantic details, repetitions, meta-cognitive statements, editorialising (for 
example: ‘That doesn’t matter’), and details of (episodic) events or factual information that 
were not part of the main event. Therefore, the total number of external details did not 
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represent a purely semantic measure, and this may affect the pattern of results. Examining 
the individual detail category “semantic details” rather than the composite “external 
details” could be a solution to this (Fuentes & Desrocher, 2013; Levine et al., 2002; St. 
Jacques & Levine, 2007; Willoughby, Desrocher, Levine, & Rovet, 2012). Moreover, users of 
the AI often only ask participants to recall one memory for each life period, as in the 
Levine et al. (2002) paper, whereas the AMI samples three memories per life period. 
Barnabe, Whitehead, Pilon, Arsenault-Lapierre and Chertkow (2012) suggested that 
requesting two or more events per life period might be more likely to produce a temporal 
gradient, whereas recalling just one event might reflect the rehearsal effect of a repeatedly 
retrieved memory. Race and Verfaellie (2012) suggested that “additional insight into the 
pattern of remote autobiographical memory impairment in patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome could be gained by studies that use more sensitive measures to evaluate the 
richness and detailed nature of patients’ extended autobiographical narratives” (p. 111). To 
our knowledge, the AI has not yet been used in patients with amnesia due to Korsakoff’s 
syndrome.
 Some autobiographical memory studies have included rating scales in order to 
evaluate the impact of additional factors that might affect autobiographical retrieval and 
the temporal gradient. For example, Buchanan, Tranel, and Adolphs (2006) employed the 
Crovitz procedure, and asked participants to rate their memories for pleasantness, 
emotional intensity, vividness, rehearsal, personal significance, and confidence on 7-point 
rating scales. This is potentially useful because, for example, emotion may modulate 
ageing effects in episodic memory (St. Jacques & Levine, 2007). Moreover, it has been 
demonstrated that patients with semantic dementia were more likely to remember auto-
biographical episodes that were high in autobiographical significance, compared with 
episodes of low significance, although patients with damage to the medial temporal lobe 
(MTL) did not exhibit this bias (Westmacott, Black, Freedman, & Moscovitch, 2004). 
Examination of emotional significance on autobiographical memory recall has not been 
examined as such in patients with Korsakoff syndrome. However, a previous study 
examining flashbulb memories suggested that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome are 
capable of remembering highly emotional events (Candel, Jelicic, Merkelbach, & Wester, 
2003). 
 The aim of this study was to examine whether differences between the AMI and AI 
procedures would influence the presence or absence of a temporal gradient in semantic 
and episodic autobiographical memory in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. To date, 
the AMI and the AI have never been compared in patients groups other than patients with 
MTL damage due to Alzheimer’s disease or Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) (Barnabe et 
al., 2012). In doing this, we analysed “semantic details” instead of “external details” on the 
AI to ensure that we had purer measure of personal semantic memory. Moreover, we 
examined whether varying the number of memories to be recalled from each life period 
affected the pattern of the gradient. Last, we incorporated subjective rating scales for the 
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retrieved life events, based on Buchanan et al. (2006), to see whether emotionally 
enhanced memories affected the pattern of recall in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. 
Our specific aims were:
1. To see whether or not we obtained a temporal gradient on either task (AMI, AI) in the 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome.
2. To see whether the AI would be more sensitive than the AMI to episodic autobio-
graphical memory differences between the groups.
3. To see whether the tests would differ with respect to the slope of the temporal 
gradient.
Method
Participants
We recruited 20 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome at the Centre of Excellence for 
Korsakoff and Alcohol-Related Cognitive Disorders of Vincent van Gogh Institute for 
Psychiatry in Venray, the Netherlands. The criteria for alcoholic Korsakoff’s syndrome 
(Kopelman et al., 2009) had to be met: A disproportionate memory disorder with evidence 
of a history of Wernicke encephalopathy, and a history of malnutrition or thiamine deficit. 
This diagnosis was consistent with ICD-10 Amnesic syndrome, due to use of alcohol, and 
also with DSM-5 Alcohol-induced major neurocognitive disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; World Health Organisation, 1992) as established by neurological, 
psychiatric, neuroradiologial, and neuropsychological examinations. Patients’ family and 
medical records provided background information (including drinking history). All patients 
were abstinent from alcohol for at least 6 weeks at the time of testing. None of the patients 
had any evidence of other brain pathology that would account for their memory deficit. 
None of the participants met the proposed clinical criteria for alcohol-related dementia 
(Oslin, Atkinson, Smith, & Hendrie, 1998). 
 The control group consisted of 27 healthy participants. Exclusion criteria were the 
presence of subjective memory complaints, a history of neurologic disease, psychiatric 
disorders, or medical conditions that may affect cognitive function. The experimenter 
screened the controls on these criteria (self-reports by the participants). All participants 
were native Dutch speakers, who lived independently in the community. The controls 
were recruited by word of mouth. 
 The groups were matched with respect to age (t(45) = 0.57, p = .569), estimated IQ 
(t(44) = -1.00, p = .321) measured with the National Adult Reading Test (Schmand, Bakker, 
Saan, & Louman, 1991), and sex distribution (χ2(1)= 0.34, p = .854). The control group had a 
higher mean educational level than the Korsakoff group (Verhage, 1964; U = 126, Z = -2.40, 
p =.017). Memory performance of the Korsakoff group and controls was evaluated with 
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the Dutch version of the Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test - Third edition (RBMT-3; 
Wester, Van Herten, Egger, & Kessels, 2013) to assess anterograde everyday memory 
problems, and the Dutch News Events Test; AMV; Meeter, Eijsackers, & Mulder, 2006), to 
measure retrograde amnesia for semantic material. The Korsakoff group was impaired on 
the RBMT-3 (t(45) = -10.04, p <.001), and the AMV (all ps = <.001) compared with the controls. 
A summary of the results is shown in Table 1.
Procedure
The Dutch version of the AMI was used (Meeter & Murre, 2003). The English-language 
version of the AI was translated to Dutch by the first author. Two expert researchers with 
knowledge of the topic pointed out inadequate expressions/concepts and discrepancies 
in the translated interview. An independent bilingual translator, without knowledge of the 
topic, translated the instrument back to English. A comparison between the original and 
the translated interview showed no important differences in content. The translated AI 
was piloted on a healthy participant.
 Following Barnabe et al. (2012), the procedure used in the present study combined 
the AMI and AI into one interview, and therefore differs slightly from the typical procedures. 
Table 1  Participant Characteristics.
Group
Demographic information Control
(n = 27)
Korsakoff
(n = 20)
p-value
Age (years) 56.5 (7.9) 57.8 (7.2) n.s.
Sex distribution (men/women) 21/6 16/4 n.s.
Education (level) 5 (3)a 4 (5)a <.020
Abstinence (months) - 6.2 (4.9)
Neuropsychological tests
NART-IQ 93.4 (13.6) 89.1 (15.3) n.s.
RBMT-3
Global Memory Index
94.0 (16.1) 57.0 (3.9) <.001
AMV Total 17.1 (7.5) 5.7 (6.2) <.001
AMV ’80s 6.6 (2.7) 2.9 (3.1) <.001
AMV ’90s 5.7 (2.8) 1.6 (2.3) <.001
AMV ’00s 4.8 (2.7) 1.5 (2.7) <.001
Mean scores with standard deviation in parenthesis; NART-IQ = IQ as measured with the National  
Adult Reading Test; RBMT-3 = Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test - Third Edition; AMV = Amsterdam Media 
Questionnaire 
aMedian and range are displayed
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The rationale for modifying the procedure was that there was one testing session only; we 
wanted to avoid interference between the two tasks; and to arrange that the scoring 
procedures for both interviews could be applied to the same set of answers. The total 
administration was recorded (using a voice recorder) by the experimenter, and all memories 
were transcribed by the experimenter. Patients’ memories were checked using information 
from medical files and reports from the medical staff to control for confabulations.
 The participants were asked to recall knowledge from different life periods (childhood, 
young adulthood, recent period), based on the complete set of 43 questions from the AMI 
personal semantic schedule. For example, they were asked to retrieve the name of their 
high school. Immediately after this, autobiographical event memory was assessed by 
asking the participants to recall two events from each of five life periods, as in the standard 
AI procedure, but asking for two events per life period instead of one. Following Barnabe 
et al. (2012), the last life period included the past five years as opposed to only the year 
immediately before testing. The purpose of this was to examine more recent retrograde 
memories, i.e., for premorbid events. 
 As recommended in the AI and AMI manuals, it was emphasized that the events had 
to be specific in time and place. The participants were allowed to speak freely, without a 
time limit. The examiner used only the following prompts: “Please go ahead” and “Yes”. 
Following the AI manual, if the participant was unable to produce an event, a list of typical 
life events was presented to prompt recall of specific events. After the participants had 
finished retrieving each memory, the examiner determined whether the description of 
the event was detailed enough (i.e., a specific event, including time and place). If not, 
following the method of the AI (Levine et al., 2002), general probes were administered in 
order to clarify instructions or for eliciting more details. An example of such a probe is: “Is 
there anything else you could tell me?” There was no limit to the number of times general 
probes could be presented. 
 Immediately after recollection of a detailed episodic memory, participants were 
asked to rate subjective experience for each event on 5-point scales. These were ratings of 
pleasantness, emotional intensity, vividness, rehearsal, personal significance, and 
confidence. The experimenter briefly repeated the recently retrieved memory to the 
participant for each of the six different rating scales. The experimenter also presented the 
participant with a visual representation of the rating scale as a mnemonic device.
Scoring
The AMI personal semantic schedule was scored according to the instruction manual 
(Kopelman et al., 1990). A maximum of 21 points could be obtained for each of the three 
life periods (childhood, young adulthood, recent period), resulting in a maximum total 
score of 63. This was the AMI score for personal semantic memory. The recalled episodic 
events were scored according to both the AMI and AI procedures. According to the AMI 
procedure, recalled events can be given a score ranging from 0 (a response based on 
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general knowledge; or no response) to 3 (a detailed personal event that is specific in time and 
place), as described in the AMI manual (Kopelman et al., 1990). Since two events per 
life-period were asked, a maximum AMI score of 6 could be obtained per life-period. This 
was the AMI score for episodic autobiographical memory.
 For the AI scoring, instructions from the AI protocol were followed (Levine et al., 2002). 
Details directly belonging to the main event were considered internal details. The total 
number of internal details constituted the AI measure for episodic autobiographical 
memory. We examined the semantic component of the AI in two ways. First we looked 
only at the semantic details. That is, details containing factual information, such as general 
knowledge and general information specific to the person, but not, for example, 
metacognitive statements, to keep the AI measure for personal semantic as purely 
semantic as possible. Subsequently, we also looked at external details as a whole (this 
included semantic details, repetitions, metacognitive statements, and editorialising).
 One rater completed the total scoring procedure (AMI and AI scoring) for all 
participants. A second rater (who was blind for group membership) randomly completed 
the total scoring procedure for one half of the participants. Inter-rater reliability was 
examined. Before performing the scoring, both raters were given the AI reliability training, 
using a training program supplied by Dr. B. Levine. The mean reliability of our two raters 
compared with “professional raters” on the scoring examples from the training was .84, 
with a median of .90. Next, the raters scored the transcribed memories in a counterbal-
anced order to control for order and group effects. 
Statistical analysis
A two-way mixed reliability analysis (absolute agreement) was executed to examine 
inter-rater reliability. Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) were calculated per life 
period for the scores as obtained with the AMI and AI. Interpretations of the coefficients 
were based on guidelines proposed by Cicchetti (1994). 
 Repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed to examine 
personal semantic and episodic autobiographical memories as measured by the AMI and 
AI, with Group as between-subject factor (two levels: Korsakoff, control) and Life period as 
within subject factor with three levels for AMI personal semantic memory: Childhood, 
early adulthood, and recent period. For the other analyses, there were five levels: 
Childhood, adolescence, early adulthood, middle age, and the recent period. For AI 
personal semantic memory analysis, the mean number of semantic details per life period 
was calculated. We also ran the analysis with the mean number of external details per life 
period. Results for “semantic details” and “external details” were essentially similar, and 
consequently, the results obtained with the semantic details analysis will be described in 
greater detail. AI episodic autobiographical memory was analyzed in terms of the mean 
number of internal details per life period. Polynomial planned comparisons were used to 
further examine the effects. Performing the same analyses for non-personal semantic 
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memory (using AMV scores) was not possible, because of floor effects in the Korsakoff 
group (see Table 1). We also included educational level as a covariate in the above analyses 
to examine whether the episodic and semantic autobiographical memory scores were 
influenced by differences in educational level between the two groups.
 To examine whether the temporal gradient diminished when only one event per life 
period was used, repeated measures ANOVAs with polynomial planned comparisons 
were run again, examining personal semantic and episodic autobiographical memories 
with only scores from the first recalled event included. 
 Finally, we examined the “Buchanan” subjective ratings, where an event had actually 
been recalled. When a Korsakoff patient failed to recall an event, this rating could not be 
obtained. 
Results
Inter-rater agreement 
Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC), as estimates of inter-rater reliability, were calculated 
between two raters on the AMI and AI, and the results are presented in Table 2. The ICC for 
the number of internal details on the AI was good. ICCs. ICCs for the number of semantic 
details on the AI, for AMI incident schedule and for AMI personal semantic schedule were 
excellent. 
Personal semantic memory
The results obtained with external and semantic details were highly consistent. The results 
for external and semantic details are presented in Figure 1. Only the results obtained with 
the semantic details analysis will be presented here. Figure 2 shows the mean personal 
semantic memory scores and standard errors as obtained on the AMI and AI. Significant 
Table 2   Inter-rater reliability (intra-class correlation coefficients) between  
two raters on the Autobiographical memory interview (AMI) and 
Autobiographical Interview (AI).
AI
Internal details Semantic details
.61 .87
AMI
Episodic incident schedule Personal semantic schedule
.94 .99
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main effects of Group were found on the AMI (F(1,43) = 112.21, p = <.001, ηp² = .72) and AI 
(F(1,45) = 4.13, p =.048, ηp² = .08) with the Korsakoff group having lower personal semantic 
scores than the control group. Significant interactions between Group and Life period 
were found for the AMI (F(2,42) = 21.24, p <.001, ηp² = .50) and AI (F(4,42) = 2.97, p =.030, 
ηp² = .22). Both the AMI (F(1,17) = 10.00, p = .006, ηp² = .37) and AI (F(1,19) =5.93, p = .025, 
ηp² = .24) showed significant decreasing linear trends in the Korsakoff group, indicating 
the presence of a temporal gradient. Both interviews demonstrated no significant linear 
trends for the control group, indicating that recollection of personally semantic information 
was relatively stable across life periods in this group. We also included educational level as 
a covariate in the above analyses and found a significant contribution when examining 
AMI personal semantic scores across time (F(2,41) = 2.57, p = .037, ηp² = .14) . However, when 
controlling for the effect of educational level, a significant Group by Life Period was still 
found (F(2,41) = 17.25, p = <.001, ηp² = .46). No significant contribution of educational level 
was found when examining semantic details obtained on the AI.
Episodic autobiographical memory
Figure 3 shows the mean episodic autobiographical memory scores and standard errors 
of the groups as obtained on the AMI and AI. Significant main effects of Group were found 
when using both the AMI (F(1,45) = 67.39, p <.001, ηp² = .60) and AI (F(1,45) = 82.39, p <.001, 
ηp² = .65). The Korsakoff group recalled fewer episodic details than the controls. Significant 
interactions between Group and Life period were found on both the AMI (F(4,42) = 6.52, 
p <.001, ηp² = .38) and AI (F(4,42) = 8.60, p <.001, ηp² = .45). Significant decreasing linear 
Figure 1   External detail (left panel) and semantic detail (right panel) scores obtained 
with the autobiographical interview (AI). Error bars represent the standard error 
of the mean. 
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Figure 2   Scores on the personal semantic schedule (PSS) from the autobiographical 
memory interview (AMI) (left panel) and number of semantic details obtained 
with the autobiographical interview (AI) (right panel). Error bars represent  
the standard error of the mean. 
Figure 3   Scores on autobiographical incident schedule from the autobiographical 
memory interview (AMI) (left panel) and number of internal details obtained 
with the autobiographical interview (AI) (right panel). Error bars represent  
the standard error of the mean.
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trends in the Korsakoff group were found for both the AMI (F(1,19) = 10.69, p = .004, 
ηp² = .36) and AI (F(1,19) = 5.27, p = .033, ηp² = .22), again consistent with a temporal gradient. 
A significant trend was found for the control group with the AI (F(1,26) = 39.06, p = <.001, 
ηp² = .60), but not the AMI. On the AI, the controls recalled more internal details from 
recent periods than from remote periods. We also included educational level as a covariate 
in the above analyses, but found no significant contribution.
Varying the number of events to be recalled
We examined whether the use of one (the first recalled memory) instead of two memories 
per life period would obscure a temporal gradient. The mean scores and standard deviations 
when only using one memory per life period are presented in Table 3. A marginally 
significant interaction was found for semantic details of the AI (F(4,42) = 2.49, p =.058, 
ηp² = .19). No significant trends were observed in either group. Significant Group by Life 
period interactions were found for AI internal details (F(4,42) = 5.39, p = <.001 ηp² = .14), and 
the AMI episodic incident schedule (F(4,42) = 4.50, p =.004, ηp² = .30), with a significant 
decreasing linear trends in the Korsakoff group (p-values ≤ .048). A significant trend for 
the control group was only observed with the AI internal details (F(1,26) = 20.49, p = <.001, 
ηp² = .44), indicating an increase in internal details across time-periods. In sum, examining 
one memory per life period was still enough to obtain significant interaction effects in 
the Korsakoff group for episodic memory on both the AI and AMI, reflecting the presence 
of a temporal gradient.
Table 3   AMI and AI personal semantic and episodic autobiographical memory scores 
(means and standard deviations) when scoring one memory.
Childhood Adolescence Early 
Adulthood
Middle  
Age
Recent 
Period
AMI – Episodic (range 0 – 3)
Korsakoff 2.00 (0.86) 1.65 (0.67) 1.93 (0.61) 1.55 (1.10) 1.00 (1.08)
Control 2.52 (0.51) 2.32 (0.85) 2.70 (0.47) 2.59 (0.50) 2.70 (0.47)
AI – Semantic (range 0 - ∞)
Korsakoff 10.55 (8.40) 13.65 (11.18) 13.65 (9.05) 9.10 (6.53) 6.50 (7.96)
Control 10.22 (9.66) 10.26 (8.31) 13.96 (12.40) 15.52 (12.99) 14.41 (15.31)
AI – Episodic (range 0 - ∞)
Korsakoff 9.50 (8.75) 6.85 (4.28) 9.20 (5.21) 7.25 (8.40) 3.90 (5.95)
Control 13.93 (8.02) 12.93 (8.97) 19.59 (10.29) 20.48 (10.28) 23.07 (9.71)
AMI = autobiographical memory interview. AI = autobiographical interview.
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Subjective experience
Table 4 displays the means and standard deviations for the subjective ratings. Only five out 
of 20 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome recalled a full set of 10 life events. Five patients 
recalled 9 events, three patients recalled 8 events, two patients recalled 7 events, two 
patients recalled 6 events, two patients recalled five events, and one patient recalled only 
3 events. One-way ANOVAs, instead of repeated measures ANOVAs, were run to examine 
differences in subjective experience by patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, where a 
memory was successfully retrieved, compared with controls. ANOVAs showed a significant 
effect of Group only on the emotional intensity rating (F(1,45) = 4.85, p =.033). The controls 
rated their memories as more “emotionally intense” (M = 3.28) than the patients (M = 2.71). 
There were no significant differences between the groups on the other five ratings. 
Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine whether there was a temporal gradient in patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome, and whether differences between the AMI and AI procedures 
influenced the findings in semantic and episodic autobiographical memory in patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome. There was a temporal gradient in patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome across both aspects of autobiographical memory; and the findings were 
generally consistent across the AMI and AI, as Barnabe et al (2012) had found in patients 
with MCI and Alzheimer’s disease. Varying the number of events did not affect the pattern 
of the gradient. In accordance with previous studies, we found temporal gradients for 
personal semantic and episodic autobiographical memories in this patient group (Albert 
et al., 1981; Kopelman, 1989; Kopelman et al., 1999; Zola-Morgan et al., 1983). 
 We found that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome consistently demonstrated remote 
memory impairments in semantic autobiographical memory across all tested periods 
compared with healthy controls on both the AMI and the AI. Moreover, both interview 
methods revealed a significant Group by Life period interaction effect for personal 
semantic memory, indicating a robust temporal gradient in personal semantic memory in 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. These results are in line with previous studies using 
the AMI in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome (Kopelman, 1989; Kopelman et al., 1999). It 
Table 4   Mean “Buchanan” rating scores (standard deviations in parenthesis).
Pleasantness Emotional 
intensity
Vividness Rehearsal Significance Confidence
Korsakoff 3.36 (0.82) 2.71 (1.06) 3.91 (0.67) 2.21 (0.75) 3.27 (1.03) 4.79 (0.36)
Control 3.59 (0.55) 3.28 (0.69) 4.07 (0.54) 2.51 (0.57) 3.56 (0.64) 4.68 (0.36)
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should be noted that, whereas the AMI personal semantic schedule was designed for 
assessing semantic autobiographical memory independently of episodic recall, the AI 
“semantic details score” was not. The AI assumes that semantic and episodic details are 
not independent of each other, as they are given in the context of the same interview. The 
scoring of the AI is based on the notion that the recall of episodic events can contain 
semantic information. Despite this, the results of this study show that the AMI personal 
semantic schedule and AI semantic details scores are equally likely to detect a temporal 
gradient in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. 
 Although the findings were largely comparable between the AMI and AI, some 
differences must be addressed. First, the effect sizes for the main effect of Group and the 
Group by Time Period interaction for semantic autobiographical memory were 
considerably higher for the AMI than for the AI. It is not clear what caused these differences 
in effect sizes. A possibility might be that participants were not asked to provide semantic 
memories according to the AI instructions. The AI semantic details score shows how much 
semantic information is incorporated in the context of episodic events and it does not 
directly reflect memory for personal facts. Future studies should consider adjusting the AI 
method, and include semantic probing for a fairer comparison between the AMI and AI 
personal semantic scores. Second, the AI is a fine grained method with an extended 
scoring system. Although the inter-rater reliability of the internal details was good, the 
scoring system appears to be more difficult (even for trained raters in this study) than the 
scoring of the AMI, which has excellent inter-rater reliability. Finally, across all life periods 
controls scored consistently high on the AMI’s personal semantic schedule, likely reflecting 
a ceiling effect. This was also pointed out by Levine et al., (2002). However, it must be 
noted that the AMI was designed to examine autobiographical memory in patient groups, 
not healthy participants.
 Only a few studies examined the pattern of episodic autobiographical memory loss 
in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. Moreover, the AI does not appear to have been 
administered in this patient group before. We found that patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome were impaired in episodic autobiographical memory compared with healthy 
controls across all time periods, and that there was a significant Group by Life period 
interaction effects for episodic autobiographical memory using both the AMI and AI. 
These results are consistent with previous findings in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome 
using the AMI and Crovitz procedures (Kopelman, 1989; Kopelman et al., 1999, 2009; 
Zola-Morgan et al., 1983). The results from the present study indicate that the AMI and AI 
were equally able to detect a temporally graded pattern of retrograde amnesia in personal 
semantic and episodic autobiographical memory when assessing patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome. Hence, the temporal gradient in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome would not 
appear to be an artefact of either the AMI or AI method.
 We also examined the effect of asking for only one memory to be recalled from each 
life period, as is commonly done using the AI. Barnabe et al. (2012) found that requesting 
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one memory per life-period obscured the presence of a temporal gradient in episodic 
autobiographical memory in patients with Alzheimer’s disease, presumably because 
participants recalled only their best “embedded” and most richly rehearsed episode. The 
present study shows that in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, by contrast, a temporal 
gradient for episodic and personal semantic autobiographical memory, was present even 
when only the first recalled memory was scored on both the AMI and AI. Kopelman (1989) 
reported that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome show a “steeper” gradient than patients 
with Alzheimer’s disease, and this may have contributed to the greater robustness of the 
temporal gradient in the Korsakoff group on testing for a single memory per life-period. 
 We also examined whether the recollection of episodic or internal details by patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome showed enhanced, similar, or diminished emotional valence, 
compared with controls’ episodic recall. However, only five patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome were able to produce a full set of ten life-events, and the other patients recalled 
a lesser number of life-events. Overall, the controls indicated that they experienced their 
memories as more “emotionally intense” than the patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. No 
significant differences on other ratings were found between the groups, indicating that, 
where successful retrieval had occurred, the subjective experience of the events was 
comparable across the groups. In other words, if patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome could 
recall autobiographical memories, they did not differ from controls in subjective 
experience, except on ratings of “emotional intensity” itself. It has been demonstrated that 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome are likely to remember highly emotional events 
(Candel et al., 2003). It is possible that the reversed effect might also be true: Autobi-
ographical memories that are rated as less emotional intense are more prone to be 
forgotten. Future studies should examine the topic of emotionality and autobiographical 
memory in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome in greater depth.
 Various theories exist regarding the nature and appearance of temporal gradients in 
amnesic disorders (Alvarez & Squire, 1994; Cermak, 1984; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Squire, 
2006; Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011). These theories have focused mainly on the role of the 
MTL, and in particular the hippocampus. According to consolidation theory (Alvarez & 
Squire, 1994), recent memories are in the process of consolidation, and will therefore be 
more vulnerable to disruption in brain damaged than older memories, giving rise to a 
temporal gradient for both semantic and episodic memories. In contrast, multiple trace 
theory (MTT; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997) suggested that the loss of memories depends on 
the number of traces laid down, and that there is a steeper gradient for semantic facts 
than for episodic memoires. As patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome primary damage is in 
the diencephalon rather than the MTL (Pitel et al., 2012; but see Sullivan & Pfefferbaum, 
2009), no specific claims about MTL functioning can be made in the present study. 
However, our results are highly relevant for understanding the nature of temporally 
graded retrograde amnesia in patient groups with lesions in brain areas other than the 
MTL. The findings showed a temporal gradient in the Korsakoff group for personal 
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semantic and episodic autobiographical memories. We suggest that future studies might 
focus on the collection of similar data in other patient groups with autobiographical 
memory impairments resulting from brain lesions outside the MTL.
 Some limitations of this study must be addressed. The procedure used in the present 
study combined the AMI and AI into one interview. The rationale for modifying the 
procedure was to apply the scoring procedures for both interviews to the same set of 
answers, and to prevent interference between the two tasks. These modifications were 
also used in Barnabe et al. (2012). However, by modifying the procedures, some important 
changes were made to both protocols. For example, we omitted the specific probe 
condition of the AI interview, which could have affected our results.
 In summary, there was a temporal gradient in the Korsakoff group for both personal 
semantic and episodic autobiographical memory, detectable on both the AMI and the AI. 
Both tasks appeared sensitive to picking up differences between a control group and 
Karsakoff patients, and the slope of the temporal gradient appeared similar across the two 
tasks. Autobiographical memory is difficult to assess and available methods have been 
criticized. Moreover, it has been suggested that the presence of a temporal gradient is 
related to the technique used. The results of this study show that the temporal gradient 
for autobiographical memory is a robust and reliable finding in amnesic patients, not an 
artefact of a particular method. These results indicate that a temporally graded retrograde 
amnesia is also present in patients with lesions in brain areas other than the MTL. Moreover, 
the results of this study demonstrate that the AMI and AI are both appropriate interview 
methods to clinically and empirically assess important phenomena associated with the 
amnesiac syndrome: retrograde amnesia and the temporal gradient.
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Abstract
Objective: Even though the first awareness of confabulations is often based on observations, 
only questionnaires and structured interviews quantifying provoked confabulations are 
available. So far, no tools have been developed to measure spontaneous confabulation. 
This study describes and validates an observation scale for quantifying confabulation 
behavior, including spontaneous confabulations, in clinical practice. 
Method: An observation scale consisting of 20 items was developed, the Nijmegen–
Venray Confabulation List (NVCL-20). This scale covers spontaneous confabulation, provoked 
confabulation, and memory and orientation. Professional caregivers completed the NVCL-20 
for 28 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and 24 cognitively impaired chronic alcoholics. 
Their ratings were related to the confabulation battery, Provoked Confabulation Test, and 
standard neuropsychological tests. 
Results: The categories of the NVCL-20 have “good” to “excellent” internal consistency 
and inter-rater agreement. Patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome confabulated more (both 
spontaneously and provoked), and more memory and orientation problems were observed 
compared with the control group. Correlations with neuropsychological test scores showed 
that confabulations were associated with memory deficits, but not with intrusions or tests 
of executive dysfunction. 
Conclusions: The NVCL-20 is the first instrument that includes items addressing spontaneous 
confabulation. Administration is reliable, valid and feasible in clinical practice, making it a 
useful addition to existing confabulating measures.
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Introduction
Confabulations are statements, incorrect in time and place, which are unintentionally 
produced (Cooper, Shanks, & Venneri, 2006; Dalla Barba, 1993). They are prominent in 
some brain disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease and Korsakoff’s syndrome (Cooper et al., 
2006; Schnider, 2008; Tallberg & Almkvist, 2001). A distinction has been made between 
several types of confabulation (Bonhoeffer, 1901; Schnider, 2001). The most widely used 
distinction was introduced by Kopelman (1987). Here, one central feature is crucial: 
The evocation of the confabulations, distinguishing between provoked and spontaneous 
confabulations. A provoked confabulation is considered to be an incorrect response to a 
question or situation in which a person feels compelled to say something, for example in 
an assessment situation. It has been suggested that provoked confabulations may be 
related to intrusions on memory tests and can also be evoked in healthy participants 
(Bartlett, 1932; Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Kopelman, 1987; Schnider, von Däniken, & Gutbrod, 
1996). Spontaneous confabulations, on the other hand, occur without any obvious trigger 
(Kessels, Kortrijk, Wester, & Nys, 2008; Kopelman, 1987; Schnider, 2008). The latter have 
been linked to impaired reality monitoring and impaired source memory (Kessels et al., 
2008). Another taxonomy, which distinguishes four forms of confabulation, was introduced 
by Schnider (2008). In addition to the evocation, he also included other aspects of 
confabulation. Simple provoked confabulations are intrusions in memory tests; momentary 
confabulations are false verbal statements produced in situations inciting a patient to 
respond; fantastic confabulations have no basis in reality; and behaviorally spontaneous 
confabulations occur in patients with amnesia and disorientation, and results in these 
patients acting according to their false ideas. 
 Several researchers have suggested that spontaneous and provoked confabulations 
are different expressions of the same cognitive deficit, with spontaneous confabulations 
covering the more severe end of the continuum. However, there is also evidence that 
these concepts concern two different deficits, each with its own neurocognitive 
mechanisms (Dalla Barba, 1993; Dalla Barba, Nedjam, & Dubois, 1999; Moscovitch & Melo, 
1997; Schnider, 2001; Schnider et al., 1996). Spontaneous confabulation may be the result 
of a deficit in reality filtering caused by (orbito-)frontal pathology, while provoked 
confabulation may be a normal response to a faulty memory (Kopelman, 1987; Nahum, 
Bouzerda-Wahlen, Guggisberg, Ptak, & Schnider, 2012). Executive dysfunction has also 
been associated with confabulations. Baddeley and Wilson (1988), for example, noted that 
‘clouding’ of autobiographical memory only results in confabulation behavior when this is 
accompanied by dysexecutive problems, such as monitoring deficits. In contrast, Cooper 
et al. (2006) did not find correlations between confabulations (as measured with the 
Provoked Confabulation Test (PCT)) and executive tests, such as the Stroop Color- 
Word Test. Furthermore, while some studies have demonstrated that spontaneously 
confabulating patients showed more impairments on executive function tasks, such as 
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the Wisconsin Cart Sorting Task and Digit Span Backwards (Fischer, Alexander, D’Esposito, 
& Otto, 1995) than non-confabulating controls, other studies demonstrated that 
(behaviorally) spontaneous confabulators did not differ from non-confabulating amnesic 
patients on frontal/executive measures (Schnider et al., 1996; Schnider & Ptak, 1999). 
 A clear relationship between confabulation and a closely related phenomenon, 
namely intrusions, has also yet to be established. Intrusions can be defined as the 
unintentional recall of inappropriate responses specifically observed in test situations, for 
example on word-recall tasks such as the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT) (Dalla 
Barba & Wong, 1995). The number of intrusions on episodic memory tasks is other used as 
an index of confabulations (Dalla Barba, Attali, & La Corte, 2016; Kopelman, 1987; Schnider 
et al., 1996), but significant relationships between intrusions on memory tests and 
measures of confabulation have not consistently been found (Kessels et al., 2008). 
 Instruments that are regularly being used to asses confabulations include the 
confabulation battery (Dalla Barba, 1993) and the PCT (Cooper et al., 1996). These paradigms 
are mostly used for research purposes, yet little is known about the validity of these 
assessments for predicting specific confabulatory behavior (Schnider, 2008). Moreover, 
the confabulation battery and PCT do not cover some important aspects of (spontaneous) 
confabulation, such as the content of confabulations or acting upon false ideas. 
Observations by professional caregivers or relatives may offer a potentially valid addition 
to the assessment of confabulatory behavior. However, to date, standardized observation 
scales that also aim to include spontaneous confabulation behavior are not available. 
The purpose of this study was to develop and validate an observation scale that could be 
used for quantifying confabulations, including all aspects of spontaneous confabulation, 
in clinical practice. This observation scale might be of relevance for diagnostic purposes, 
as the presence of confabulations is a clinical feature of several neuropsychiatric disorders, 
such as Korsakoff’s syndrome, affecting everyday behavior (Adams, & Collins, 1971; Borsutzky, 
Fujiwara, Brand, & Markowitsch, 2008; Victor, Adams, & Collins, 1971). It may also serve 
as a feasible, standardized way to monitor confabulation over time, as (in particular 
spontaneous) confabulation behavior is often found to be temporally limited. The decline 
of spontaneous confabulation over time is also reported to be accompanied with 
improvement in other cognitive areas, such as normalization of temporal-context 
confusion (Schnider, 2008), reflecting cognitive improvement of the patient.
 We administered this instrument to a group of patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome 
and compared their scores with those obtained in an alcoholic control group, that is, 
individuals with alcohol-related brain damage and cognitive dysfunction (not fulfilling the 
criteria for Korsakoff’s syndrome). Korsakoff’s syndrome is an irreversible neurological 
disorder, resulting from nutritional (thiamine) depletion, in which memory and learning 
(severe anterograde and retrograde amnesia) are disproportionately affected compared 
with other cognitive functions (Victor et al., 1971). Other neuropsychological deficits 
associated with this syndrome fall, among others, within the domains of executive 
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functions. The neuropsychological deficits in individuals with alcohol-related brain 
damage and cognitive dysfunction are heterogeneous, but it has been estimated that 
approximately 80% of these patients show impairments in executive functions (controlled 
and effortful processing of novel information, and selective and divided attention) (Bates, 
Bowden, & Barry, 2002; Giancola & Moss, 1998). Also, memory deficits may occur (Parsons 
& Farr, 1981; Rourke & Grant, 1999), but these deficits are mild in comparison with those 
observed in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome (Zahr, Kaufman, & Harper, 2011). Unlike 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, alcoholic controls do not show the tendency to 
produce confabulations. Therefore, we expected that the observers would award higher 
scores to the Korsakoff group on the observation scale than to the alcoholic control group
 We validated our instrument against other instruments which measure confabulations, 
the confabulation battery and the PCT. We expected to find strong, positive correlations 
between the category provoked confabulation of the observations scale and the 
confabulation measures of the confabulation battery and the PCT. Confabulations have 
been associated with memory impairments, the production of intrusions, and executive 
deficits (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988; Dalla Barba & Wong, 1995; Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 
1998). To examine this relation further, we included tests measuring memory performance, 
intrusions, and executive functions. Significant, positive correlations were expected 
between these measures and the scores obtained with the observation scale developed 
in this study.
Scale development
Item generation (alpha version)
Literature search and expert panel: The goal was to develop an observation scale 
which is easy to complete for people who know the patient well (such as professional 
caregivers). On the basis of a literature search and expert opinion, nine items were 
formulated that covered all aspects of spontaneous confabulation, asking about; the 
frequency of confabulatory behavior, the content and coherency of the confabulations, 
acting on confabulations, and the precipitants to confabulations. In order to assess other 
aspects of confabulation, three items about provoked confabulations, and five items 
about orientation and memory, were also included. Five other items contributed to the 
total confabulation score only. These items asked about aspects associated with 
confabulation, such as the persistence of confabulations (‘Can the patient be corrected 
when telling these stories?’) and confusing old recollections with new events (‘Does the 
patient recognizes acquaintances correctly?’). All items were rated on the basis of a 5-point 
rating scale.
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Evaluation by professional caregivers: Professional caregivers evaluated the alpha 
version on clarity and applicability. A few adjustments were made in response to their 
comments. For example, for some items, the rating scale ranging from “never” to “(almost) 
always” was found unclear, and was therefore replaced by more extensive behavioral 
descriptions to rate confabulatory behavior. This adjusted alpha version was further 
evaluated by caregivers, and no adjustments were needed. Therefore, the alpha version of 
the confabulation list contained 22 items. 
Administration: Subsequently, we tested the alpha version in clinical practice. This 
version was completed for patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and alcoholic controls. 
All patients were inpatients of the Centre of Excellence for Korsakoff and Alcohol-Related 
Cognitive Disorders of Vincent van Gogh Institute for Psychiatry in Venray, the Netherlands. 
In the Centre, every patient was assigned a “primary caregiver”, who coordinated the care 
of the patient. Most (but not all) patients were also assigned a “secondary caregiver”, who 
took over these tasks in absence of the primary caregiver. Because of their important roles 
in the care and treatment of the patients, we asked the primary caregivers to complete 
the alpha version for the patients under their care. For the 33 patients who also had a 
secondary caregiver, we asked these caregivers to complete the alpha version as well. 
 The caregivers read the instruction, which emphasized the purpose of the instrument, 
namely to assess spontaneous confabulations. Then, the definitions of confabulation were 
given, in particular, the definition of spontaneous confabulation. The instruction stressed 
that spontaneous confabulations are produced without any prompts or questions. Finally, 
instructions were provided about scoring, for example: ‘Please encircle the answer that is 
most appropriate for the behavior of the patient at the time of completing the instrument’. The 
alpha version took about 5 to10 minutes to complete.
Participants: The alpha version was initially completed for 42 participants (24 patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome and 18 alcoholic controls). At a later point, additional data were 
collected (ratings from primary caregivers; four patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and six 
alcoholic controls), resulting in a total sample of 52 patients. The total Korsakoff group 
consisted of 28 patients (20 men; Mage = 55.9 years; range = 35-73 years), all meeting the 
criteria for DSM-5 Alcohol-induced major neurocognitive disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), supported by examination of the patients’ medical history, 
neuroimaging findings (excluding other etiologies such as tumors or stroke), as well as 
neurological, psychiatric, and neuropsychological examinations. Also, the criteria for 
alcoholic Korsakoff’s syndrome (Kopelman, 2002) had to be met. These included the 
presence of disproportionate impairments of memory, relative to deficits in other 
cognitive domains (see also Victor et al., 1971). Moreover, patients were only included 
when they had a history of Wernicke encephalopathy, alcoholism, and nutritional 
depletion (notably thiamine deficiency) (Kopelman, 2002).
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 The second group consisted of 24 control patients (alcoholic control group) (15 men, 
Mage = 54.3 years; range = 38-72 years). They had a history of chronic alcohol abuse, 
which caused persistent, mild neurocognitive impairments. The temporal course of the 
impairments was consistent with the timing of alcohol use and abstinence (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The impairments were not attributable to another medical 
condition, and they did not meet the criteria for Korsakoff’s syndrome. All fulfilled the 
DSM-5 criteria for mild neurocognitive disorder due to alcohol abuse. Patients’ family and 
medical records provided background information (including drinking history). All 
participants were abstinent from alcohol at the time of testing. Clinical diagnoses were 
made independent of the current study, by a multidisciplinary expert team at the Centre 
of Excellence for Korsakoff and Alcohol-Related Cognitive Disorders.
 Level of education was measured within the Dutch educational system using a 
7-point rating scale, ranging from 1 is (less than primary education) to 7 (university degree). 
The Korsakoff group had a median score of 4 (range = 5). The control patients also had a 
median of 4 (range = 3). An estimation of premorbid verbal intelligence was obtained with 
the Dutch version of the National Adult Reading Task (NART; Schmand, Bakker, Saan, & 
Louman, 1991). The full-scale intelligence quotient (FSIQ) of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Test – Third Edition (WAIS-III; Uterwijk, 2000) was also obtained as a measure of current 
intellectual functioning. Furthermore, standard neuropsychological tests were administered, 
assessing the domains memory (including intrusions) and executive function. Performances 
of the groups on these tasks were compared. Later, the performances on neuro-
psychological tests were correlated with confabulation scores. Confabulation behavior is 
related to impaired performance on a wide range of memory tasks, such as verbal memory 
tasks, non-verbal memory tasks, effortful recall tasks, and less demanding cued recall 
tasks (Cunningham, Pliskin, Cassisi, Tsang, & Rao, 1997). To cover a wide range of episodic 
memory aspects, the Dutch version of the Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test - Third 
edition (RBMT-3; Wester, 2014) was used to assess anterograde everyday memory 
problems, and the Dutch version of the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT; Mulder, 
Dekker, & Dekker, 1996) to assess verbal memory ability. On the CVLT, the number of 
intrusions was also recorded. The executive function tests consisted of the Trail Making 
Test (TMT D-KEFS; Bowie & Harvey, 2006) as a measure of mental flexibility; the Tower of 
London test (TOL D-KEFS; Shallice, 1982) and the Mazes subtest from the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children (Kort et al., 2005) to assess planning capacity; and the Stroop 
Color-Word Test (Hammes, 1973) as a measure of response inhibition. 
 The executive measures described above were selected, since problems with 
response inhibition and self-monitoring may underlie confabulation behavior (Mercer, 
Wapner, Gardner & Benson, 1977). However, results from more recent studies, often using 
the TMT and the Stroop Color-Word Test, are inconclusive (Cunningham, et al., 1997; 
Fischer et al., 1995; Schnider et al., 1996). Previous studies lacked more open-ended 
executive functioning tasks, which might be relevant with respect to the ecological 
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validity. Therefore, we also included TOL and Mazes as open-ended executive functioning 
tasks, measuring planning ability.
Neuropsychological assessment was performed approximately six weeks after admission 
of the patients to the Vincent van Gogh Institute, to ensure that the patients were 
completely abstinent from alcohol. Ethical approval for this study was given by the 
Institutional Review Board of the Vincent van Gogh Institute for Psychiatry (CWOP). The 
participant gave written informed consent before entering the study.
Table 1 summarizes the group characteristics. The groups did not differ significantly with 
respect to age, sex distribution, estimated intelligence, or education. On the executive 
tests, a significant difference was found only for the Stroop Color-Word Test (F(1,36) = 4.22, 
Table 1   Group characteristics of the Korsakoff group (KS) and alcoholic control  
group (ALC).
KS ALC p.
Group Demographics
Age 55.9 (9.1) 54.3 (8.6) n.s.
Sex (male/female) 20/8 15/9 n.s.
Education 4 (5) 4 (3) n.s.
Delay admission-administration
(in weeks)
25.3 (77.0) 17.3 (73.0) n.s.
Neuropsychological Testing
NART-IQ 92.7 (14.0) 94.8 (15.6) n.s.
WAIS-III FSIQ 82.3 (11.4) 86.3 (11.5) n.s.
CVLT total correct 43.6 (15.1) 84.2 (26.5) <.001
CVLT total intrusions 14.8 (10.5) 8.7 (7.7) .025
RBMT standard profile score 9.8 (5.3) 17.5 (4.6) <.001
TMT interference 102.2 (81.9) 84.6 (49.9) n.s.
Stroop interference 142.8 (86.5) 94.9 (46.4) <.05
TOL total score 24.6 (3.4) 26.1 (3.3) n.s.
Mazes total socre 22.5 (9.8) 26.1 (6.5) n.s.
Note. Mean and standard deviations are presented for age, duration between admission and administration and the 
scores of neuropsychological testing. Frequency scores are given for the variable ‘sex’; median and range are 
presented for education, frequency scores. NART-IQ, National Adult Reading Test-IQ; WAIS-III SFIQ, Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale-III Full Scale IQ; CVLT, California Verbal Learning Test; RBMT, Rivermead Behavioral 
Memory Test; TMT, Trail Making Test D-KEFS, TOL, Tower of London. N.s., non-significant results (p = >.05) were 
obtained.
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p = .047, h2p = .11). As expected, the Korsakoff group had significantly lower scores on 
memory tests than the alcoholic control group (all ps <.026). 
Internal consistency of categories from the alpha version
Participants and analyses: After the scores from the caregivers were obtained, internal 
consistency, or interrelatedness, of the items per category from the alpha version 
(spontaneous confabulation, provoked confabulation, memory and orientation, total 
confabulation score) was examined by calculating Lambda 2 reliability (Guttman, 1945; 
Ten Berge & Zegers, 1978). The ratings given by the primary caregivers for the total sample 
of 52 participants (28 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and 24 alcoholic controls) were 
used in the analyses. The “scale if item deleted” option was used, which indicated whether 
deleting that particular item would increase the reliability of the category. We examined 
the internal consistency of the category items in the patient groups, as well as for all 
participants taken together (see Table 2). Since the alcoholic control group produced very 
few spontaneous confabulations (indicating a floor effect), their spontaneous confabulation 
score could not be used to determine the internal consistency of this particular scale, 
because of low variance. 
Results: In order for the observation scale to be feasible and quick to administer in clinical 
practice, our aim was to develop an observation scale with no more than 20 items. We 
therefore removed two items. One item (‘Does the patient always tell the same stories, or 
does the content change?’) contributed the least to the internal consistency, the other 
(‘Does the patients tell old stories like they happened recently?’) showed content overlap with 
another item. The “scale if item deleted” option revealed that eliminating any of the items 
from the spontaneous confabulation category in the Korsakoff group produced a lower 
Table 2   Internal consistency (Lambda 2) of the categories of the Nijmegen Venray 
Confabulation List (NVCL-20) for all participants, Korsakoff group (KS) and 
alcoholic control group (ALC).
All participants
(N=52)
KS
(n=28)
ALC
(n=24)
Spontaneous confabulation .91 .91  -a
Provoked confabulation .83 .75 .91
Memory and orientation .90 .91 .81 
Total confabulation score .95b .94b .96b
a. Could not be obtained because of low variance 
b Results should be interpreted with caution, due to small sample sizes
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internal consistency; therefore, no items were deleted. If item 15 (‘When the patient is being 
asked about something (s)he does not remember anymore, does (s)he admit this?’) would be 
eliminated, internal consistency of provoked confabulation could increase to respectively: 
.97 (all participants), .95 (Korsakoff group), and .97 (alcoholic control group). However, this 
category then would consist of only two items. Since the reliability with 3 items was good 
already, we retained item 15 (see Table 2). 
 The beta version of 20 items (after removal of the two items described above) was 
used for further analyses (see Appendices A and B for beta version). This version had four 
outcome measures: Spontaneous confabulation (items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 16, and 17), 
provoked confabulation (items 13, 14, and 15), memory and orientation items (items 6, 12, 
18, 19, and 20), and a total confabulation score (responses to all 20 items summed up, with 
item 8, 9, and 11 only contributing to the total confabulation score). The beta version of the 
observation scale is referred to as the Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List (NVCL-20).
Inter-rater reliability
Participants and analyses: Thirty-three participants of the initial group of 42 participants 
also had been assigned a secondary caregiver in addition to the primary caregiver (all 
were trained psychiatric nurses). For these participants (19 patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome and 14 alcoholic controls), the observation scale was completed by both the 
primary and secondary caregivers (i.e., trained psychiatric nurses). There were 25 unique 
pairs of primary and secondary caregivers who were involved in the care of these 33 
patients.
 Inter-rater reliability was measured using intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs). The 
mean rater scores for items assessing spontaneous confabulation, provoked confabulation, 
memory and orientation, and the total confabulation score were used in the analyses. 
Interpretation of ICCs was based on the guidelines as proposed by Cicchetti and Sparrow 
(1981).
Results: Table 3 presents the results from the analyses on inter-rater reliability (ICCs) for all 
participants, patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and alcoholic controls on the NVCL-20 
categories. Fair agreement (ICC = .50) was only found for provoked confabulation in the 
Korsakoff group. In addition, all other ICCs were excellent in all participants and in the 
Korsakoff group (ICCs ranging from .76 to .80) and good in the alcoholic control group 
(ICCs ranging from .64 to .73) for spontaneous confabulation, memory and orientation, 
and the total confabulation score. Good reliability coefficients were found for provoked 
confabulations within the total group and in the alcoholic control group (ICC = .62). 
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Validation (beta version)
Concurrent Validity 
Confabulation battery and provoked confabulation test: Next to the NVCL-20, two 
other confabulation measures, the confabulation battery and PCT, were administered to 
assess concurrent validity. The Dutch version of the confabulation battery (Dalla Barba, 
1993; Peters, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & van Damme, 2012) was used in this study. This is a 
semi-structured interview that contains 64 questions. Questions are divided into seven 
different categories: Personal semantic memory, episodic memory, general semantic 
memory, prospective memory, orientation in time and place, and “I don’t know semantic” 
and “I don’t know episodic”. These latter two categories consist of questions that have 
been constructed to receive an “I don’t know” response; for example ‘Do you remember 
what you did on March 13, 1985?’. Instead of giving an “I don’t know” response, confabulating 
patients often provide an incorrect answer in reply to these questions (Dalla Barba, 1993). 
In the Dutch version of this test, questions from the English-language version were 
adjusted to Dutch news facts (Peters et al., 2012). The patients’ answers were later scored 
by the investigator as correct, incorrect, confabulation, “I don’t know” or not applicable. 
As in the study by Dalla Barba, Nedjam and Dubois (1999), the total number of correct 
answers and the total number of intrusions on the confabulation battery were used for 
the analyses in this study.
 The PCT (Cooper et al., 2006) was also administered. Here, the patient was asked to 
name five picture cards (e.g., image of a doctor, a bus). Next, he/she was asked to construct 
a short story based on the five pictures. After a short interval, the patient was asked to 
freely recall the story he/she had constructed. This was followed by a recognition task, 
which consisted of 20 questions about the five pictures. These questions were divided 
into four categories: Very specific questions, specific questions, general questions, and 
“I don’t know” questions. The correct responses and “confabulations” were scored by the 
Table 3   Inter-rater reliability (intra-class correlation coefficients) of the categories 
of the Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List (NVCL-20) for all participants, 
Korsakoff group (KS) and alcoholic control group (ALC).
NVCL-20 category All participants
(N=33)
KS
(n=19)
ALC
(n=14)
Spontaneous confabulation .78 .79 .64
Provoked confabulation .62 .50 .62
Memory and orientation .80 .77 .73
Total confabulation score .79 .76 .68
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investigator. Again, incorrect responses to “I don’t know” questions represented potential 
confabulatory responses. The total number of correct answers and the total number of 
intrusions on the PCT were used for the analyses in this study.
Participants and analyses: The confabulation battery and PCT were administered to 
the initial group of 42 participants, but one of these participants declined to participate. 
Therefore, confabulation battery and PCT scores of 41 participants were available. Scores 
on the NVCL-20 categories were available for the total sample of 52 participants. 
 Because of a floor effect on the NVCL-20 found in the alcoholic control group, it was 
decided to use only the scores from the Korsakoff group in the correlational analyses. 
Firstly, one-tailed Spearman correlations between the total score and category scores on 
the NVCL-20 were calculated using the scores from the Korsakoff group (n = 28). Next, 
one-tailed Spearman correlations were computed between the NVCL-20 category and 
total scores and the total scores on the confabulation battery and PCT. For these analyses, 
the data from 24 Korsakoff’s syndrome were used, as the confabulation battery and PCT 
were not administered in all participants, only to the initial group of 42 participants 
(consisting of 24 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, 18 alcoholic controls). Subsequently, 
one-tailed Spearman correlations were computed between the NVCL-20 category and 
total scores and the confabulation scores on the confabulation battery and PCT, using data 
from these 24 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome.
Results: The results from the correlational analyses are presented in Table 4. The total 
and category scores on the NVCL-20 correlated significantly with one another, ranging 
from .59 (spontaneous confabulation and memory and orientation) to .92 (total score and 
spontaneous confabulation). Validating the NVCL-20 total and category scores against 
the confabulation battery and the PCT total scores showed that participants with higher 
numbers of correct answers on the confabulation battery and PCT were less likely to 
confabulate, according to the NVCL-20. These significant correlations ranged from rs = -.39 
(NVCL-20 provoked confabulation and confabulation battery total score) to rs = -.57 
(NVCL-20 total score and PCT total score). The only relation that failed to be significant was 
between the NVCL-20 spontaneous confabulation category and the confabulation battery 
total score. 
 Validating the NVCL-20 total and category scores against the confabulation scores of 
the confabulation battery and the PCT showed that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome 
who confabulated on the NVCL-20, also confabulated on the PCT. These significant 
correlations ranged from .39 (provoked confabulation) to .51 (total score). The confabulation 
battery confabulation score did not significantly correlate with any of the NVCL-20 scores. 
The correlations between the spontaneous and provoked confabulation categories of the 
NVCL-20 and measures from the other instruments did not differ.
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 The PCT and confabulation battery total correct scores correlated significantly (rs = .47). 
Participants who obtained higher scores on the confabulation battery performed better 
on the PCT. However, the confabulation battery and PCT confabulation scores did not 
correlate significantly. 
Predicted differences based on diagnostic groups
Participants and analyses: The scores from 52 participants (28 Korsakoff’s syndrome and 
24 alcoholic controls) were used to compare group differences on the NVCL-20. The scores 
of 41 participants (24 Korsakoff’s and 17 alcoholic controls; only the scores given by the 
primary caregiver) were used to compare group differences on the confabulation battery 
and PCT. Shapiro-Wilk tests showed that the data obtained with the NVCL-20 were not 
normally distributed (all ps <.001). This could be explained by floor effects, particularly 
found in the alcoholic control group. Therefore, the differences in performances on the 
NVCL-20 between the two groups were therefore analyzed using Mann-Whitney U tests. 
Results: Results on the NVCL-20, confabulation battery, and PCT are presented in Table 5, 
showing that the Korsakoff group had significantly higher total scores (U = 91.50 , p = <.001), 
spontaneous confabulation scores (U = 153.00, p = .001), provoked confabulation scores 
(U = 101.50, p = <.001), and memory and orientation scores (U = 114.50, p = <.001) than 
the alcoholic control group. 
 When looking at the performance on the confabulation battery and PCT (which were 
also not normally distributed), almost no differences were found between the groups. The 
only significant difference was found for the “I don’t know”-episodic items on the 
confabulation battery (U = 131.00, p = .049), where the alcoholic controls had higher 
confabulation scores than the patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. We also included delay 
between admission and administration as a covariate in the above analysis, but found no 
significant contribution.
Relation between time of admission and administration of the NVCL-20
Participants and analyses: We examined whether the frequency of confabulations 
diminished over time. The NVCL-20 category scores from 28 patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome (only the scores given by the primary caregiver) and the time between 
admission and administration (in weeks) were used for the analysis. There was a mean 
delay of 25.32 weeks (range: 1 week to 78 weeks) between admission and administration 
of the NVCL-20. Spearman correlations (two-tailed) were computed between scores and 
the delay between admission and administration of the scale.
Results: In the Korsakoff group, no significant correlations were found between spontaneous 
confabulations (rs = -.06), provoked confabulations (rs = -.16), and memory and orientation 
(rs = -.29), and the durations between admission and administration of the NVCL-20.
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Confabulation in relation to memory, intrusions and executive function
Participants and analyses: As addressed earlier, a floor effect was found in the alcoholic 
control group on the NVCL-20. Therefore, only data from the Korsakoff group were used 
in the correlational analyses. The NVCL-20 was administered to the total sample of 
52 participants (28 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, 24 alcoholic controls). The 
confabulation battery and PCT were administered to the initial sample of 42 participants 
(24 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, 18 alcoholic controls). For the correlational analyses 
between the NVCL-20 and neuropsychological test scores, the results from 28 patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome were used. For the analyses between the confabulation battery 
and PCT and the neuropsychological test results, scores from 24 patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome were used.
Table 5   Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for performances on 
Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List (NVCL-20), Provoked Confabulation Test 
(PCT), and confabulation battery (CB).
Confabulation measures KS ALC p-value
NVCL-20 (n = 28) (n = 24)
Total Score 35.73 (13.90) 24.15 (6.53) <.001
Spontaneous 14.0 (6.4) 10.3 (2.8) <.001
Provoked 7.5 (2.8) 4.5 (2.2) <.001
Memory&Orientation 9.3 (4.6) 5.7 (1.5) <.001
CB (n = 24) (n = 17)
Total correct score 47.9 (4.6) 50.6 (6.0) n.s.
Total confabulation score 7.8 (3.5) 8.4 (5.2) n.s.
Autobiographic-semantic 0.1 (0.3) 0.2 (0.7) n.s.
Autobiographic-episodic 1.0 (1.2) 0.6 (1.0) n.s.
Semantisch 0.6 (0.9) 0.7 (1.2) n.s.
Prospective 1.8 (1.4) 1.4 (1.3) n.s.
Orientation 0.2 (0.4) 0.1 (0.2) n.s.
‘I don’t know’ episodic 2.3 (1.6) 3.4 (1.7) <.05
‘I don’t know’ semantic 1.7 (1.4) 2.0 (1.7) n.s.
PCT (n = 24) (n = 17)
Correct answers 16.9 (2.2) 17.4 (1.9) n.s.
Provoked confabulations 1.3 (1.0) 1.1 (0.9) n.s.
Note. Korsakoff group (KS) and alcoholic control group (ALC). N.s., non-significant results (p = >.05) were 
obtained.
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 The raw RBMT-3 and CVLT results were converted to standardized Z-scores. For the 
RBMT-3, the screening score was used. For the CVLT, the total number of correct answers 
on the five learning trials was used. Subsequently, a memory composite score was calculated, 
by averaging the RBMT-3 and CVLT Z-scores. Z-scores were also calculated for the TMT 
interference score, TOL total score, Mazes total score and Stroop interference score, and 
combined in an executive function composite score in the same way as described above. 
Z-scores were also calculated for the total number of intrusions on all CVLT trials. This score 
was used as the intrusion score. Spearman rank correlations were calculated to relate the 
NVCL-20, confabulation battery, and PCT confabulation scores to performance on the 
individual neuropsychological tests, the intrusion score and the memory and executive 
function composite scores (see Table 6).
Results: The results from the correlational analyses are presented in Table 6. A significant, 
negative correlation was found between memory composite score and the total 
confabulation score of the NVCL-20 (rs = -.50). Participants who obtained higher scores on 
the memory tests had a lower total confabulation score on the NVCL-20. Significant, 
negative correlations were also found between the total score of the NVCL-20 and the 
Table 6   Spearman correlations between confabulation scores on confabulation 
instruments, individual neuropsychological tests, and composite scores of 
neuropsychological tests in Korsakoff participants.
Neuropsychological Tests NVCL-20 CB PCT
Memory (composite) -.503* -.030 -.329
RBMT-3 -.474* -.038 -.268
CVLT -.433* .062 -.328
Executive functions (composite) -.277 .012 -.298
TMT -.009 -.065 .018
TOL -.299 -.063 -.288
Mazes -.169 -.120 -.132
Stroop task .155 .340 -.137
Intrusions .032 .165 .273
Note. NVCL-20, total score of the Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List; PCT, confabulation score of the  Provoked 
 confabulation test; CB, confabulation score on the Confabulation battery; RBMT-3, screeningscore on the 
 Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test-3; CVLT, total number of correct responses on all trials of the California Verbal 
Learning Test; TMT, interference score on the Trail Making Test D-KEFS, TOL, total score on the Tower of London; 
Mazes, total score on the Mazes subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children; Stroop, interference 
score on the Stroop Color-Word Test; Intrusions, total number of intrusions on all trials of the CVLT.
* p <.50; ** p <.010; *** p <.001
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individual memory tests (RBMT, rs = -.47; CVLT, rs = -.43). No significant correlations were 
found between the memory scores (composite score or subtest scores) and the 
confabulation scores of the confabulation battery and PCT. No significant correlations 
were found between the intrusion score and the confabulation scores on the NVCL-20, 
confabulation battery, and PCT. None of the executive tests (neither the composite nor 
the individual executive test scores) correlated significantly with any of the confabulation 
measures. 
Discussion
The aim of this study was to develop a reliable and valid observation scale for quantifying 
confabulatory behavior. We wanted to include spontaneous and provoked confabulations, 
as well as memory and orientation. Criteria were that the instrument had to be convenient 
for use in clinical practice; therefore, it had to be brief and easy to administer. On the basis of 
a literature search, expert opinion, and evaluation of professional caregivers, the NVCL-20 
was constructed. It consisted of a third-party observation scale containing 20 items.
 A “fair” inter-rater reliability was found only for provoked confabulations in the Korsakoff 
group. Obviously, ratings on observation scales always reflect subjective assessments by a 
caregiver and, as a result, may be prone to biased responding. For instance, neither the 
primary nor the secondary caregivers were blind for diagnosis, which may have affected 
the ratings. The fair inter-rater reliability might indicate that this might be particularly so 
for the provoked confabulation category in the Korsakoff group. Hence, it would be 
valuable for future studies to complete the NVCL-20 in a group of observers who are blind 
for diagnosis. 
 Internal consistency was excellent for spontaneous confabulation, and good-to- 
excellent for the provoked confabulation, and for memory and orientation. Internal 
consistency could not be calculated for spontaneous confabulation in the alcoholic 
control group, due to low variance. Almost no confabulatory behavior was observed in 
the control group, which is what one would expect to find in this non-Korsakoff group. 
Internal consistency was excellent for the total confabulation score.
 The relation between the NVCL-20 and the confabulation battery and PCT was 
investigated to examine whether and how it was related to other instruments that are 
assumed to measure the same construct. We found that patients who confabulated 
according to the NVCL-20 had lower total correct scores on the confabulation battery and 
PCT. Moreover, participants who were awarded high NVCL-20 scores by caregivers also 
obtained high scores on the PCT, which supports the concurrent validity of the NVCL-20. 
However, implications of two further results must be considered. First, both spontaneous 
and provoked confabulation categories of the NVCL-20 correlated significantly with the 
PCT confabulation score. This suggests that these categories might not represent distinct 
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processes. However, differentiating between these forms of confabulation remains 
difficult, because provoked and spontaneous confabulation may be correlated constructs. 
Next, the NVCL-20 and PCT did not correlate with the confabulation battery confabulation 
score. This latter finding is noteworthy, as the three instruments aim to quantify the same 
underlying construct. An explanation might lie in the nature and scoring of the 
confabulation battery items. It is difficult to distinguish whether participants are guessing, 
rather than actually confabulating. For instance, when asking: ‘The minister of foreign affairs 
from the United States of America had to resign because of what affair?’ a participant answered: 
‘Monica Lewinsky’ when the correct response should be: ‘I don’t know’. The confabulation 
battery scoring considers this as a confabulation. However, the participant might also have 
tried to guess what a possible correct answer might have been. This is qualitatively 
different from confabulation, as the participant is aware of the incorrect nature of their 
response. As a result, the confabulation battery confabulation score might reflect a 
qualitatively different construct from the confabulation scores of the PCT and NVCL-20.
 Large, significant differences were found between the Korsakoff group and the 
alcoholic control group on the NVCL-20 scores for spontaneous and provoked, memory 
and orientation, and the total confabulation score. The patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome 
showed more spontaneous and provoked confabulations. They also made more memory 
and orientation errors. Almost none of the patients in the alcoholic control group 
produced spontaneous confabulations on the NVCL-20. Thus, the NVCL-20 is able to 
distinguish between patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and alcoholic controls. Some 
studies have noted that confabulations are more commonly seen early after the onset of 
the syndrome and improve over time (Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Schnider, Ptak, von 
Däniken, & Remonda, 2000). This study did not find that spontaneous confabulation, 
provoked confabulation, and memory and orientation scores declined over time in 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. 
 The literature on confabulation is conflicting with regard to the relation between 
confabulation behavior and executive functions. Spontaneous confabulation is thought 
often to result from of (orbito-) frontal or ventromedial frontal pathology (Kopelman, 
2010). However, several studies failed to demonstrate significant correlations between 
confabulations (as measured with the PCT and confabulation battery) and tests considered 
to be sensitive to executive dysfunction (Cooper et al., 2006; Dalla Barba et al., 1999; Kessels 
et al., 2008). In the present investigation, no significant correlations were found as well 
between the total confabulation score of the NVCL-20 and performance on executive 
function tests. The findings above might be in agreement with Schnider et al., (1996) who 
suggested that standard tests of executive dysfunction (such as those included in this 
study; TMT, TOL Strool Test, and Mazes) might not reveal the specific frontal dysfunction 
underlying confabulatory behavior. In addition, Schnider et al. (1996) suggested that the 
presence of temporal-order recognition failure might set confabulating patients apart 
from other amnesiacs. An example of a temporal-order task is described in Shimamura, 
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Janowsky, and Squire (1990). In this study, participants were presented a list of 15 words. 
Subsequently, they were asked to reproduce the list order from a random array of words. 
Tasks measuring this type of executive dysfunction might relate to confabulation as 
measured with the NVCL-20. 
 With respect to other neuropsychological tests, we found strong correlations 
between confabulation behavior as measured on the NVLC-20, and scores of memory 
function. The total score of the NVCL-20, however, did not correlate significantly with the 
intrusion score of the CVLT. This indicates that, although maybe related, confabulations 
and intrusions may be two phenomena that are dissociated (see also Kessels et al., 2008). 
Therefore, using intrusions as an index for confabulations may not be justified. The 
confabulation scores of the confabulation battery and the PCT did not show significant 
correlations with any of the composite or individual test scores. 
 These results point towards relations between confabulations and memory. It must 
be noted that the NVCL-20 scores were generally obtained at a later date than the data 
from neuropsychological testing. However, we found no significant contribution for this 
covariate when examining the predicted differences based on diagnostic groups, 
indicating that the NVCL-20 scores were not influenced by delay between admission and 
administration. 
 A strength of the NVCL-20 is that confabulation scores can be obtained through the 
observations of caregivers. This makes it possible to obtain a standardized measure for 
spontaneous confabulation, which is not available to date. Several limitations of our study 
should also be acknowledged. Since no objective measure of spontaneous confabulation 
exists, the groups were categorized on the basis of their diagnosis, assuming that patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome are more likely to produce confabulations than alcoholic 
controls. In this study, we aimed to provide such a measure, so that in the future, groups 
can be selected based on their confabulation behavior. Furthermore, it remains uncertain 
whether the spontaneous and provoked confabulation categories of the NVCL-20 reflect 
distinct cognitive categories, rather than a single underlying process. Based on the 
content of the items, we expected to distinguish two different phenomena. However, the 
results for these categories were largely similar throughout this study. 
 Performing a factor analysis would be helpful in gaining more insight into the validity 
of the three category structure that we proposed. Depending on how low the 
communalities are, the number of factors, and the indicators per factor, sample sizes 
ranging from 100 to 300 would be needed (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999). 
With the present sample size, execution of a factor analysis for the NVCL-20 was not 
possible. A large scale study would be required to validate these instruments further. A 
larger sample size would also make it possible to perform receiver operating characteristic 
analyses to examine sensitivity and specificity, and to determine a potential cutoff score 
for determining confabulation in Korsakoff’s syndrome. For now, scores regarding 
provoked confabulation and spontaneous confabulation obtained with the NVCL-20 must 
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be interpreted with some caution, as they might not reflect distinct neurocognitive 
constructs. Also, although results of this study demonstrated good internal consistency and 
inter-rater agreement, significant group differences on the NVCL-20, positive correlations 
with the PCT confabulation score and the memory composite score, the interpretation 
and generalization of the present results need to be considered with caution in the light 
of the small sample size in this study. 
 It would be interesting to administer the NVCL-20 to other patient groups who are 
known to produce confabulations, for example patients with Alzheimer’s disease or 
patients with ruptured anterior communicating artery aneurysms. Confabulations in 
these patients groups are often based on observations, or the number of intrusions they 
make on memory tests are interpreted as confabulations (Kern, Gorb, Cummings, Brown, 
& Osato, 1992). The reliability and validity of these methods is questionable, and the latter 
method measures only provoked confabulation. Moreover, significant relationships 
between intrusions on memory tests and measures of confabulation have not consistently 
been found (Kessels et al., 2008). Therefore, the NVCL-20 is a valuable addition to the range of 
available assessments for confabulations. The NVCL-20 could also be helpful in quantifying 
the patterns of spontaneous and provoked confabulation in these other patient groups.
 To summarize, the NVCL-20 is capable of distinguishing between patients with 
Korsakoff’s syndrome (confabulating patients) and a non-confabulating alcoholic control 
group. The categories of the NVCL-20 have good-to-excellent internal consistency and 
inter-rater agreement. Strong correlations with tests measuring executive functions were 
not found, possibly because the prefrontal control mechanism linked to confabulations is 
distinct from the executive tests used. Strong correlations with memory tests were found. 
We propose to expand this study in a larger sample of patients, including other diagnostic 
groups, in order to examine further the underlying category structure of the observation 
scale. 
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Abstract
Objective: Intrusions on verbal memory tests have been used as an index for clinical 
confabulation. Severe memory impairments in combination with executive dysfunction 
have been suggested to be the underlying mechanism of confabulation, but to date, 
this relation is unclear. The aim of this study was to examine (a) the relation between 
(different types of) intrusions and confabulations in a large sample of confabulating 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and (b) to investigate whether different measures of 
executive functioning and memory performance are related to provoked and spontaneous 
confabulation. 
Method: The Dutch version of the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT) and various 
executive function and memory tests were administered to a group of 51 confabulating 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. Professional caregivers rated the severity of provoked 
and spontaneous confabulation behavior of the patients using the Nijmegen-Venray 
Confabulation List (NVCL-20). 
Results: The total number of intrusions on the CVLT was not related to either provoked 
or spontaneous confabulation scores. None of the CVLT intrusion scores correlated 
significantly with any of the confabulation scores, but we did find small-to-medium, 
positive correlations between unrelated intrusions and both provoked confabulations 
and spontaneous confabulation. Provoked confabulation behavior was associated with 
executive dysfunction and poorer memory performances. Spontaneous confabulations 
was not related to performance on measures of executive function and memory.
Conclusions: The total number of intrusions on verbal memory tests and clinical 
confabulations appear to be different phenomena. Only unrelated intrusions produced 
on the CVLT might possibly be related to confabulations. The production of provoked, but 
not spontaneous confabulation, is associated with executive dysfunction and memory 
deficits.
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Introduction
Confabulations can be defined as unintentionally produced actions and statements that 
are incongruent with the present situation, and are frequently observed in amnesic 
patients (Cooper, Shanks, & Venneri, 2006; Dalla Barba, 1993). Confabulation has also been 
referred to as “honest lying”, since people who confabulate are not aware of the falseness of 
their statements (Moscovitch, 1989). Several distinctions between forms of confabulation 
have been proposed. Kopelman (1987) introduced a dichotomy which focused mainly 
on the evocation of confabulations as a crucial factor, and proposed to distinguish between 
provoked and spontaneous confabulations. He stated that whereas spontaneous 
confabulation may result from the superimposition of frontal dysfunction on an organic 
amnesia, provoked confabulation may reflect a normal response to a faulty memory (p. 
1482). More recently, Schnider (2008) argued that this dichotomy might not cover all 
aspects of confabulations and proposed a classification system that distinguishes four 
forms of confabulation: (Simple) Provoked confabulations are intrusions on memory tests; 
momentary confabulations are false verbal statements produced in a discussion or a 
situations eliciting a person to respond; behaviorally spontaneous confabulations 
emphasize the combination of confusion in reality and acting upon these false ideas, 
which occurs in patients with amnesia and disorientation. Finally, fantastic confabulations 
have no basis in reality and are implausible (Schnider, 2008).
 Provoked confabulations can occur in many diseases (even in healthy people) and 
do not seem to have a specific anatomical basis (Schnider, 2008). In patient groups, they 
have often been linked with amnesia, which is consistent with Kopelman’s (1987) 
description of provoked confabulations. However, conflicting results have been found 
in studies correlating provoked confabulations with neuropsychological measures of 
memory. Some studies demonstrated significant positive relations between provoked 
confabulations (i.e., intrusions on the California Verbal Learning Test; CVLT: Delis, Kramer, 
Kaplan, & Ober, 1987) and memory performance (on the CLVT; Kopelman, 1987; Schnider 
et al., 1996). Other studies did not find significant correlations between measures of 
memory and provoked confabulations (Kapur & Couglan , 1980; Schnider, von Daniken, & 
Gutbrod, 1997). Therefore, Schnider (1996, 2008) concluded that provoked confabulations 
are not reliably associated with the degree of amnesia. However, provoked confabulations 
have mostly been measured by the number of intrusions on word-list learning tasks. 
Examination of the relation between provoked confabulation and measures of memory 
functioning may be informative when using measures better suited to examine provoked 
confabulation, such as the Provoked Confabulation Test (Cooper et al., 2006) or the 
Nijmegen- Venray Confabulation List (NVCL-20; Rensen et al., 2015).
 Several mechanisms have been proposed to underlie spontaneous confabulation 
behavior. One theoretical account suggests that temporal context confusion might set 
spontaneously confabulating patients apart from non-confabulating amnesic patients 
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(Dalla Barba, Nedjam, & Dubois, 1999; Schnider & Ptak, 1999; Schnider, Ptak, von Däniken, 
& Remonda, 2000). This might result from an inability to suppress previously activated, 
but currently irrelevant, memory traces that may guide their behavior. For example, 
spontaneous confabulators show problems with recognizing the temporal order of stored 
information (Schnider et al., 1996). Another hypothesis is that spontaneous confabulations 
may arise from executive dysfunction in addition to severe memory impairments (Burgess 
& McNeil, 1999; Fischer, Alexander, D’Esposito, & Otto, 1995; Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; 
Stuss, Alexander, Lieberman, & Levine, 1978). Fischer et al. (1995) proposed that the extent 
of executive dysfunctions, in addition to the presence of memory deficits, determines the 
severity of confabulating behavior. Poor strategic and monitoring capacities (Moscovitch 
& Melo, 1997), resulting in problems such as formulating a memory strategy, specifying 
appropriate cues, guiding search, and evaluating retrieved memories (Gilboa et al., 2006; 
Metcalf, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2010; Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002) have also been argued 
to result in spontaneous confabulations. In their review, Gilboa and Moscovitch (2002) 
noted that in 81% of 79 spontaneous confabulators the prefrontal cortex was affected. 
Especially damage to the ventromedial and/or oribitofrontal regions might result in 
spontaneous confabulation behavior (for a review, see Kopelman, 2015). Although 
spontaneous confabulations have been linked to frontal damage and executive dysfunction, 
several studies demonstrated that there was no relation between performance on 
executive measures and confabulation behavior (Cooper et al., 2006; Rensen et al., 2015; 
Schnider et al., 1996; Schnider & Ptak, 1999). The relationship between spontaneous 
confabulation and executive dysfunction remains unclear and has never been explored 
in large sample sizes. 
 Several studies attempted to quantify confabulation behavior using intrusions on 
word and story recall tasks (De Anna et al., 2008; Kopelman, 1987; Schnider, von Däniken, 
& Gutbrod, 1996). However, the relation between memory intrusions and confabulation 
behavior has not clearly been established. So far, studies failed to find significant 
correlations between intrusions produced on the CVLT and provoked or spontaneous 
confabulations as determined by clinical reports, confabulation batteries or observation 
scales (Kessels, Kortrijk, Wester, & Nys, 2008; Nahum, Bouzerda-Wahlen, Guggisberg, Ptak, 
& Schnider, 2012; Rensen et al., 2015). The results from these studies indicate that intrusions 
and confabulations might represent dissociated phenomena, possibly with different 
underlying cognitive mechanisms. In addition, results from studies by Gilboa et al. (2006) 
and Kan, Larocque, Lafleche, Coslett, and Verfaellie (2010) showed that the type of 
intrusions, rather than the total number of intrusions, distinguishes confabulators from 
non-confabulating groups. Specifically, false recall and recognition of semantically 
unrelated words (e.g., idiosyncratic errors, implausible lures) distinguishes confabulating 
patients from non-confabulating patients. In contrast, only examining the total number of 
intrusions might obscure this relation, possibly explaining the non-significant correlations 
found in previous studies. In the present study, we examined the relation between 
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(different types of) intrusions and provoked and spontaneous confabulation scores, and 
extended the work of Gilboa et al. (2006) and Kan et al. (2012) in a relatively large sample of 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, who are known for the production of confabulations. 
 Our first aim was to examine the relation between (different types of) intrusions and 
confabulations. We (a) examined whether the total number of intrusions on the CVLT was 
related to provoked, and spontaneous confabulations on the NVCL-20. On the basis of 
previous reports, we expected to find no significant relations (Kessels et al., 2008; Nahum 
et al., 2012; Rensen et al., 2015), and (b) we examined whether different types of intrusions 
(semantically related errors, semantically unrelated errors, proactive interference, and 
retroactive interference) were related to different forms of confabulations. Based on the 
findings by Gilboa et al. (2006) and Kan et al., (2010), we expected to find a relation between 
all confabulation behavior and semantically unrelated intrusions. Moreover, we hypothesized 
that proactive and retroactive interference measures reflect an inability to suppress 
previously activated, but currently irrelevant memory traces, and might be related to 
spontaneous confabulations. Therefore, a significant correlation between interference 
scores and spontaneous confabulations was expected. Our second aim was to investigate 
whether different measures of executive functions and memory performance were 
related to provoked and spontaneous confabulation. Spontaneous confabulations are 
often thought to arise from memory and executive problems. However, only limited evidence 
exists supporting this important role of executive control. Also, provoked confabulations 
have been related to memory deficits. 
Methods
Participants
We included 51 patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome (43 men; Mage = 58.6 years; range 
44-75). All patients met the criteria for DSM-5 Alcohol-induced major neurocognitive 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), as established by neurological, psychiatric, 
neuroradiologial, and neuropsychological examinations. In addition, the criteria for 
alcoholic Korsakoff’s syndrome had to be met: A history of malnutrition or thiamine deficit 
with evidence of a history of Wernicke encephalopathy, and a disproportionate memory 
disorder (Kopelman, Thomson, Guerrini, & Marshall, 2009). The disproportionate memory 
disorder was reflected in the performance of all patients on the CVLT: 98.1% of the 
participants were impaired (i.e., more than 1.5 standard deviations of the mean) on their 
overall performance on trials 1-5, and 94.2% of the participants showed rapid forgetting 
after delayed testing as compared to a representative norm group. None of the patients 
had any evidence of other brain pathology that could account for their condition. 
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 Diagnoses were established by a multidisciplinary expert team. All participants were 
recruited from the Centre of Excellence for Korsakoff and Alcohol-Related Cognitive 
Disorders of the Vincent van Gogh Institute for Psychiatry in Venray, the Netherlands. 
Patients’ family and medical records provided background information (including drinking 
history). All patients were abstinent from alcohol at the time of testing (Korsakoff: Mdays = 
101.2, SD = 83.9). Prior to the study patients gave their informed consent and all procedures 
were approved by the local ethics committee. Participant characteristics are presented in 
Table 1. 
Materials 
California Verbal Learning Test: The Dutch version of the California Verbal Learning Test 
(Mulder, Dekker, & Dekker, 1996) was administered to all participants. Internal consistency 
of this test is good (Cronbach’s α = .87, SE = 2.9; as reported in Mulder et al., 1996, and 
interpreted based on the guidelines as proposed by George & Mallery, 2003). The 
predictive validity, examined with discriminant analyses in Mulder et al. (1996), is also 
good. Mulder et al. (1996) demonstrated that the overall performance on trials 1-5, the 
short-delay recall and the long-delay recall were significantly lower, and the forgetting 
rate was significantly higher, in patients with Korsaskoff’s syndrome, compared with a 
healthy control group, as was predicted (examined with Tukey-B tests, with p = <.005).
 Administration started with the presentation of a 16-word shopping list (List A) to 
the participant. This shopping list contained words from four different semantic categories: 
Herbs and spices, fruits, clothing, and tools. Immediately following presentation, the 
participant was asked to freely recall as many items as possible. This was repeated four 
more times and was followed by the presentation of an interference list (List B). After free recall 
of list B, the short-delay free recall and short-delay cued recall of List A were administered. 
After a 20 minute delay period, long-delay free recall and long-delay cued recall of List A 
were administered. The total number of intrusions, that is, the total number of false 
responses when recalling words from the shopping list, was used as a dependent variable. 
 In addition, we distinguished between different types of intrusions, as specified in the 
CVLT manual (Mulder et al., 1996), namely semantically related and unrelated intrusions, 
and proactive and retroactive interference. Semantically related intrusions belonged to 
the semantic categories of List A, but were not presented. Unrelated intrusions were 
unrelated to the words of the shopping list, for example words that are not generally on 
grocery lists or non-words. The recollection of items from list A, when list B was targeted, 
was considered as proactive interference. The recollection of items from list B, when list A 
was targeted, was interpreted as retroactive interference. Semantically related and 
unrelated intrusions, and proactive and retroactive interference were used as dependent 
variables in the correlational analyses. As our aim was to examine intrusions, we only 
included the free- and cued-recall measures in our analyses (but not recognition 
performance).
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Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List (NVCL-20): The Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation 
List (NVCL-20; Rensen et al., 2015) was completed by the first responsible caregiver of the 
patient. The NVCL-20 is an observation scale, consisting of twenty items covering various 
aspects of confabulating behavior (e.g., “Is the content of the confabulations realistic?” and 
“Does the patient act upon his/her confabulations?”), and memory functioning. The category 
scores for provoked confabulation and spontaneous confabulation were used in this 
study. Internal consistency, as reported in Rensen et al. (2015), was good-to excellent for 
provoked confabulation (Lambda 2 = .75), and excellent for spontaneous confabulation 
(Lambda 2 = .91). It has been demonstrated that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome who 
Table 1   Participant Characteristics.
Group demographics
Age (years) 58.6 (8.1)
Sex distribution (male/female) 43/8
Education (code) 4 (1-7)a
Abstinence (days) 101.2 (83.9)
Neuropsychological testing
NART-IQ (N = 47) 93.1 (17.6)
CVLT (N = 51)
Trial 5 correct 5.7 (1.8)
Short Term Free Recall correct 1.3 (2.0)
Short Term Cued Recall correct 4.3 (2.5)
Long Term Fee Recall correct 1.3 (1.8)
Long Term Cued Recall correct 4.0 (2.4)
RBMT-3 (N = 49) 58.4 (4.6)
Stroop interference (N = 49) 129.8 (43.1)
TMT (N = 35) 168.3 (62.4)
D2 processed elements (N = 47) 301.0 (96.7)
D2 concentration performance (N = 47) 93.6 (49.8)
BADS (N = 40) 12.7 (3.1)
Mean scores with standard deviation in parentheses; Educational code, the level of formal education was 
 assessed using seven categories, based on a Dutch classification system using a 7-point rating scale, ranging 
from 1 is (less than primary education) to 7 (university degree). NART-IQ, National Adult Reading Test-IQ, CVLT, 
California Verbal Learning Test, RBMT-3, Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test-3 general memory index, TMT, Trail 
Making Test D-KEFS, d2, d2 test of attention, BADS, Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome total 
profile score
 a Median and range are displayed
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confabulated on the NVCL-20 also confabulated on the Provoked Confabulation Test 
(Rensen et al., 2015). Responsible caregivers of the patients encircled the answer that was 
most appropriate for the behavior of the patient at the time of completing the instrument. 
Questions were rated on the basis of a 5-point rating scale.
Measures of executive functions and memory: The neutral, congruent and incongruent 
conditions of the Stroop Color-Word Test (SCWT; Golden, 1978) were administered. 
An interference score (time card 3 – (time card 1 + time card 2) / (time card 1 + time card 
2)×100) was used to examine response inhibition. The Trail Making Test from the Delis- 
Kaplan Executive Function System (TMT D-KEFS, the number-letter switching condition; 
Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) was used to examine cognitive flexibility. The completion 
time in seconds was used as outcome variable. The d2 test of attention (Brickenkamp & 
Zillmer, 1998) was used, a cancellation task which is considered to be a measure of 
sustained attention. The concentration performance score (total number of correctly crossed 
out items, minus the errors of commission) and total number of processed characters 
(corrected for the number of errors) were used as dependent variables. The complete 
Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS; Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, 
Emslie, & Evans, 1996) was administered to examine executive functions in a context more 
relevant to daily life, and we used the BADS total profile score. 
 The Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test – Third Edition (RBMT-3) was administered as 
an ecologically valid test of everyday memory (Wester et al., 2014). The general memory 
index was used as a dependent variable. We examined the correct performance on the 
CVLT to measure learning and remembering of new verbal information. The total number 
of correctly recalled elements on Trial 5, short delay free recall and cued recall, and long 
delay free and cued recall were used as dependent variables. 
 Neuropsychological tests were administered as part of a standard neuropsychological 
assessment, which took place after admission of the patients to the Vincent van Gogh 
Institute. The total sample of patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome completed the CVLT. 
Two participants did not complete the RBMT-3, two participants did not complete the 
Stroop Color-Word Test, and four participants did not complete the d2 Test of Attention 
due to lack of motivation or an inability to perform the task. The TMT D-KEFS was 
administered in 35 participants, because this tests was added to the assessment battery 
at a later point in time. The total profile score of the BADS could be obtained for 
40 participants. The other participants did not complete all subtests of the BADS. 
The scores on the neuropsychological tests are presented in Table 1.
Statistical analysis
Relation between intrusions and confabulations: Spearman correlation coefficients 
(one-tailed) were calculated for all analyses, as our data were not normally distributed. 
Ratio scores (intrusions corrected for the total number of recalled elements on the CVLT) 
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were used in the analyses, as we assumed relative scores to be a more valid indicator of 
the tendency to produce intrusions than raw scores. We calculated correlations between 
the ratio of total number of intrusions on the CVLT and provoked and spontaneous 
confabulation scores on the NVCL-20. To examine whether different types of intrusions 
were related to different types of confabulation, correlations were calculated between 
ratios of semantically related and unrelated intrusions, proactive interference and retroactive 
interference raw scores on the CVLT and provoked and spontaneous confabulations on 
the NVCL-20. 
Relation between confabulation, executive function, and memory: First, correlations 
were calculated between provoked and spontaneous confabulations on the NVCL-20 and 
the individual neuropsychological raw test scores. The SCWT interference score and TMT 
D-KEFS number-letter switching score were inversed (i.e., × -1), so that higher scores on 
neuropsychological tests always represented better performances. Second, correlations 
between confabulations and executive function compound score and a memory compound 
score were calculated. To construct these compound scores, we first examined the 
 interrelationship between the neuropsychological tests. Subsequently, these executive 
functions and memory variables were converted to standardized Z-scores and subsequently, 
an executive compound score and a memory compound score were calculated. Correlations 
were calculated to relate provoked and spontaneous confabulations on the NVCL-20 to 
the executive and memory compound scores.
Results
All patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome displayed confabulation behavior on the NVCL-20. 
Moreover, all of the patients who produced spontaneous confabulations, also produced 
provoked confabulations. Seven patients only produced provoked confabulations. The 
means and standard deviations of the confabulation scores on the NVCL-20 and intrusions 
on the CVLT are presented in Table 2. The total number of correctly recalled elements on 
trials 1-5 of CVLT was > 3 standard deviations below that of the control norm group. 
Moreover, the patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome in this study showed an increased 
tendency (>1.5 standard deviation from the norm) to produce semantic intrusions on the 
CVLT compared with a control norm group. The production of unrelated intrusions, 
proactive interference, and retroactive interference was normal (mean standard deviations 
from the norm ranging between -1.5 and +1.5) compared to a norm group.
Relation between intrusions and confabulations
Correlations between (different types of) intrusions and confabulations are presented in 
Table 3. Correlations between the total intrusion score on the CVLT and provoked and 
70
CHAPTER 4
spontaneous confabulation scores were not statistically significant. None of the CVLT 
intrusion scores correlated significantly with any of the confabulation scores. We did find 
small-to-medium, positive correlations between semantically unrelated intrusions on the 
CVLT and both provoked confabulations (rs =.20, p = .083) and spontaneous confabulation 
(rs =.20, p = .075) on the NVCL-20, but these correlations were not significant. 
Relation between confabulation, executive function, and memory
Neuropsychological tests that significantly correlated with one another were used to 
construct the compound scores. For the executive function composite, we found that 
Table 2   Mean and standard deviations of intrusions and confabulations in 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome.
Raw scores Ratio scores
Intrusions (CVLT)
Total recalled elements 60.3 (21.5)
Total intrusions 18.3 (12.3) 0.3 (0.1)
Semantically related 12.2 (9.1) 0.2 (0.1)
Semantically unrelated 3.7 (5.1) 0.1 (0.1)
Proactive interference 0.6 (0.9) 0.0 (0.0)
Retroactive interference 1.8 (1.9) 0.0 (0.0)
Confabulation scores (NVCL-20)
Spontaneous confabulations 15.7 (6.9)
Provoked confabulations 9.5 (2.7)
NVCL-20 = Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List-20; CVLT = California Verbal Learning Test. NVCL-20 minimum 
scores are not equal to 0. Minimum scores are: spontaneous confabulation = 9, provoked confabulation = 3.
Table 3   One-tailed Spearman correlations among provoked and spontaneous 
confabulations and ratios of intrusions in the Korsakoff group.
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SCWT interference, the d2 concentration performance score, and the d2 processed 
elements correlated significantly with one another (ranging from rs = .44 to rs = 59). For the 
memory composite score, we found that all memory measures (RBMT-3 general memory 
index, correct answers on CVLT trial 5, short delay free recall and cued recall, and long 
delay free and cued recall) correlated significantly with one another (ranging from rs = .36 
to rs = 59).
 Correlations among provoked and spontaneous confabulations and neuropsycho-
logical test scores are presented in Table 4. We found a small-to-medium, negative correlation 
between the executive compound score and provoked confabulations (rs = -.23, p = .058). 
There was no significant correlation between the executive compound score and spontaneous 
confabulations. With respect to the individual neuropsychological tests we found negative 
correlations between provoked confabulations and SCWT interference (rs = -.23, p = .058, 
small-to-medium effect), the d2 concentration performance (rs = .-.30, p = .021, medium 
Table 4   One-tailed Spearman correlations among provoked and spontaneous 
confabulations, executive functions, and memory in patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome.
Provoked
confabulations
Spontaneous 
confabulations
Memory (compound) (N = 49) -.37** -.09
CVLT Trial 5 correct (N = 51) -.22 -.13
CVLT Short Term Free Recall correct -.37** -.11
CVLT Short Term Cued Recall correct -.23 -.05
CVLT Long Term Fee Recall correct -.18 .15
CVLT Long Term Cued Recall correct -.22 .15
RBMT-3 (N=49) -.38** -.10
Executive functioning (compound) (N = 47) -.23 -.04
Stroop task (N = 49) -.23 -.14
TMT (N = 35) .02 .12
d2 concentration performance (N = 47) -.30* -.07
d2 processed elements (N = 47) -.09 .03
BADS (N = 40) -.26 -.12
NVCL-20, Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List; CVLT, California Verbal Learning Test; RBMT-3 general memory 
index on the Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test-3; Stroop task, interference score on the Stroop Color-Word 
Test; TMT, interference score on the Trail Making Test D-KEFS, d2, d2 test of attention; BADS, total profile score 
on the Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome.
**p = <.01, * p <.05
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effect), and the BADS total profile score (rs = -.26, p = .053, small-to-medium effect). 
None of the executive subtests correlated with spontaneous confabulations. 
 We found a medium, negative correlation between the memory compound score 
and provoked confabulations (rs = -.37, p = .004) in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. 
There was no significant correlation between spontaneous confabulations and the memory 
compound score. Negative correlations were found between provoked confabulations 
and the RBMT general memory index (rs = -.38, p = .004, medium effect), the total correct 
elements produced on trial 5 of the CVLT (rs = -.22, p = .058, small-to-medium effect), 
short delay free recall condition of the CVLT (rs = -.37, p = .004, medium effect), 
short delay cued recall condition of the CVLT (rs = -.23, p = .055, small-to-medium effect), 
and long delay cued recall on the CVLT (rs = -.22, p = .058, small-to-medium effect). 
No significant relations were found between provoked confabulation scores and long- 
delay free recall. None of the memory subtests correlated with spontaneous confabulations. 
Discussion
This is the first study to systematically examine the relation between (different types of) 
intrusions and confabulations in a large sample of confabulating patients with Korsakoff’s 
amnesia. The two main aims of this study were (a) to examine the relation between 
(different types of) intrusions and confabulations in a large sample of confabulating 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and (b) to investigate whether different measures of 
executive functions and memory performance are related to provoked and spontaneous 
confabulation. Overcoming limitations of previous studies by using standardized measures 
of confabulation in a large group of patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, we found that the 
results from the present study extend previous findings, as no relation between total 
number of intrusions on the CVLT and provoked and spontaneous confabulation scores 
was found (Kessels et al., 2008; Nahum et al., 2012; Rensen et al., 2015). Moreover, examining 
different types of intrusions suggested that intrusions are not related to confabulations, 
with the probable exception of unrelated intrusions. With respect to our second aim, the 
executive functions and memory compound and subtests correlated significantly with 
provoked but not spontaneous confabulation scores. Patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome 
with higher provoked confabulation scores, had lower scores on the executive functions 
and memory measures. 
Relation between intrusions and confabulations
We hypothesized that distinguishing between semantically related and unrelated 
intrusions and proactive and retroactive interference, instead of examining total intrusion 
scores, might disclose more clear relations with confabulations. We found that only 
unrelated intrusions might potentially be related to both provoked and spontaneous 
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confabulations on the NVCL-20. We did not find significant relations, but the effects were 
small-to-medium. The lack of significance might have been the result of the sample size 
of the study. Although the sample in this study is relatively large for the population, it is 
relatively small for the performed tests. A larger sample would increase the power of the 
statistical tests, possibly showing significant relations. Semantically related intrusions and 
confabulation scores were unrelated to confabulations. The results of this study are in line 
with the conclusion drawn by Gilboa et al. (2006) and Kan et al. (2010) that the production 
of semantically unrelated intrusions might set confabulators apart from non-confabulat-
ing patient groups. Semantically related intrusions might be the result of intruding, highly 
related associations, and Kan et al. (2010) noted that these types of associations place high 
demands on monitoring processes. This might even be difficult for non-confabulators. 
Unrelated intrusions might resemble confabulations. Future studies might replicate this 
findings in a larger sample of confabulating patients. 
 The production of semantically unrelated intrusions might be the result of an 
overactive associative system or an inability to determine the source of the information. It 
has been proposed that confabulators may over-process task irrelevant information (Kan 
et al., 2010). Hence, presentation of the CVLT word list might activate strongly associated 
words, such as semantically related ones (i.e., from the same categories as the words on 
the CVLT), but an overly active associative system might also result in activation of 
unrelated words. Source monitoring theory states that confabulating patients have a 
tendency to misidentify imagined events as real, possibly inaccurately accepting the 
imagined words (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Turner, Cipolotti, & Shallice, 2010). 
As a result, imagined words (semantically related or not) might be falsely accepted as 
presented words. Because of impaired monitoring processes, not only the semantically 
related, but also the unrelated intrusions are not noticed and corrected (Gilboa et al., 2006; 
Kan et al., 2010). These mechanisms might also underlie confabulations.
 Contrary to our expectations, we did not find significant relations between the 
interference scores and spontaneous confabulation (or any of the other confabulation 
scores). It has previously been demonstrated that confabulators fail to suppress currently 
irrelevant memory traces (Schnider & Ptak, 1999). We hypothesized that proactive and 
retroactive interference on the CVLT might reflect a failure to inhibit previously learned 
items from list A, when recalling items from list B (or vice versa). However, interference on 
memory tasks is not the same construct as confabulations. In addition, Gilboa et al. (2006) 
proposed that the inability to suppress currently irrelevant memory cues plays a major 
role in spontaneous confabulation and might be a necessary condition for spontaneous 
confabulation to occur, however, it is not sufficient as a single causal mechanism. Gilboa et 
al. (2006) proposed that temporal context confusion might be the result of a more 
encompassing failure to reconstruct memories. 
 The results of this study may have important clinical implications. Confabulation 
behavior is considered to be a characteristic clinical symptom of the syndrome (Borsutzky, 
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Fujiwara, Brand, & Markowitsch, 2008). In clinical practice, the screening of confabulatory 
tendencies may provide supplementary information about the cognitive profile of 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, and should be included in the neuropsychological 
examination. The results of this study indicate that only unrelated intrusions produced on 
the CVLT might be associated with clinical confabulations. Therefore, the clinician should 
focus on the production of this type of intrusion, rather than the total number of intrusions, 
when one wants to screen for confabulation tendencies. Moreover, when a clinician wants 
to quantify confabulation behavior, we suggest to use instruments, such as the Provoked 
Confabulation Test (Cooper et al., 2006) and the NVCL-20 (Rensen et al., 2015), which are 
designed to serve this purpose. As for research on confabulations, our results indicate that 
the total number of intrusions on memory tests is different from clinical confabulations, 
and conclusions based on the examination of total intrusions should not be extended to 
(provoked) confabulations.
Relation between confabulation, executive functions, and memory
The combination of severe memory impairments with executive dysfunction has been 
suggested as the underlying neurocognitive cause of confabulation, and spontaneous 
confabulation in particular. Interestingly, spontaneous confabulations and executive 
measures were unrelated in this study. In contrast, we did find relations between provoked 
confabulations and most of the executive measures used in this study, that is, the executive 
compound score, SCWT interference,d2 processed elements, and the BADS total profile 
score. We will provide two explanations for our findings. 
 First, the executive measures described in this study were selected because they are 
commonly used to assess executive functions in clinical practice. Possibly, the standard 
tests of executive functions may not reveal the specific prefrontal dysfunction underlying 
spontaneous confabulation. Models of confabulations suggest executive processes 
involved in strategic retrieval and memory monitoring might be related to confabulation 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2002; Moscovitch & Melo 
1997). It is not clear whether any of the standard tests used in this study tapped into these 
executive processes, which might explain the non-significant findings with spontaneous 
confabulations.
 Second, we should note that we had a number of missing data points for the neuro-
psychological tests, in particular the tests of executive functions. The participants with 
missing data might have differed in some systematic way from those with complete data. 
For example, for some patients data were missing for the d2 attention test because of an 
inability to perform the tests or lack of motivation. These patients then might have been 
“cognitively” worse than the patients who completed all executive tests, and as a result 
may have demonstrated more spontaneous confabulation behavior. Exclusion of these 
patients in the analyses might have resulted in a different pattern of results. We suggest 
that future studies should replicate these results, using fairly complete dataset. 
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 We did not find relations between spontaneous confabulations and measures of 
memory functions. However, provoked confabulations were significantly related to the 
compound memory score, as well as individual memory measures (RBMT-3, CVLT). That is, 
patients with lower memory scores produced more provoked confabulations. This is in 
agreement with the notion that provoked confabulations are often seen in and linked 
with amnesia (Schnider, 2008) and with Kopelman’s (1987) description, that ‘provoked 
confabulation may represent a normal response to a faulty memory’ (p. 1486). Some 
previous studies did not find significant correlations between measures of memory and 
provoked confabulations (Kapur & Couglan , 1980; Schnider, von Daniken, & Gutbrod, 
1997). However, these studies used the number of intrusions on word-list learning tasks as 
the provoked confabulation measure. As we have argued above, these variables may 
reflect different phenomena
Limitations
With respect to the limitations of the current study, it should be noted that we performed 
multiple tests, which increases the probability of making a Type I error. As a result, the 
findings in the sample of patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome described in this study might 
not reflect the actual pattern in the general population. We aimed to explore the relation 
between types of intrusions and different forms of confabulations, and multiple explorative 
correlational analyses were performed accordingly. We suggest that future studies should 
focus especially on the possible relation between unrelated intrusions and confabulations 
in confabulating patient groups. Moreover, we recommend the use of instruments, such 
as the Provoked Confabulation Test (Cooper et al., 2006) and the NVCL-20 (Rensen et al., 
2015), to quantify confabulation behavior in research and clinical practice, instead of (types 
of) intrusions on memory tests. In addition, we reported relations between provoked 
confabulations and measures of executive functions. However, other studies failed to find 
significant relations between these two measures (Cooper et al., 2006; Rensen et al., 2015; 
Schnider et al., 1996; Schnider & Ptak, 1999). We emphasize that the results of this study 
should be replicated in a larger group of patients.
 Second, the patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome in the current study had a rather 
broad range of abstinence. It has been demonstrated that length of abstinence might be 
associated with cognitive functions in alcoholics. In non-Korsakoff alcoholics, for example, 
impaired cognitive functions is widespread during the first months of abstinence, but 
improves over time (Fein, Bachman, Fisher, & Davenport, 1990). Moreover, improved 
performance on cognitive tests was related to increased length of abstinence in patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome (Joyce, & Robbins, 1993). Including patients with relatively short 
periods of abstinence, as was done in this study, might result in a sample of patients with 
more severe cognitive problems, and potentially increased confabulation behavior, 
compared with a sample of patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome in a nursing home, who 
might be abstinent for several years. However, Walvoort, Wester, & Egger (2013) suggest 
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that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome are already in a chronic, stable phase of syndrome 
after more than 6 weeks of abstinence (Walvoort et al., 2013). Most patients in this study, 
except for five, were abstinent for 6 weeks or more. Consequently, we believe that our 
results might be fairly representative patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome in a chronic state. 
 In order to compare samples of patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome with respect to 
confabulation behavior, it might also be helpful to include a cognitive screening instrument, 
such as the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein, Folestein, & McHugh, 1975) 
or Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA, Nasreddine et al., 2005), so that the results can 
be interpreted relative to overall level of cognitive functions. 
Conclusion
We did not find a significant relation between the total number of intrusions on the CVLT 
and provoked or spontaneous confabulation behavior. Only unrelated intrusions might 
possibly be related to confabulations. Spontaneous confabulation scores were unrelated 
to measures of executive function and memory. However, provoked confabulation 
behavior was associated with executive dysfunction and poorer memory performances. 
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Abstract
Objective: One of the symptoms of Korsakoff’s syndrome is the tendency to produce 
confabulations. Although confabulation behavior has been quantified by counting intrusions 
on word-list and story-recall tasks in some studies, the relation between confabulations 
and (types of) intrusions remains under debate. The aims of the current study were (1) to 
examine whether the nature of the story might influence the production of intrusions, 
and (2) to investigate whether different types of intrusions in both newly acquired and 
premorbidly acquired story recall were related to confabulations.
Method: Twenty-two patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome recalled three different types of 
stories: A novel story, a familiar fairy tale, and a modified familiar fairy tale (e.g., Cinderella 
went to a barbecue). The total number of intrusions produced on the different stories 
were examined. Subsequently, the different types of intrusions (interference of overlearned 
information, proactive interference, semantically related intrusions, unrelated intrusions) 
were correlated with scores on confabulation measures.
Results: Although patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome produced more intrusions in the 
modified familiar fairy tale condition compared with the recall of the familiar fairy tale, 
these intrusions were unrelated to confabulations. Only intrusions produced when recalling a 
novel story and semantically unrelated intrusions were related to confabulation behavior 
in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. 
Conclusions: Testing the memory of confabulating patients for novel stories may reveal 
the working of a mechanism underlying provoked confabulations outside test situations. 
We suggest that studies examining intrusions and confabulations should specify different 
types of intrusions and should take the nature of the to-be-remembered material into 
account.
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Introduction
Korsakoff’s syndrome is an irreversible neurological disorder, typically resulting from 
nutritional (thiamine) depletion following years of chronic alcohol abuse, in which 
memory and learning (severe anterograde and retrograde amnesia) are disproportionate-
ly affected compared with other cognitive functions (Victor, Adams, & Collins, 1971). 
A salient symptom of Korsakoff’s syndrome is the patient’s tendency to confabulate (van 
Damme & d’Ydewalle, 2010). Confabulations are false statements about experiences and 
events that never took place. As confabulating patients are not aware of the falseness of 
their statements, confabulation has also been referred to as “honest lying” (Moscovitch, 
1989). Often a distinction is made between provoked and spontaneous confabulations 
(Kopelman, 1987). Spontaneous confabulations are a rare, pathological phenomenon, 
often occurring in the context of an amnesic syndrome. Provoked confabulations, in turn, 
are more common and have been observed in both cognitively-impaired patients and 
healthy individuals. This latter phenomenon has frequently been regarded to be a 
“normal” response to a challenge of memory (e.g., a memory test, when confronted with 
leading questions) (Heidler & Eling, 2015; Kopelman, 1987; Kopelman, 2002).
 It has been repeatedly demonstrated that patients, when confabulating, retrieve 
personal semantic information, habits, overlearned information, and routines (Dalla Barba, 1993; 
Dalla Barba, Nedjam, & Dubois, 1999; La Corte, Serra, Attali, Boissé, & Dalla Barba, 2010). 
Dalla Barba and colleagues (Attali, De Anna, Dubois, & Dalla Barba, 2009; De Anna et al., 2008) 
used an experimental approach to examine whether confabulating patients suffer from 
enhanced interference from overlearned information during episodic recall. In one of their 
experiments, patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and healthy controls were requested 
to recall three different types of stories: A familiar fairy tale, a modified familiar fairy tale (e.g., 
in which Little Red Riding Hood was not eaten by the wolf), and a novel story. Another study 
(De Anna et al., 2008) showed that patients with Alzheimer’s disease produced less correct 
responses and more confabulations in the modified familiar fairy tale condition than for the 
other two stories. The confabulations in the modified fairy tale always encompassed 
elements of the original version of the story. De Anna and colleagues (2008) concluded 
that strongly embedded, semantic information interfered with the recall of unique, 
episodic representations of the modified elements and thus may result in confabulations. 
 So far, we have used the term confabulation as a synonym for what is commonly 
referred to as an intrusion on a memory test. Although confabulation behavior has been 
quantified by counting intrusions on word-list and story recall tasks in some studies (Kan, 
Larocque, Lafleche, Coslett, & Verfaellie, 2010; Kopelman, 1987; Schnider, von Däniken, & 
Gutbrod, 1996), the relation between confabulations and intrusions remains under debate. 
Some researchers have suggested that confabulations and intrusions reflect different 
phenomena, subsumed under the umbrella term of “false memories” (Borsutzky, Fujiwara, 
Brand, & Markowitch, 2010). Others have suggested that an intrusion on a memory test 
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can be considered as an example of a provoked confabulation (Attali et al., 2009). Only a 
few studies have explicitly examined the correlation between confabulation behavior and 
(the total number of) intrusions on word-list recall (Kessels, Kortrijk, Wester, & Nys, 2008; 
Nahum, Bouzerda-Wahlen, Guggisberg, Ptak, & Schnider, 2012; Rensen et al., 2015; Rensen, 
Oosterman, Walvoort, Eling, & Kessels, 2016). Interestingly, these studies failed to find a 
significant correlation, suggesting that the total number of intrusions on word-list recall 
and clinical confabulation might actually represent distinct phenomena. 
 Attali and colleagues (2009) suggested that the nature of the administered task 
determines whether one measures intrusions or confabulations. That is, the production of 
unstudied words in word-list recall may be considered intrusions, and the production of 
unstudied information in story recall may be interpreted as confabulations. However, the 
authors do not support their suggestion with empirical evidence or a clear rationale. 
Moreover, it has also been suggested (Gilboa et al., 2006) that errors in the retrieval of 
complex narratives (e.g., stories) acquired prior to the onset of the brain disorder, resemble 
confabulations in the personal domain. In that case, it can be hypothesized that errors 
during retrieval of premorbidly acquired stories are more strongly related to confabulations 
than errors during recall of newly acquired stories. So far, it has never been experimentally 
examined whether intrusions on any story recall task are related to clinical confabulations. 
Moreover, potential differences between the type of confabulations in relation to stories 
acquired before or after the brain disease have not been studied either.
 Results from several studies (Gilboa et al., 2006; Kan et al., 2010; Rensen et al., 2016) 
showed that distinguishing between types of intrusions, instead of examining the number 
of intrusions, might disclose clearer relationships with confabulations. These studies 
demonstrated that semantically unrelated (or idiosyncratic) intrusions are associated with 
the production of confabulations. In contrast, it has been reported that both confabulating 
and non-confabulating patient groups have difficulty monitoring semantically related 
intrusions (Gilboa et al., 2006; Kan et al., 2010). Semantically related intrusions (i.e., 
distortions of true details) might therefore represent a non-specific error on a memory 
recall task rather than reflecting confabulations.
 The goals of the present study were to examine how the type of to-be-remembered 
information influences the production of intrusions, and how intrusion subtypes are 
related to the production of confabulations. For this, we first examined whether the 
nature of the story might influence the production of intrusions in patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome. This approach is similar to previous studies examining patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease (Attali et al., 2009; De Anna et al., 2008). It was expected that pre-morbidly acquired, 
overlearned information would interfere with fairy tale recall, especially when familiar 
information was manipulated, as was the case in the modified fairy tale condition. 
Therefore, we expected that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome would make more 
intrusions in the fairy tale conditions compared with the novel story condition, and the 
original fairy tale condition.
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 Second, and most importantly, we correlated the different types of intrusions 
produced on different types of stories with scores on confabulation measures. We 
administered the confabulation battery developed by Dalla Barba (1993) which quantifies 
provoked confabulation behavior, and the Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List (NVCL-20, 
Rensen et al., 2015) which, in addition to provoked confabulation, also addresses aspects 
of spontaneous confabulation. We hypothesized that intrusions on fairy tales would be 
more strongly related to confabulations than intrusions produced on a novel story. Based 
on previous studies, we furthermore hypothesized that interference of overlearned 
information (e.g., not-presented information from the original fairy tale, information from 
other fairy tales), proactive interference (e.g., recalling elements from other previously 
presented stories, producing interference between the stories of the experiment), and 
unrelated intrusions (random intrusions, that did not match with the gist or semantic 
structure of the story) would be related to spontaneous confabulation. Semantically 
related intrusions (plausible intrusions, matching with the gist and semantic structure of 
the story) were thought to resemble typical responses to a challenge of memory, and 
were therefore expected to relate with provoked confabulations.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-two patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome (13 men; Mage = 60.7 years; range 48-76) 
participated in the study. Level of formal education was assessed using a scale with seven 
categories based on the Dutch educational system, 1 being the lowest (less than primary 
education; i.e., six or less years of education) and 7 the highest (academic degree; 18 or 
more years of education). The group had a median educational level of 4 (range 1-6). This 
is comparable to 9 years of education on average in the Anglo-Saxon educational system. 
The patients met the criteria for DSM-5 Alcohol-induced major neurocognitive disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), as established by neurological, psychiatric, and 
neuropsychological examinations. Diagnoses were established by a multidisciplinary 
expert team. In addition, the criteria for alcoholic Korsakoff’s syndrome had to be met: A 
disproportionate memory disorder with evidence of a history of Wernicke encephalopathy, 
and a history of malnutrition or thiamine deficit (Kopelman, Thomson, Guerrini, & Marshall, 
2009). The impairments were not attributable to another medical condition or use of 
other substances and none of the participants met the criteria for alcohol-related 
dementia (Oslin, Atkinson, Smith, & Hendrie, 1998). 
 All participants were recruited at the Centre of Excellence for Korsakoff and Alcohol- 
Related Cognitive Disorders of the Vincent van Gogh Institute in Venray, the Netherlands. 
Patients’ family and medical records were screened to obtain background information 
(including drinking history). All patients were at least six weeks abstinent from alcohol at 
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the time of testing. The local Institutional Review Board approved the study and all 
participants gave written informed consent. The study has been conducted according to 
the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedure
Three stories were read aloud to the participants in a counterbalanced order: A novel 
story, adapted from the Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test (RBMT; Wilson, Cockburn, & 
Baddeley, 1985), a familiar fairy tale (either Cinderella or Little Red Riding Hood) and a 
modified familiar fairy tale (altered version of either Cinderella or Little Red Riding Hood, 
see Appendix C). All stories were matched in length and consisted of 30 distinct elements. 
In the modified familiar fairy tale condition, ten elements had been altered from their 
original form; for instance, Cinderella had stepbrothers instead of stepsisters. Our approach 
differs slightly from previous studies, using similar procedures (Dalla Barba et al., 2010; 
De Anna et al., 2008) in which the content of the story was altered more drastically. 
We expected that altering the story only slightly would elicit more intrusions, as the story 
would show more resemblance to the familiar version of the fairy tale. If the familiar fairy 
tale Little Red Riding Hood was presented to a participant, the modified version of 
Cinderella was presented, and vice versa. The participants were asked to recall as many 
elements from the story as possible immediately after the presentation of a story. 
 All responses were audio-recorded and transcribed. Recalled elements that were not 
part of the presented story were considered intrusions. We classified intrusions into four 
categories: Interference of overlearned information, proactive interference, semantically 
related intrusions, and unrelated intrusions. Examples of the different intrusions are 
presented in Table 1. A scoring format was developed by one of the authors of this paper 
(YR), and the stories were scored by an independent rater, blinded to all participant 
 characteristics and research questions.
Confabulation measures: The Dutch version of the confabulation battery (Dalla Barba, 
1993; Peters, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & van Damme, 2012) was administered to all participants to 
assess confabulation behavior. Participants had to answer 66 questions (the questions were 
presented in a counterbalanced order) from each of the following categories: General 
semantic memory, personal semantic memory, personal episodic memory, and orientation in 
place and time. Strongly deviating answers were considered to be confabulations 
(for example the answer “1980” to the question: ‘What was the year in which World War II 
started’?). In addition, this questionnaire contains two other categories (“I don’t know –semantic” 
and “I don’t know – episodic questions) which elicit confabulations. For example, to the 
question ‘What was the job of Marilyn Monroe’s father?’, the correct answer would be “I don’t 
know”. Responses to these questions, other than “I don’t know” were considered to be 
confabulations. The confabulation scores from all categories were summed and formed a 
“total confabulation score” (see also Dalla Barba, Nedjam, & Dubois, 1999).
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 In addition, the NVCL-20 (Rensen et al, 2015), a validated observation scale to quantify 
confabulation behavior, was completed by the first responsible caregiver of the patient. 
The NVCL-20 consists of twenty items tapping various aspects of confabulating behavior 
(e.g., ‘Is the content of the confabulations realistic?’, ‘Does the patient act upon his/her 
confabulations?’), and memory functioning. The category scores for provoked confabulation 
and spontaneous confabulation were used in this study.
Statistical analyses
Nature of the stories and intrusions. The total numbers of intrusions produced on the 
three types of stories were transformed into ratio scores (total intrusions divided by total 
recalled elements), as we assumed relative scores to be a more valid indicator of the 
tendency to produce intrusions than raw scores. A repeated measures ANOVA with Type 
of story (new story, familiar fairy tale, modified fairy tale) as within-group factor and the 
Intrusion ratio scores as dependent variables was performed to examine production of 
ratios of total intrusions across stories. 
Correlations between intrusions and confabulations. Confabulations scores on the 
NVCL-20, ratio scores of interference of overlearned information and semantic intrusions 
were not normally distributed. Hence, Spearman rank correlation coefficients (two-tailed) 
Table 1   Examples of types of intrusions across stories.
Interference 
of overlearned 
information
Proactive 
interference
Semantically 
related intrusions
Unrelated 
intrusions
Little Red Riding 
walked through the 
forest (familiar fairy 
tale LRRH).
Cinderella was 
attacked by the big 
bad wolf (familiar 
fairy tale Cinderella).
LRRH visited her 
grandmother, who 
was dressed up as a 
wolf (modified fairy 
tale LRRH). 
Korsakoff worked as 
a security guard in 
a large department 
store (novel story).
Cinderella did not 
hide in the clock 
(familiar fairy tale 
Cinderella).
Cinderella lived with 
her grandmother 
(familiar fairy tale 
Cinderella). 
A huntsman shot the 
wolf (familiar fairy 
tale LRRH).
Cinderella broke up 
with her boyfriend 
because she did not 
want to live together 
(modified fairy tale 
Cinderella).
Grandmother was 
eaten by the wolf 
(modified fairy tale 
LRRH).
Note. The presented story is displayed in parenthesis. LRRH: Little Red Riding Hood.
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were computed between ratios of total intrusions, semantic intrusions, interference of 
overlearned information (only in the fairy tale conditions), and confabulation scores (i.e., 
total confabulations on the confabulation battery and provoked an spontaneous 
confabulations on the NVCL-20). The novel story task was not related to a familiar story; 
therefore, interference of overlearned information is unlikely to occur in this condition. 
Unrelated intrusions and proactive interference occurred only occasionally. Therefore, the 
intrusions produced across the three story conditions were summed. Subsequently, this 
sum score was transformed into a ratio score and Spearman correlation coefficients 
(two-tailed) were calculated using the total ratio score of unrelated intrusions and the total 
ratio score of proactive interference. 
Results
Nature of the stories and intrusions
The total number of intrusions produced by patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome in the 
novel story and fairy tale conditions are presented in Figure 1. There was a significant 
effect of Story (F(2,20) = 3.95, p = .036, ηp² = .28). Patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome 
produced more intrusions in the modified fairy tale condition, compared with the familiar 
fairy tale condition (F(1,21) = 7.22, p = .014, ηp² = .26). No significant differences in production 
of intrusions were found between the fairy tale conditions and the novel story. 
 We could not examine the production of different types of intrusions across different 
types of stories because a) unrelated intrusions and proactive interference occurred only 
occasionally, and b) overlearned information is unlikely to occur in the new story condition.
Figure 1   Mean ratio scores of intrusions (over total recalled elements) in the three 
experimental conditions produced in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome.  
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
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Correlations between intrusions and confabulations
The mean numbers of (different types of) intrusions and the confabulations scores are 
presented in Table 2. We included the total correct scores in the table to provide insight in 
the overall performance and how the ratio scores were constructed. Table 3 shows the 
correlations among ratios of intrusions and confabulations in the Korsakoff group. 
Intrusions on the novel story were related to confabulation behavior. We found that ratios 
of total intrusions on the novel story correlated significantly with provoked confabulation 
on the NVCL-20 (rs = .55, p = .008) and the total score on the confabulation battery (rs = .43, 
Table 2   Means and standard deviations of confabulations and intrusions across 
stories in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome.
Confabulations
NVCL-20
Spontaneous confabulations 15.6 (5.8)
Provoked confabulations 9.0 (3.1)
Confabulation Battery
Total confabulation score 7.0 (3.2)
Intrusions
Novel story
Total correct 2.5 (2.1)
Total intrusions 2.6 (2.7)
Semantic intrusions 2.2 (2.7)
Unrelated intrusions 0.2 (0.5)
Original fairy tale
Total correct 4.9 (4.1)
Total intrusions 4.0 (3.5)
Interference of overlearned information 1.1 (1.5)
Semantic intrusions 2.6 (2.7)
Unrelated intrusions 0.0 (0.0)
Modified fairy tale
Total correct 3.4 (2.0)
Total intrusions 5.1 (5.3)
Interference of overlearned information 2.4 (3.1)
Semantic intrusions 2.1 (2.9)
Unrelated intrusions 0.4 (0.9)
N = 22. NVCL-20 = Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List; NVCL-20 minimum scores are not equal to 0.  
Minimum scores are: spontaneous confabulation = 9, provoked confabulation = 3.
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p = .047). Ratios of semantic intrusions on the novel story correlated significantly with 
spontaneous (rs = .46, p = .033) and provoked confabulations on the NVCL-20 (rs = 49, p = 
.021). None of the correlations between total intrusions, semantic intrusions and 
interference of overlearned information produced on the familiar fairy tale and modified 
fairy tale task and confabulation scores were significant. 
 The ratio of unrelated intrusions, due to their low occurrence calculated as a total 
score across all three stories, correlated significantly with the confabulation battery score 
(rs = .58, p = .004), but not with other measures of confabulations. No significant relation 
was found between proactive interference and any of the confabulation measures. 
Discussion
This is the first study to examine the relation between the production of intrusions when 
recalling (modified) premorbidly and newly acquired stories and the degree of 
confabulation in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. The aims of this study were (a) to 
Table 3   Spearman correlations among ratios of intrusions and confabulations in 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome.
NVCL-20  
spontaneous
confabulation
NVCL-20  
provoked
confabulation
Confabulation 
battery
total score
Novel story
Total intrusions .38 .55* .43**
Semantic intrusions .36** .49** .19
Original fairy tale
Total intrusions .24 .26 .22
Semantic intrusions .23 .18 .14
Overlearned -.23 -.33 -.12
Modified fairy tale
Total intrusions -.12 .10 .07
Semantic intrusions .03 .17 .24
Overlearned -.09 -.12 -.32
Across stories
Unrelated intrusions .24 .31 .58*
Proactive interference .17 .21 .35
*p <.01, **p <.05 (two-tailed).
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examine whether the nature of the story might influence the production of intrusions, 
and (b) to investigate whether different types of intrusions were related to confabulations. 
Although patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome produced a greater number of intrusions in 
the modified familiar fairy tale condition compared with the recall of the familiar fairy tale, 
these intrusions were not related to confabulations. Only intrusions produced when 
recalling a novel story and semantically unrelated intrusions were related to confabulation 
behavior in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. 
 First, we found that the nature of story affected the production of intrusions in 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. Relatively more intrusions were produced when 
recalling a premorbidly acquired modified fairy tale compared with the recall of a familiar 
fairy tale. This is in line with previous studies comparing the results of patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease and healthy older adults using a similar paradigm. These studies 
showed that patients with Alzheimer’s disease produced a larger number of intrusions in 
the modified well-known fairy tale condition compared with the other two story 
conditions (Attali et al., 2009; De Anna et al., 2008). It has been suggested that presentation 
of a modified fairy tale might also activate non-presented, but strongly embedded 
elements from the original, overlearned version of the fairy tale (Attali et al., 2009). These 
activated “original” elements might interfere with the recall of the episodic representation 
of the elements of the modified fairy tale. This might result in an increased production of 
intrusions, especially in amnesic patients. Hence, recalling manipulated familiar information 
(i.e., a fairy tale) might be especially difficult for patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, as they 
suffer from interference of overlearned information. 
 The results fit several confabulation theories (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Dalla Barba, 1993). The increased production of total intrusions in the modified fairy tale 
might reflect the inability of confabulating patients to determine the source of the recalled 
information (i.e., modified fairy tale or “original”, overlearned fairy tale). Sourcing of 
memories – where or when the event happened – may be confused, leading to the 
production of confabulations (Johnson et al., 1993; Metcalf, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007). In 
addition, the results are in line with the temporal-context theory of confabulation (Dalla 
Barba, 1993), which states that confabulating patients have difficulties with temporal 
consciousness. It was suggested that confabulators are aware of their personal past, 
present, and future, but might only use the most stable elements of their autobiographi-
cal memory when making temporal judgements. The results from this study suggest that 
confabulators might produce more stable representations, instead of modified elements, 
when recalling manipulated, familiar information. 
 We subsequently examined the relation between (different types of ) intrusions 
produced on the three types of stories and scores on confabulation measures. Patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome who produced more intrusions (ratios of total intrusions and 
semantic intrusions) when retrieving the novel story were more likely to show confabulation 
behavior on the NVCL-20 and the confabulation battery. The significant correlations 
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between intrusions during novel story retrieval and confabulations might be explained by 
the strong relation between provoked confabulations and memory deficits. Provoked 
confabulations are often seen in amnesia. Moreover, previous studies demonstrated that 
provoked confabulations correlated significantly with the degree of amnesia Schnider, 
2008; Rensen et al., 2015; Rensen et al., 2016). This is in line with Kopelman’s (1987) statement, 
that “provoked confabulation may represent a normal response to a faulty memory” 
(p. 1486). Hence, testing the memory of confabulating patients for novel stories may reveal 
the working of a mechanism underlying provoked confabulations outside test situations. 
 Moreover, we found that the production of unrelated intrusions in the Korsakoff 
group correlated significantly with confabulations on the confabulation battery. This 
finding is in line with results from other studies (Gilboa et al., 2006; Kan et al., 2010) 
The production of unrelated intrusions on a memory task might set confabulating 
patients apart from non-confabulating patients. The production of semantically unrelated 
intrusions might be the result of an ‘overactive’ associative system, source monitoring, 
or strategic retrieval deficits (Gilboa et al., 2006; Johnson, Lindsay, & Hashtroudi, 1993; 
Turner, Cipolotti, & Shallice, 2010). An overly diffuse associative retrieval process may lead 
to activation of task-irrelevant information (Kan et al., 2010), including the activation of 
unrelated words. Because of severe source monitoring and strategic retrieval deficits, 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome also falsely accept retrieved, yet unrelated memories, 
associations, thoughts, and imaginations (Gilboa et al., 2006). These mechanisms might 
underlie both unrelated intrusions and confabulations.
 Surprisingly, although patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome showed increased production 
of intrusions in the modified fairy tale conditions, none of the intrusions scores correlated 
significantly with confabulations. This is not in line with our hypothesis that intrusions 
during the retrieval of premorbidly acquired stories are more strongly related to 
confabulations than errors in the retrieval of newly acquired stories. An explanation for not 
finding significant relations between intrusions and confabulations in the fairy tale 
conditions might be that confabulations are often restricted to materials from episodic 
memory (Dalla Barba, Cipolotti, & Denes, 1990), whereas the well-known fairy tales may 
particularly reflect semantic memory functioning. Future studies are therefore needed 
that focus on the relation between intrusions when retrieving premorbidly acquired 
episodic materials (e.g., autobiographical information) and confabulations. 
 The significant correlations between intrusions on the novel story retrieval and 
confabulations are remarkable, as previous studies using word-recall tasks did not find 
significant correlations between the retrieval of novel information and confabulation 
scores (Nahum et al., 2012; Rensen et al., 2015; Rensen et al., 2016). It has been suggested 
(Attali et al., 2009) that the production of unstudied words in word-list recall can be 
considered ‘intrusions’, and the production of unstudied information in story recall can be 
described as ‘confabulations’. The results from the present study and previous studies on 
word-list recall provide empirical grounds for this suggestion. Hence, novel story recall 
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(but not memory for fairy tales), appears to be better suited to assess confabulation 
behavior than word-recall tasks. 
 In summary, although patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome produced a greater number 
of intrusions in the modified familiar fairy tale condition compared with the familiar fairy 
tale condition, these intrusions were not related to confabulation scores. Only intrusions 
produced when retrieving the novel story, but not the premorbidly acquired and modified 
fairy tales, correlated with the measure for provoked confabulations in patients with 
Korsakoff’s syndrome. The total ratio of unrelated intrusions correlated significantly with 
provoked confabulation scores. We suggest that studies examining intrusions and 
confabulations should specify different types of intrusions and should take the nature of 
the to-be-remembered material into account. 
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Abstract
Objective: Previous research indicates that older adults (OA) are more susceptible to 
interference of overlearned information than younger adults (YA), and patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) even more so than OA. In two experiments we replicated and 
extended previous research by examining whether the production of different types of 
intrusions was quantitatively and qualitatively different between YA and OA (Experiment 
1) and between OA and patients with AD (Experiment 2) across different types of stories. 
Moreover, we investigated whether different types of intrusions were related to forms of 
confabulations in OA and AD.
Method: Younger adults, older adults, and patients with AD recalled three different types 
of stories: A novel story, a familiar fairy tale, and a modified familiar fairy tale (e.g., Cinderella 
went to a barbecue). The total number of intrusions produced on the different stories was 
examined. Subsequently, the different types of intrusions (interference of overlearned 
information, semantically related intrusions, unrelated intrusions) were examined and 
correlated with scores on confabulation measures.
Results: Healthy OA are susceptible to interference of overlearned information when 
familiar information is manipulated. This is evidence for the hypothesis that strongly 
represented, over-learned information interfered with episodic recall in healthy OA. 
Moreover, OA are more likely to recall the gist of the story, thereby producing more semantic 
intrusions than YA and patients with AD when reproducing familiar, not manipulated, 
information. Intrusions produced on story recall tests were not related to clinical provoked 
and spontaneous confabulations in patients with AD, except for the production of 
unrelated intrusions. 
Conclusions: These results indicate that intrusions and clinical confabulations in patient 
groups are not one and the same concept. However, provoked confabulations might 
resemble intrusions on memory tests in healthy participants. Future research is needed 
to replicate this findings in a larger sample size.
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Introduction
Intrusions and confabulations both describe incorrect statements about past events. 
Intrusions can be defined as the unintentional recall of inappropriate responses specifically 
observed in test situations, for example on story-recall tests. Confabulations are statements, 
incorrect in time and place, which are unintentionally produced, and occur in the context 
of brain disease, such as Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (Berlyne, 1972; Cooper, Shanks, & Venneri, 
2006; Dalla Barba, 1993). A distinction can be made between spontaneous and provoked 
confabulations (Kopelman, 1987). Spontaneous confabulations occur without any obvious 
trigger (Kessels, Kortrijk, Wester, & Nys, 2008; Kopelman, 1987), and patients might act 
according to their false ideas. Provoked confabulations, in contrast, are normal responses 
to a faulty memory and resemble the errors produced by healthy individuals when they 
are confronted with leading questions (Heidler & Eling, 2015; Kopelman, 1987). An example 
demonstrating the effect of leading questions on memory in healthy individuals is 
described in Loftus and Palmer (1974). They reported that participants were more likely to 
falsely report seeing broken glass in a film, after being asked the leading question: ‘How 
fast were the cars going when they smashed each other?’, compared with a group that was 
asked: ‘How fast were the cars going when they hit each other?’ or a group that was not 
asked a question at all (Loftus, & Palmer, 1974). In some studies provoked confabulations 
have been quantified by counting intrusions in memory recall tasks (Kopelman, 1987; 
Schnider, von Daniken, & Gutbrod, 1996). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that 
healthy older adults (OA) are more susceptible to producing intrusions on memory tests 
compared with younger adults (YA)(Balota et al., 1999; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Norman 
& Schacter, 1997; Schacter, Wang, Tulving, & Freedman, 1982). Confabulations occur in 
pathological ageing, such as in patients with AD. However, it has not been clearly 
established whether the confabulations observed in patients with AD, resemble intrusions 
in healthy OA. Confabulations and intrusions might be comparable with respect to the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms, with confabulations being the more severe form, 
suggesting a continuum. Another possibly might be that brain changes characteristic for AD 
result in memory errors that are qualitatively different from errors observed in healthy OA.
 Several theories have been proposed to describe the mechanism underlying 
confabulations (see for reviews, Metcalf, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2010; Schnider, 2008). The 
temporal-context theory of confabulations suggests that confabulators are aware of their 
personal past, present, and future, but might only use the most stable elements of their 
autobiographical memory when making temporal judgments. As a result, the content of 
confabulations often consists of personal semantic information, habits, and routines (Dalla 
Barba, 1993; Dalla Barba, Nedjam, & Dubois, 1999; La Corte, Serra, Attali, Boissé, & Dalla 
Barba, 2010). Dalla Barba and colleagues experimentally examined this, using a paradigm 
in which three different types of stories had to be recalled: A novel story, a familiar fairy 
tale (such as Cinderella), and a modified familiar fairy tale (consisting of elements from the 
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original telling of the story, but also of modified elements, e.g., a version in which Cinderella 
has stepbrothers) (Attali & Dalla Barba, 2012; Dalla Barba, Attali, & La Corte, 2010; De Anna et 
al., 2008). OA and patients with AD produced more intrusions when recalling the modified 
well-known fairy tale condition, compared with the recall of the other two conditions. 
Moreover, OA produced significantly more intrusions than young adults (YA; Dalla Barba et 
al., 2010). The authors concluded that the increases in intrusions in OA and patients with 
AD on the modified fairy tale were the result of interference of strongly represented, 
over-learned information in episodic memory. Moreover, they suggested that the same 
mechanism is responsible for both increases in intrusions in OA and patients with AD. 
 It must be noted that Dalla Barba and colleagues referred to unstudied words on the 
story recall paradigm described above as confabulations, also when they were produced 
by healthy YA and OA (Attali, & Dalla Barba, 2012; Dalla Barba et al., 2010). They suggested 
that the term “intrusion” more appropriately describes the production of unstudied words 
in word-list recall, whereas “confabulation” better describes the production of unstudied 
information in story recall (Attali et al., 2009; Attali & Dalla Barba, 2012; Dalla Barba et al., 
2010). However, the relation between memory intrusions and confabulations has not 
clearly been established. For example, studies examining correlations between intrusions 
on word-list recall and confabulations failed to find significant, positive results (Kessels et 
al., 2008; Nahum, Bouzerda-Wahlen, Guggisberg, Ptak, & Schnider, 2012; Rensen et al., 
2015). Results from other studies showed that distinguishing between types of intrusions, 
rather than examining the number of intrusions, might disclose clearer relationships with 
confabulations (Gilboa et al., 2006; Kan, Larocque, Lafleche, Coslett, & Verfaellie, 2010; 
Rensen, Oosterman, Walvoort, Eling, & Kessels, 2016). More particularly, both confabulating 
and non-confabulating amnesic patient groups have difficulty monitoring semantically 
related intrusions (i.e., distortions of true details). This type of intrusions might therefore 
represent non-specific errors on a memory recall task rather than reflecting confabulations. 
The production of unrelated intrusions seems to be characteristic for confabulating patient 
groups (Gilboa et al., 2006; Kan et al., 2010, Rensen et al., 2016). Finally, examining potential 
differences between intrusions in healthy aging and intrusions and confabulations in 
patients with AD has not received much attention. Examining these related concepts 
might shed light on the debate whether confabulations in patients with AD are a more 
severe form of intrusions observed in healthy OA, or whether confabulations in patients 
with AD have a different underlying mechanism than intrusions in healthy aging.
 The current study describes two experiments using a story recall paradigm, 
comparable to the one used in the studies by Dalla Barba and colleagues. In Experiment 
1, the paradigm was administered in healthy YA and OA. The aim of Experiment 1 was to 
replicate the findings by Dalla Barba and colleagues and to examine whether strongly 
represented, over-learned information interfered with episodic recall in OA compared 
with YA. Moreover, we examined whether the production of different types of intrusions 
(semantic intrusions, interference of overlearned information, and unrelated intrusions) 
97
FALSE MEMORIES AND CONFABULATIONS IN HEALTHY AGING AND AD
6
were produced by YA and OA. In Experiment 2, the same story recall paradigm was 
administered in a group of patients with AD and a group of matched OA. The aims of 
Experiment 2 were to: (a) Examine whether strongly represented, over-learned information 
interfered with episodic recall in both OA and patients with AD, (b) examine whether the 
production of types of intrusions differed between OA and AD, and (c) investigate whether 
different types of intrusions were related to forms of confabulations in OA and AD. Based 
on the results from previous studies (Attali et al., 2009; Attali & Dalla Barba, 2012; Dalla 
Barba et al., 2010, Gilboa et al.,2006; Kan et al., 2010, Rensen et al., 2016), we hypothesized 
that interference of overlearned information (e.g., non-presented information, but clearly 
derived from related sources) and unrelated intrusions (random intrusions that do not 
match with the gist or semantic structure of the story) would be related to spontaneous 
confabulation in patients with AD. Semantic intrusions (plausible intrusions, matching the 
feel and semantic structure of the story) were thought to resemble typical responses to a 
challenge of memory, and were therefore expected to relate with provoked confabulations 
in both healthy OA and patients with AD.
Experiment 1: Intrusions in healthy aging
In the first experiment, healthy YA and OA had to recall three types of stories (novel story, 
familiar fairy tale, modified fairy tale). We examined whether strongly represented, 
over-learned information interfered with episodic recall in OA.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-nine YA and 30 OA were screened for participation in the study. All participants 
were native Dutch speakers, who lived independently in the community. YA were recruited 
at a school for advanced vocational education. OA were recruited by word of mouth. 
Participants received a gift voucher of 10 Euros for their participation. Full informed 
consent was collected from all participants.
 Group characteristics are presented in Table 1. Participants were screened with the 
Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & Mchugh, 1975), and only 
participants who obtained a score of 24 points or higher were included in the study. 
Depressive symptoms were screened with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). Two YA were excluded because of depressive 
symptoms indicative for a probable clinical depression (BDI scores > 20), resulting in a 
sample of 27 YA (24 women; Mage = 23.8, range 16-37 years). None of the OA were excluded, 
resulting in a sample of 30 OA (28 women; Mage = 71.1, range: 60-82).
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 The groups were matched with respect to estimated verbal IQ (t(55) = 1.47, p = .147; 
measured with the Dutch version of the National Adult Reading Task; Schmand, Bakker, 
Saan, & Louman, 1991), sex distribution (χ2(1)= 0.34, p = .554), and MMSE scores (t(55) = 1.64, 
p = .107). Also, formal education level was measured according to the Dutch educational 
system on a 7-point rating scale ranging from 1 (less than primary education; six or less years 
of education) to 7 (university degree; 16 or more years of education) (Verhage, 1964). YA had 
a significantly higher median educational level than OA (U = 162.50, Z = -4.08, p = <.001).
Materials and procedure
Three stories (see Appendix C) were read aloud to the participants in a counterbalanced 
order: A familiar fairy tale (either Cinderella or Little Red Riding Hood), a modified familiar 
fairy tale (altered version of Cinderella or Little Red Riding Hood), and a novel story, 
adapted from the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT; Wilson, Cockburn, & 
Baddeley, 1985). If the familiar fairy tale Little Red Riding Hood was presented to a 
participant, the modified version of Cinderella was presented, and vice versa. Each story 
was composed of 30 to-be-remembered elements. The elements were matched for 
length across stories. In the modified familiar fairy tale, ten elements were slightly altered 
from its original form; for instance, Cinderella had stepbrothers (instead of stepsisters); 
Grandma got locked up by the wolf (instead of eaten). This differs slightly from the 
procedures described in De Anna et al. (2007) and Dalla Barba et al. (2010), in which the 
content of the story was altered more drastically. We assumed that only slightly altering 
the story would elicit more intrusions, as it would show more resemblance to the familiar 
version of the fairy tale.
Table 1   Group Characteristics of younger adults (YA) and older adults (OA).
YA
(n = 27)
OA
(n = 30)
p-value
Age 23.8 (6.2) 71.1 (6.1) <.001
Sex (woman/man) 24/3 28/2 n.s.
Education 5 (5-7) 4 (2-6) <.001
MMSE 28.9 (1.1) 28.4 (1.7) n.s.
BDI 8.4 (8.7) 6.2 (4.2) n.s.
NART-IQ 92.5 (7.1) 87.1 (10.0) n.s.
Note. Mean and standard deviations are presented for age, Mine Mental State Examination score (MMSE) 
scores, Beck Depression Inventory score (BDI), and National Adult Reading Test-IQ (NART-IQ). Frequency scores 
are given for the variable sex. Median and range are presented for education. N.s., non-significant results 
(p ≥.05) were obtained.
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 Immediately after the presentation of a story, which took approximately 60 seconds, 
a free recall phase followed in which the participants were required to recall as many 
details from the story as possible. Elements that were not part of the presented story were 
considered intrusions. Participants’ responses were recorded, and all memories were 
transcribed by the experimenter. The stories were scored according to a scoring format, 
developed by the first author. We classified intrusions into three categories (see Table 2 for 
examples). Semantic intrusions were elements that were not presented and were not part 
of another source, but matched with the feel and semantic structure of the story. Those 
elements that had not been presented during the experiment but were clearly derived 
from other sources were scored as interference of overlearned information. Unrelated 
intrusions were random intrusions that did not match with the gist or semantic structure 
of the story.
Statistical analyses
Intra-rater reliability: Scoring was executed by one rater and repeated after six months 
by the same rater. Intra-rater reliability was assessed using intra-class correlation coefficients 
(two-way mixed) with absolute agreement. Interpretation of the ICCs was based on the 
guidelines as proposed by Cicchetti and Sparrow (1981).
Nature of the stories and intrusions: The total number of intrusions produced on the 
three types of stories were transformed into ratio scores (total intrusions divided by total 
recalled elements), as we assumed relative scores to be a more valid indicator of the 
Table 2   Examples of types of intrusions across stories.
Semantically related 
intrusions
Interference of overlearned 
information
Unrelated intrusions
Grandmother ate the wolf 
(modified fairy tale LRRH). 
Little Red Riding carried a 
basked full of fruit (familiar 
fairy tale LRRH).
The wolf bought something 
for LRRH. He bought.. No, she 
bought a bear (familiar fairy 
tale LRRH)
The wolf asked LRRH: “Where 
are you going?” (familiar fairy 
tale LRRH).
Cinderella and the seven 
dwarfs (familiar fairy tale 
Cinderella).
I asked Cinderella: “Can I 
join you for a walk?”. “Yes” 
she said, so I walked with 
her (modified fairy tale 
Cinderella)
Cinderella had stepsisters 
(modified fairy tale 
Cinderella).
Note. The presented story is displayed in parenthesis. LRRH: Little Red Riding Hood.
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tendency to produce intrusions than raw scores. We performed a 2 (Group: YA, OA) × 3 
(Type of story: novel story, familiar fairy tale, modified fairy tale) repeated measures ANOVA, 
with Group as between-group factor, Type of story as within-group factor, and the 
intrusion ratio scores as dependent variables.
Different types of intrusions: The novel story task was not related to a familiar story, 
therefore, interference of overlearned information is unlikely to occur in this condition. 
This differs from the familiar and modified fairy tales, where all types of intrusions were 
possible. Differences between the groups in the production of ratios of interference of 
overlearned information were examined for all the fairy tale conditions using Mann- 
Whitney U tests (all intrusions types scores were not normally distributed). Differences 
between the groups in the production of ratios of semantic intrusions were examined for 
all three conditions using Mann-Whitney U tests.
Results and discussion
Intra-rater reliability
Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) for total intrusion scores ranged from good 
(ICC = .72 in the novel story condition) to excellent (ICC = .89 in the modified fairy tale 
condition, and ICC = .93 in the familiar fairy tale condition). ICCs for types of intrusions 
also ranged from good (ICC = .66, semantic intrusions in the modified fairy tale conditions) 
to excellent (ICC = .81, semantic intrusions in the familiar fairy tale condition). The scoring 
of the intrusions across stories was stable, when repeated under identical conditions 
by the same rater.
Nature of the stories and intrusions
The mean ratios and standard errors of intrusions produced by YA and OA across story 
conditions are presented in Figure 1. We found a significant main effect of Group (F(1,55) = 
14.17, p = .<.001, ηp² = .21). OA produced higher ratios of intrusions (M = .34) than YA 
(M = .24). This is in line with results from previous studies, demonstrating that healthy OA 
are more susceptible to producing intrusions compared with YA (Balota et al., 1999; 
Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Norman & Schacter, 1997; Schacter et al., 1982). Moreover, 
we did not find a significant main effect for Story (F(2,54) = 2.17, p = .124, . ηp² = 07). 
The modified fairy tale condition did not elicit more intrusions than the other story recall 
conditions in these two groups of healthy individuals. 
 We did not replicate the findings by Dalla Barba and colleagues (Attali & Dalla Barba, 
2012; Dalla Barba et al., 2010), as we did not find a significant Group × Story interaction 
(F(2,54) = 2.30, p = .110, ηp² = .08). In addition, we performed the analyses with total 
intrusions scores, next to ratio scores. The results obtained with total intrusion scores and 
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ratio scores were essentially similar, excluding the hypothesis that the non-significant 
interaction might have been the result of using ratio scores. 
Different types of intrusions
The mean ratios and standard deviations of different types of intrusions produced by YA and 
OA in the novel story and fairy tale conditions are presented in Table 3. OA produced 
significantly more semantic intrusions compared with YA (U = 274.50, Z = -2.09, p = .037) 
in the familiar fairy tale. OA also showed increased ratios of interference of overlearned 
information in the modified fairy tale condition compared with YA (U = 175.50, Z = -3.68, 
p = <.001). No other differences were found between the groups. Unrelated intrusions 
were not produced by either YA or OA.
Experiment 2: Intrusions and confabulations in older 
adults and patients with Alzheimer’s disease 
In the second experiment, the story recall task described in Experiment 1 was administered 
in healthy OA and patients with AD. Two different groups of OA participated in the two 
experiments presented in this study. We examined the different types of intrusions 
(semantic intrusions, interference of overlearned information, and unrelated intrusions) 
produced in the recall of different stories, to see whether brain changes characteristic for 
AD resulted in the production of memory errors that are qualitatively different from that 
of healthy OA. Moreover, we examined whether different types of intrusions produced for 
Figure 1   Ratios and standard errors of intrusions (over recalled elements) on the  
novel story, familiar fairy tale (familiar FT), and modified fairy tale (modified FT) 
in younger adults (YA) and older adults (OA).
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the three types of stories were related to provoked confabulations in OA and patients 
with AD, and spontaneous confabulations in the group of AD patients. 
Methods
Participants
Twenty-two healthy OA and 11 patients with AD were screened for participation in the 
study. Patients with AD were recruited from the “Carint Reggeland” institution in Delden, 
the Netherlands. Only patients with the diagnosis probable AD were included, fulfilling 
the DSM-IV-TR criteria for Dementia of the Alzheimer’s Type (APA, 2000). That is, patients 
with vascular dementia or frontotemporal dementia were excluded from this study. Two 
participants were excluded from the OA group, because they had a score of 24 points or 
lower on the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1975), resulting in a 
sample of 20 OA (9 women; Mage = 81.7, range: 64-93). None of the patients with AD were 
excluded, resulting in a sample of 11 patients with AD (9 women; Mage = 81.8, range 72-93 
years). Full informed consent was collected from all participants, in accordance with the 
declaration of Helsinki. Permission from the legal representative of the patients with AD 
(family member, professional mentor) was also obtained.
Table 3   Mean ratios and standard deviations of semantic intrusions and interference 
of overlearned information corrected on the total number of recalled 
elements for the novel story, familiar fairy tale and modified fairy tale in 
younger adults (YA) and older adults (OA).
YA
(n = 27)
OA
(n = 30)
p-value
Novel story
Total elements 14.22 (3.91) 9.67 (4.05) <.001
Semantic .29 (.17) .33 (.21) n.s.
Familiar fairy tale
Total elements 22.93 (4.67) 17.70 (6.91) .002
Semantic .15 (.08) .22 (.15) .037
Overlearned .05 (.06) .08 (.08) n.s.
Modified fairy tale
Total elements 23.52 (4.71) 16.93 (6.70) <.001
Semantic .14 (.07) .21 (.22) n.s.
Overlearned .08 (.08) .19 (.11) <.001
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 Group characteristics are presented in Table 4. The groups were matched with 
respect to age (t(29) = -.06, p = .949), sex distribution (χ2(1)= .97, p = .290), and formal 
education level (U = 109.500, Z = -.02, p = .984). Patients with AD performed significantly 
lower on the MMSE (M = 18.1) than the OA (M = 27.2) (t(29) =10.39, p = .008). 
Materials and procedure
The procedure described in Experiment 1 was also applied in Experiment 2. The stories 
were scored by an independent rater, blinded to all participant characteristics and research 
questions. We also administered a shortened version of the confabulation battery (Dalla 
Barba, 1993) to the participants to examine provoked confabulations. This is a semi-struc-
tured interview that contains 33 questions. Questions are divided into seven different 
categories: Personal semantic memory, episodic memory, general semantic memory, 
prospective memory, orientation in time and place, and “I don’t know semantic” and “I 
don’t know episodic”. These latter two categories consist of questions that have been 
constructed to receive an “I don’t know” response, for example ‘’Do you remember what 
you did on March 13, 1985?’. Instead of giving an “I don’t know” response, confabulating 
patients often provide an incorrect answer in reply to these questions (Dalla Barba, 1993). 
Answers were verified with family members and medical staff. The confabulation scores 
from all categories were summed and formed a “provoked confabulation score” (see also 
Dalla Barba et al., 1999).
 Moreover, professional caregivers completed a short observation list, in which six 
questions were asked about aspects of spontaneous confabulations, such as ‘Does the 
Table 4   Group Characteristics of patients with Alzheimer’s dementia (AD) and  
older adults (OA).
AD
(n = 11)
OA
(n = 20)
p-value
Age 81.8 (6.4) 81.7 (7.3) n.s.
Sex (woman/man) 9/2 13/7 n.s.
Education 4 (2-6) 4 (2-6) n.s.
MMSE 18.1 (3.2) 27.2 (1.7) .008
Provoked confabulation 6.09 (4.04) 1.57 (1.54) <.001
Spontaneous confabulation 15.9 (7.85) - -
Note. Mean and standard deviations are presented for age, Mine Mental State Examination score (MMSE) 
scores, Beck Depression Inventory score (BDI), and National Adult Reading Test-IQ (NART-IQ). Frequency 
scores are given for the variable sex. Median and range are presented for education. N.s., non-significant 
results (p >.05) were obtained.
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patient act upon his/her confabulations?’ and ‘Does the patient tell you or others that (s)
he has an appointment with others (family, doctor) when this is not the case?’ These 
scores were only obtained for the AD group, as this type of confabulation only occurs in 
patient groups (Schnider, 2008). The questions were rated on the basis of a 5-point rating 
scale, with 1 being the lowest (spontaneous confabulation behavior is seldom / never 
observed) and 5 being the highest (spontaneous confabulation behavior is very frequently 
observed). A minimum of 6 and a maximum of 30 points could be obtained for this 
observation list.
Statistical analyses
Nature of the stories and intrusions: The total number of intrusions produced on each 
of the three types of stories was transformed into a ratio score. We performed a 2 (Group: 
OA, AD) × 3 (Type of story: Novel story, familiar fairy tale, modified fairy tale) repeated 
measures ANOVA, with Group as between-group factor, Type of story as within-group 
factor, and the Intrusion ratio scores as dependent variables.
Different types of intrusions: The novel story task was unrelated to a familiar story, 
therefore, interference of overlearned information is unlikely to occur in this condition. 
Differences between the groups in the production of ratios of interference of overlearned 
information were examined for the fairy tale conditions using Mann-Whitney U tests 
(as the scores were not normally distributed). Differences between the groups in the 
production of ratios of semantic intrusions were examined for all three conditions using 
one-way ANOVAs (as the scores were normally distributed). Unrelated intrusions occurred 
only occasionally. Therefore, the unrelated intrusions produced across the three story 
conditions were summed and this sum score was transformed into a ratio score to allow 
for a more reliable comparison between groups, which was performed using the Mann- 
Whitney U-test.
Correlations between intrusions and confabulations: Spearman correlation coefficients 
(one-tailed) were calculated between ratios of total intrusions, semantic intrusions, interference 
of overlearned information (only in the fairy tale conditions), unrelated intrusions (across 
the stories) and confabulation scores (i.e., provoked confabulations on the confabulation 
battery and spontaneous confabulations on the observation list).
Results and discussion
Nature of the stories and intrusions
The ratios of intrusions produced by OA and patients with AD in the novel story and fairy 
tale conditions are presented in Figure 2. We found no significant effect of Group (F(1,29) 
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= 1.85, p = .184, ηp² = .06). That is, the number of intrusions in AD patients was similar to the 
number of intrusions in healthy OA. We did find a significant effect of Story (F(2,28) = 5.09, 
p = .013, ηp² = .27). More intrusions were produced in the novel story compared with the 
familiar fairy tale condition (p = .004) and modified fairy tale condition (p = .055). This latter 
finding was only marginally significant. There is a tendency of more intrusions being 
produced in the modified fairy tale condition compared with the familiar fairy tale 
condition (p = .057). Our results do not support the hypothesis that patients with AD 
produce more intrusions on the modified fairy tale compared with the other stories and 
compared with OA, as we did not find a significant Group × Story interaction (F(2,28) = 
2.43, p = .107, ηp² = .15). 
Different types of intrusions
The mean ratios and standard deviations of different types of intrusions produced by OA 
and patients with AD in the novel story and fairy tale conditions are presented in Table 5. 
OA produced significantly more semantic intrusions than patients with AD in the familiar 
fairy tale condition (F(1,28) = 6.17, p = .019). Patients with AD produced more unrelated 
intrusions across stories than OA (U = 34.50, Z = -3.64, p = .001). This was not surprising, as 
unrelated intrusions were barely produced by OA. No other differences in the production 
of types of intrusions were found between the groups. These results suggest that, when 
controlled for overall memory performance, the memory distortions in normal aging 
and AD are neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different, except for the production of 
semantic intrusions (when recalling familiar information) and unrelated intrusions (across 
different types of stories).
Figure 2   Ratios and standard errors of intrusions (over recalled elements) on the novel 
story, familiar fairy tale (familiar FT), and modified fairy tale (modified FT) in 
patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and older adults (OA).
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Correlations between intrusions and confabulations
Significant correlations were found between provoked confabulations on the confabulation 
battery and intrusions on the stories in OA. Medium-to-large, positive correlations were 
found between provoked confabulations and semantic intrusions on the novel story 
(rs = .369, p = .060), total intrusions (rs = .395, p = .047), semantic intrusions (rs = .491, p = .016), 
and overlearned information (rs = .395, p = .047) on the familiar fairy tale, and semantic 
intrusions on the modified fairy tale (rs = . 379, p = .55). The other correlations showed 
mall-to-medium effects, and were non-significant.
 In patients with AD, only the total number of intrusions on the familiar fairy tale 
condition correlated with provoked confabulation (rs = .491, p = .063, medium-to-large 
effect). Moreover, medium-to-large, negative correlations were found between spontaneous 
confabulation in AD and total intrusions (rs = -.474, p = .083) and semantic intrusions 
(rs = -.446, p = .098) on the modified fairy tale. Provoked confabulations on the 
confabulation battery appeared to be strongly related to intrusions on memory tests 
in OA. In contrast, provoked confabulations in AD might be different from intrusions on 
memory tests. 
Table 5   Mean ratios and standard deviations of semantic intrusions, interference 
of overlearned information, and unrelated intrusions corrected on the 
total number of recalled elements for the novel story, familiar fairy tale and 
modified fairy tale in patients with Alzheimer’s dementia (AD) and older 
adults (OA).
AD
(n = 11)
OA
(n = 20)
p-value
Novel story
Total elements 4.59 (3.17) 10.22 (5.49) .004
Semantic .34 (.35) .48 (.22) n.s.
Familiar fairy tale
Total elements 5.05 (3.13) 14.84 (7.29) <.001
Semantic .19 (.23) .36 (.14) .019
Overlearned .32 (.73) .16 (.19) n.s.
Modified fairy tale
Total elements 7.46 (4.74) 14.84 (7.29) .005
Semantic .36 (.25) .34 (.13) n.s.
Overlearned .43 (.70) .26 (.28) n.s.
Across stories
Unrelated .15 (.18) .00 (.01) <.001
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 Relatively strong, positive correlations were found between unrelated intrusions and 
provoked (rs = .622, p = .021) and spontaneous confabulations (rs = .491, p = .063) in patients 
with AD. Again, this finding supports the view that the production of unrelated intrusions 
might set confabulators apart from non-confabulating patient groups. We could not 
calculate correlations between provoked confabulations and unrelated intrusions in OA, 
as this type of intrusion was almost never produced.
Table 6   One-tailed Spearman correlations among intrusions and confabulations in 
patients with Alzheimer’s dementia (AD) and older adults (OA).
AD OA
Provoked Spontaneous Provoked
Novel story
Total intrusions .411 -.134 .061
Semantic -.362 -.400 .369
†
Familiar fairy tale
Total intrusions .491
† .122 .395*
Semantic .253 .280 .491*
Overlearned .368 .352 .395*
Modified fairy tale
Total intrusions -.101 -.474
† .199
Semantic -.139 -.446
† .379†
Overlearned -.065 -.116 .018
Across stories -
Unrelated .622* .465
† -
***p = .001, **p = <.01, * p <.05, †p ≤ .10
108
CHAPTER 6
General discussion 
In two experiments we examined whether the production of different types of intrusions 
was quantitatively and qualitatively different between YA and OA (Experiment 1) and OA 
and patients with AD (Experiment 2) on the recall of three different types of stories: 
A novel story, a familiar fairy tale, and a modified fairy tale. 
Experiment 1: Intrusions in healthy aging
In Experiment 1, the story recall task was administered in healthy YA and OA. We found 
that in OA the relative total production of intrusions was higher than in YA. This is in line 
with previous studies (Balota et al., 1999; Dalla Barba et al., 2010; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; 
Norman & Schacter, 1997; Schacter et al., 1982). Moreover, we wanted to replicate the 
findings by Dalla Barba and colleagues (Attali et al., 2009; Attali & Dalla Barba, 2012; Dalla 
Barba et al., 2010) and examine whether in OA strongly represented, over-learned 
information interfered with episodic recall. It has been suggested that the presentation of 
a modified fairy tale also activates non-presented, but strongly embedded elements from 
the original, over-learned version of the fairy tale. These activated “original” elements 
might interfere with the recall of the episodic representation of the elements of the 
modified fairy tale (Attali & Dalla Barba, 2012; Dalla Barba et al., 2010; De Anna et al., 2008). 
When examining total intrusions across stories, we did not find an age-related increase of 
intrusions in the modified fairy tale condition, as was hypothesized. However, when 
examining different types of intrusions, we did find increases in the production of 
interference of overlearned information in OA compared with YA on the modified fairy 
tale. Hence, examining total numbers of intrusions might have obscured this result. Our 
results are somewhat different from the studies by Dalla Barba and colleagues, who 
reported aging related increases in ratios of total intrusions on the modified fairy tale 
condition, compared with the other stories. The different findings might be the result of 
the scoring procedures used in the present study and in the studies by Dalla Barba and 
colleagues. We used a very detailed scoring procedure, and all non-presented information 
was scored as “intrusions”. This might have resulted in increased ratios of intrusions across 
all story conditions, possibly obscuring the interference of overlearned information in the 
modified fairy tale condition, when examining ratios of total intrusions.
 Moreover, we found that OA produced more semantic intrusions in the modified fairy 
tale condition, compared with YA (Experiment 1), and patients with AD (Experiment 2). 
It has been suggested that increased production of intrusions in OA results from problems 
with merging and binding unrelated elements that together form a distinctive and 
cohesive episodic memory representation (Naveh-Benjamin, 2000; Shing et al., 2010). 
Moreover, the fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990) assumes that memory repre-
sentations involve both verbatim traces (item-specific information) and gist traces 
(semantic information). It is proposed that OA rely more on less distinctive gist-encoding 
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compared with YA. This has been demonstrated to enhance the production of semantic 
intrusions (Li, Naveh-Benjamin, & Lindenberger, 2005; Tun, Wingfield, Rosen, & Blanchard, 
1998). With respect to the present study, OA might have encoded the gist of the 
information (e.g., remembering that the fairy tale Little Red Riding Hood was presented), 
but not the exact details. 
 In sum, normal aging results in an overall increase in the production of intrusions. OA 
are especially susceptible to interference of overlearned information when familiar 
information is manipulated. When reproducing familiar, not manipulated, information, OA 
might be more likely to recall the gist of the story, thereby producing more semantic 
intrusions than YA, who are able to recall the verbatim traces of the story. 
Experiment 2: Intrusions and confabulations in older adults and 
patients with Alzheimer’s disease 
In Experiment 2, we examined whether (a) strongly represented, over-learned information 
interfered with episodic recall in both OA and patients with AD, (b) the production of 
different types of intrusions (semantic intrusions, interference of overlearned information, 
and unrelated intrusions) was quantitatively and qualitatively different in normal aging 
and AD, and (c) investigate whether different types of intrusions were related to 
confabulations in normal aging and AD. 
 With respect to the first aim of Experiment 2, we did not find evidence for the 
hypothesis that strongly represented, over-learned information interfered with episodic 
recall in healthy OA or patients with AD. Participants only produced more intrusions in the 
modified fairy tale compared with the familiar fairy tale, but not compared with the novel 
story. Moreover, both groups showed more intrusions when recalling the novel story, 
compared with the other two tasks. It has been demonstrated that encoding of novel 
stories with auditory presentation places great demands on divided attention, which is 
especially difficult for OA (Corgiat, Templer, & Newell, 1989). Corgiat et al. (1989) reported 
that OA showed an diminished ability to simultaneously perform the task of registering 
surface meaning of a presented story, while carrying out processes of integration, 
construction, and reorganization of the different elements of the story. In addition, Craik 
and colleagues (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Craik & Tulving, 1975) 
demonstrated that dividing attention during encoding has a negative effect on memory 
performance. During presentation and recall of the fairy tales participants could have 
relied more on “embedded” and most richly rehearsed information, which possibly 
resulted in the production of relatively less intrusions compared with the novel story. We 
also found that OA and patients with AD did not differ in the relative production of 
intrusions. This result suggests that AD does not result in the production of more intrusions 
compared with normal aging. 
 Examining the different types of intrusions also revealed a rather similar performance 
in OA and AD patients. The most remarkable difference was that patients with AD 
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produced unrelated intrusions, a type of intrusion that rarely occurred in the OA group. 
These results suggest that the memory distortions in normal aging AD are neither 
quantitatively nor qualitatively different, except for the production of semantic intrusions 
when recalling familiar information or the production of unrelated intrusions. This latter 
finding is in line with previous studies, which also found that the production of unrelated 
intrusions might set confabulators apart from non-confabulating patient groups (Gilboa 
et al., 2006; Kan et al., 2010). However, it must be noted that the sample size of the groups 
in Experiment 2 was limited. Therefore, the results of this study must be interpreted with 
some caution.
 With respect to the last aim of Experiment 2, we found that the provoked confabulation 
score on the confabulation battery showed medium-to-large correlations with almost all 
intrusion variables in healthy OA. The results support the idea that provoked confabulations 
in healthy individuals are normal responses to a faulty memory (Heidler & Eling, 2015; 
Kopelman, 1987). In contrast, only unrelated intrusions were related to provoked and 
spontaneous confabulations in AD. The findings might suggest intrusions occurring in 
healthy aging are different from confabulations observed in patients with AD. 
Limitations and future directions
It must be acknowledged that the experiments in this study had small sample sizes. 
Performing the analyses with larger samples would increase the power of the statistical 
tests, possibly showing significant Group × Type of story interactions or significant 
differences between the OA and patients with AD in the production of different types of 
intrusions (Experiment 2), as was also reported by Dalla Barba and colleagues. Thus, it is 
possible that the lack of differences between the groups was due to the small sample size. 
However, the small effect sizes in this study suggest that an interaction effect might still 
not be present when examining a larger group of participants. 
 Moreover, the confabulation battery was used to assess provoked confabulations. 
However, there are concerns regarding the validity of the instrument. A previous study 
(Rensen et al., 2015) examined the relation between scores obtained with different 
provoked confabulation assessment tools: the Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List 
(NVCL-20, Rensen et al., 2015), the Provoked Confabulation Test (PCT, Cooper et al., 2006), 
and the confabulation battery. Confabulation scores obtained with the NVCL-20 and PCT 
were correlated, however, the NVCL-20 and PCT scores did not correlate with the 
confabulation score on the confabulation battery. The confabulation battery possibly 
measures a qualitatively different construct (i.e., intrusions on a memory test) than the PCT 
and NVCL-20. This might explain the medium-to-large correlations between provoked 
confabulations and intrusions on the CVLT in the present study. Future research should 
additionally administer the NVCL-20 or PCT when examining relations between intrusions 
and provoked confabulations. 
111
FALSE MEMORIES AND CONFABULATIONS IN HEALTHY AGING AND AD
6
 The findings of the current study may have important implications for the concepts 
of confabulations and intrusions. Intrusions and confabulations have both been used to 
describe incorrect statements about past events. However, authors use similar terms with 
different meanings, and conclusions on one form of confabulations might be extended to 
other forms of confabulatory behavior. The use of unclear and different definitions 
complicates the scientific communication on confabulation. Our study clearly shows that 
intrusions and confabulations are not one and the same. Intrusions on story recall tests 
produced by patients with AD are not related with clinical provoked and spontaneous 
confabulations, except for the production of unrelated intrusions. Future studies should 
focus on the different types of intrusions produced by large samples of healthy OA and 
patients with AD. Moreover, the relation between clinical confabulations and intrusions in 
large samples of healthy aging and Alzheimer’s disease should be examined.
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The studies of the present thesis focused on the assessment of confabulations and topics 
that are closely related to confabulations, such as autobiographical memory and intrusions. 
Here, I will summarize and discuss the results of the studies, and recommendations for 
future studies are proposed. 
Main findings 
Chapter 2 examined whether differences between autobiographical memory assessment 
procedures, the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI) and the Autobiographical 
Interview (AI), would influence the presence or absence of a temporal gradient in semantic 
and episodic autobiographical memory in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. Both the 
AMI and the AI detected a temporally graded pattern of retrograde amnesia for personal 
semantic and episodic autobiographical memory. The temporal gradient in Korsakoff’s 
syndrome appears not to be an artefact of method. The results are consistent with previous 
studies using the AMI in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome (Kopelman, 1989; Kopelman 
et al., 1999, 2009). The AI was not been administered in this patient group before.
 Chapter 3 described a study examining some aspects of the clinical validity of an 
observation scale, the Nijmegen-Venray Confabulation List (NVCL-20), for quantifying 
confabulation behavior, including spontaneous confabulation. The NVCL-20 was capable 
of distinguishing between patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome (confabulating patients) 
and a non-confabulating alcoholic control group. The categories of the NVCL-20 showed 
“good” to “excellent” internal consistency and inter-rater agreement. The concurrent 
validity with the confabulation battery and provoked confabulation test (PCT) was 
assessed, and we found that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome who confabulated on the 
NVCL-20 also confabulated on the PCT. The NVCL-20 appears to be a feasible, reliable, and 
valid instrument to quantify confabulation in clinical practice. 
 The aims of the study described in Chapter 4 were to (a) examine the relation 
between (different types of) intrusions on the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT) and 
confabulations on the NVCL-20 in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome, and (b) to investigate 
whether different measures of executive functions and memory performance were related 
to provoked and spontaneous confabulation. With respect to our first aim, we found that 
only unrelated intrusions on the CVLT might possibly be related to confabulations. None 
of the other CVLT intrusions scores, including the total number of intrusions, were related 
to confabulation behavior. Intrusions on a word recall test appear to be different from 
confabulations. For our second aim, we found that provoked confabulations were 
significantly related to measures of memory functioning. In contrast, none of the executive 
subtests correlated with any of the confabulation scores.
 In Chapter 5 we examined the relation between (different types of) intrusions on 
different types of story recall tasks and confabulations on the NVCL-20 and the confabulation 
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battery in patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. Patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome produced 
 a greater number of intrusions in the modified familiar fairy tale condition compared 
with the recall of the familiar fairy tale. However, these intrusions did not correlate with 
confabulations. Only intrusions produced when recalling a novel story and semantically 
unrelated intrusions were related to confabulation behavior in patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome. 
 Finally, in Chapter 6, we administered the same paradigm used in Chapter 5 to 
healthy younger adults (YA), older adults (OA), and patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). 
In addition, we administered shortened versions of the confabulation battery and NVCL-20. 
Healthy OA are susceptible to interference of overlearned information when familiar 
information is manipulated, this is evidence for the hypothesis that strongly represented, 
over-learned information interfered with episodic recall in healthy OA. Moreover, OA are 
more likely to recall the gist of the story, thereby producing more semantic intrusions 
than YA and patients with AD when reproducing familiar, not manipulated, information. 
Moreover, intrusions on story recall tests produced by patients with AD were not related 
with clinical provoked and spontaneous confabulations, except for the production of 
unrelated intrusions. In addition, intrusions and provoked confabulations in OA were 
related. These results indicate that intrusions and clinical confabulations in patient groups 
are not one and the same, however, provoked confabulations might resemble intrusions 
on memory tests in healthy participants. 
General discussion
Confabulations are a characteristic clinical symptom of Korsakoff’s syndrome (Borsutzky et 
al., 2008). It has even been adopted in the clinical diagnostic guidelines of the syndrome, 
as the diagnosis in the DSM-5 is referred to as ‘Alcohol-induced major neurocognitive 
disorder, amnestic confabulatory type’ (291.1)(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Given the salient role of confabulations in Korsakoff’s syndrome, it is important to include 
the examination of confabulations in the neuropsychological examination. Confabulations 
have commonly been examined in the following ways: (a) by using instruments such as 
the confabulation battery (Dalla Barba, 1993) and the PCT (Cooper et al., 2006), (b) by 
examination of intrusions on memory tests, and (c) by observations. However, these 
methods have limitations: First, the confabulation battery and PCT have been designed to 
elicit provoked confabulations, they do not cover important aspects of spontaneous 
confabulations. Second, intrusions on memory tests have been used as a measure of 
provoked confabulations, but the relation between memory intrusions and confabulation 
behavior has not clearly been established. Last, spontaneous confabulations are often 
described based on non-standardized observations. 
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 The NVCL-20 has been developed to remediate these problems of the current 
assessment tools. The NVCL-20 is an observation scale that quantifies both provoked and 
spontaneous confabulations, outside a testing situation. This scale was validated in 
confabulating patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and non-confabulating alcoholics. 
The NVCL-20 was able to distinguish between patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and 
alcoholic controls, as the patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome showed more spontaneous 
and provoked confabulations. Interestingly, almost no differences between the groups 
were found on the confabulation battery and the PCT. Moreover, the instrument is short 
and easy to use in clinical practice, and it does not burden the patient, as family members 
or caretakers can complete the instrument. This is in contrast to the confabulation battery, 
which requires patients to answer 60 questions and takes approximately 30 to 45 minutes 
to administer. It is common to assess clinical features such as memory and executive 
functions, but the assessment of confabulations is often overlooked. We emphasize that 
it is important to include the examination of confabulations in the neuropsychological 
examination, and the NVCL-20 can be used for this. 
 In addition to developing an observation scale, we also examined the relation 
between intrusions on memory tests and confabulations, as these two phenomena have 
been used interchangeably. Based on the studies presented in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 three 
important conclusions can be drawn regarding the relation between intrusions and 
clinical confabulations.
 First, the total numbers of intrusions and confabulations appear to be unrelated in 
patient groups. We found no significant correlations between the total number of 
intrusions and scores on the memory tasks. This was true for the total numbers of 
intrusions produced on word list recall (i.e., the California Verbal Learning Test as presented 
in Chapters 3 and 4) and story recall (i.e., Chapters 5 and 6) in patients with Korsakoff’s 
syndrome and Alzheimer’s disease. Our findings are consistent with other studies that 
failed to find significant correlations between intrusions and confabulation (Kessels et al., 
2008; Nahum et al., 2012). The results from these studies indicate that the total number of 
intrusions and confabulations might represent dissociated phenomena, possibly with 
different underlying cognitive mechanisms in patient groups. These results are important 
with respect to the classification of confabulations. Based on the results of these studies 
we suggest to add an important element to the definition of provoked confabulations as 
proposed by Kopelman (1987). We suggest that a provoked confabulation is an incorrect 
responses to a question or a situation in which a person feels compelled to say something 
outside test situations. In addition, intrusions are errors produced on memory tests. This is in 
line with the classification proposed by Schnider (2008), although he used different 
definitions for the same concepts. 
 Second, semantically unrelated intrusions might resemble confabulations. We examined 
whether different types of intrusions produced on word recall and story recall tasks were 
correlated with scores on confabulation measures. We found that the ratio of unrelated 
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intrusions produced on the California Verbal Learning Test (CVLT, Delis et al., 2001; Mulder et 
al., 1996) correlated significantly with both provoked confabulations and spontaneous 
confabulation on the NVCL-20. Moreover, semantically unrelated intrusions produced on 
story recall showed medium-to-large correlations with the confabulation battery score in 
both patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome and Alzheimer’s disease. This is consistent with 
results described in studies by Gilboa et al. (2006) and Kan et al. (2010), who examined 
patients with ruptures of an ACoA aneurysm. These studies demonstrated that false recall 
and recognition of semantically unrelated words (e.g., idiosyncratic errors, implausible lures) 
might set confabulating patients apart from non-confabulating patients. The finding that 
the production of semantically unrelated intrusions might be related to confabulations is 
fitting with theories of confabulations. That is, semantically unrelated intrusions might be 
the result of an ‘overactive’ associative system, source monitoring, or strategic retrieval 
deficits. An overly diffuse associative retrieval process may lead to activation of task-irrele-
vant information, including the activation of unrelated words. Because of severe source 
monitoring and strategic retrieval deficits, patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome also falsely 
accept retrieved, yet unrelated memories, associations, thoughts, and imaginations.
 Last, confabulations appear to be related to memory performance, but not to 
executive dysfunction. In Chapters 3 and 4 we related measures of confabulations to 
memory subtests. We found that increased provoked and total confabulations scores on 
the NVCL-20 was associated with poorer performance on memory subtest, such as the 
Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test – Third Edition, the CVLT, and memory compound 
scores. In addition, in Chapter 5 we found that patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome who 
produced intrusions on novel story recall were more likely to show confabulation behavior 
on the NVCL-20 and the confabulation battery. These results point towards a relation 
between (provoked) confabulations and memory. This is in agreement with more recent 
definitions of confabulations, which emphasize the association between confabulations 
and amnesia. For example definitions by Berlyne (1972), who stated that confabulations 
are ‘a falsification of memory occurring in clear consciousness in association with an organically 
derived amnesia’ (p. 38), and Kopelman (2015), who suggested that ‘confabulations refers 
to false erroneous memories arising involuntarily in the context of a neurological amnesia’ 
(p.51). Interestingly, none of the executive measures (neither the composite score nor the 
individual executive test scores) in Chapters 3 and 4 correlated with any of the confabulation 
scores. Some authors suggest that there is a causal relation between confabulations and 
executive failures (Kapur & Coughlan, 1980). Others noted that confabulations may arise 
from executive dysfunction in addition to severe memory impairments (Fischer et al., 
1995; Kapur & Coughlan, 1980; Shapiro et al., 1981; Stuss et al., 1978). Fischer et al. (1995) 
proposed that the extent of executive dysfunction, in addition to the presence of memory 
deficits, determines the severity of confabulating behavior. The results from our studies 
suggests that standard tests of executive functions may not reveal the specific prefrontal 
dysfunction underlying confabulation.
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 We also examined a topic that is closely related to confabulations: Autobiographical 
memory. It has been observed that confabulations often relate to events from episodic 
autobiographical memory, for example when one is asked to recall what she ate last night. 
Next to confabulations in autobiographical memory, it has also been demonstrated that 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome present loss of more recent memories in autobi-
ographical memory (Kopelman, 1989; Moscovitch et al., 2006). This has been referred to as 
the temporal gradient of remote memory. Some inconsistencies have been reported in 
the literature for the presence of a temporal gradient (see Race & Verfaellie, 2012, for a 
review). We examined whether these inconsistencies might be the result of the nature of 
remote memory impairment under study (i.e., non-personal or autobiographical memory) 
and differences between autobiographical interview methods. We found that both the 
AMI and AI picked up on the temporal gradient in semantic and episodic autobiographi-
cal memory. The gradient was even present when only the first recalled, and probably the 
“best embedded”, memory was scored. Hence, whereas assessment procedure is very 
important and influential for the outcomes with respect to confabulations, remote 
memory impairments and the temporal gradient in autobiographical memory are very 
robust phenomena in Korsakoff’s syndrome. In addition, the remote memory performance 
of patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome is very different from healthy participants, who 
produced relatively stable memory representations across life periods for semantic 
memory, or even more detailed memories recent periods than from remote periods for 
episodic memories. 
Future directions
A recommendation for future research is to administer the NVCL-20 in a larger group of 
confabulating patients. Although we do propose to use the NVCL-20 as a measure of 
confabulation behavior in clinical practice, more research is needed. For example, 
administration of the NVCL-20 in a larger sample would make it possible to perform factor 
analysis and receiver operating characteristic analyses. These analyses would be helpful in 
(a) gaining more insight into the validity of the three category structure of the NVCL-20 
that we proposed, (b) examining sensitivity and specificity, and to determine a potential 
cutoff score for determining confabulation, and (c) providing a norm group for the 
NVCL-20, so that the scores of an individual obtained on this scale can be benchmarked 
against scores from a demographically similar norm group. 
 Moreover, it would be relevant to repeat the studies described in this thesis in a larger 
variety of patient groups. Although confabulation behavior is often linked to Korsakoff’s 
syndrome, it is also observed in other disorders, such as in patients with ruptured 
aneurysms of the anterior communicating artery, traumatic brain injury, and encephalitis. 
Future studies might examine if confabulations have a specific anatomical basis (i.e., the 
120
CHAPTER 7
posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex is often suggested), or a specific mechanism. If this is 
the case, the results across etiologies should be consistent. Moreover, it can be examined 
whether different lesions may be associated to different qualitative types of confabulation. 
In addition, for future studies it would be interesting to compare the differences in the 
production of intrusions on memory tests in confabulating and non-confabulating 
patients with Korsakoff’s syndrome. 
Conclusion
In this thesis confabulations and intrusions were investigated. Based on the findings we 
can provide some clarity in the puzzling field of confabulations. The findings indicate that 
intrusions on memory tests are different from clinical confabulations, and conclusions 
based on the examination of intrusions should not be extended to (provoked) 
confabulations. Clearly, the type of memory error under examination and the nature 
of the to-be-remembered material should be taken into account when assessing 
confabulations. Moreover, a reliable and valid observation scale was developed that is 
available for use in clinical practice and research to quantify provoked and spontaneous 
confabulations. 
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Het syndroom van Korsakov ontstaat door een vitamine-B1-tekort, vaak na langdurig, 
overmatig alcoholmisbruik. Dit tekort is meestal het gevolg van een periode van beperkte 
voedselinname en zelfverwaarlozing. Het ziektebeeld wordt gekenmerkt door ernstige 
geheugenstoornissen, onder andere in het autobiografisch geheugen. Het autobiografisch 
geheugen is de verzameling herinneringen die iemand heeft over zijn leven. Bij patiënten 
met het syndroom van Korsakov blijken herinneringen over de afgelopen tijd het eerst 
verloren gaan en oude herinneringen het laatst. Dit patroon wordt ook wel temporele 
gradiënt genoemd. Naast geheugenproblemen zijn er problemen met functies die nodig 
zijn voor doelgericht gedrag (executief functioneren), zoals plannen en het switchen van 
aandacht.
 Eén van de opvallendste kenmerken van het syndroom van Korsakov is de neiging 
tot confabuleren. Confabuleren is het hebben van foutieve herinneringen, die (meestal) 
onbewust optreden en incongruent zijn met de huidige situatie. Wanneer bijvoorbeeld 
aan een patiënt met Korsakov gevraagd werd: “Wat heb je gisteren gedaan?”, reageerde 
hij met: “Ik heb in de tuin gezeten en gewerkt”. Echter, hij was de dag ervoor naar therapie 
geweest en had tv gekeken. Confabulaties gaan vaak (maar niet uitsluitend) over sterk 
verankerde informatie uit iemands leven, zoals gewoontes en routines. De patiënt uit het 
voorbeeld kan als hobby tuinieren hebben gehad. Patiënten die confabuleren hebben 
geen intentie om te liegen, ze geloven dat hun herinnering juist is. 
 Er wordt in het onderzoek naar deze confabulaties vaak een onderscheid gemaakt 
tussen uitgelokt en spontaan confabuleren. Uitgelokte confabulaties zijn foute antwoorden 
of reacties op vragen of situaties waarbij iemand zich genoodzaakt voelt om een antwoord 
te geven, zoals in het voorbeeld van de man die gisteren aan het tuinieren was. Dit lijkt erg 
op fouten die gezonde mensen ook kunnen maken. Spontane confabulaties ontstaan 
zonder duidelijke aanleiding. De inhoud van deze confabulaties is vaak voor een toehoorder 
moeilijk te plaatsen. Patiënten kunnen zich in lijn met deze confabulaties gedragen. Het 
kan bijvoorbeeld voorkomen dat een patiënte opstaat en naar de deur loopt om haar 
baby eten te geven, terwijl haar kinderen al volwassen zijn. Er bestaan verschillende 
theorieën over het ontstaan van confabulaties. Er wordt bijvoorbeeld verondersteld dat 
confabuleren het gevolg is van de combinatie van geheugenstoornissen met executieve 
beperkingen. Juist de ernst van de executieve beperkingen zou de ernst van het 
confabuleren bepalen. Echter, tot op heden is hier beperkt bewijs voor gevonden.
 De neiging tot confabuleren is inmiddels opgenomen in de diagnose van het 
syndroom van Korsakov. In de DSM-5 wordt het syndroom geclassificeerd als ‘uitgebreide 
neurocognitieve stoornis, amnestisch confabulerende-type’ (code 291.1). Echter, er bestaan 
slechts twee instrumenten om confabuleren te meten: de confabulatie batterij en de 
uitgelokte confabulatie test (UCT). De confabulatie batterij is een semi-gestructureerd 
interview, dat naast logische vragen, ook episodische en semantische geheugenaspecten 
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onderzoekt via vragen die normaal gesproken een ‘ik-weet-het-niet’ -respons uitlokken, 
bijvoorbeeld: ‘Herinner je je nog wat je deed op 13 maart 1985?’. Gezonde mensen geven in 
de regel toe het antwoord op deze vragen niet te weten. Er wordt verondersteld dat 
confabulerende personen geneigd zijn deze vragen wel een specifiek antwoord te geven. 
Hetzelfde geldt voor de UCT, waarbij deelnemers een verhaal moeten bedenken bij vijf 
plaatjes. Vervolgens worden, na een korte tijdsinterval, verschillende vragen over de 
plaatjes gesteld. Sommige vragen zijn op basis van de plaatjes niet te beantwoorden (‘Op 
welke verdieping van het ziekenhuis werkt de dokter?’). Als de deelnemer op deze zeer vragen 
toch een specifiek antwoord geeft, wordt dit als een confabulatie gescoord. Een kritische 
noot bij deze tests is dat ze vrijwel uitsluitend in de wetenschap gebruikt worden (niet in 
de praktijk) en enkel uitgelokt confabuleren meten. 
 In de praktijk wordt het aantal fout-genoemde, niet-gepresenteerde woorden 
(‘intrusies’) op geheugentaken, zoals de Verbale Leer- en Geheugen Taak (VLGT) vaak als 
maat genomen voor confabuleren. Het is echter nooit onderzocht of dergelijke intrusies 
op geheugentaken ook iets zeggen over confabuleren in de klinische praktijk. Een aantal 
auteurs veronderstelt bijvoorbeeld dat niet naar het totale aantal intrusies gekeken moet 
worden, maar naar het type intrusies dat gemaakt wordt op een geheugentaak. Als 
iemand een lijst met boodschappen (zoals bij de VLGT) geleerd heeft en vervolgens zegt 
dat er een ‘gitaar’ (ongerelateerde intrusie) op het lijstje stond, is dit mogelijk meer 
gerelateerd aan de neiging om te confabuleren dan wanneer iemand iets noemt dat 
regelmatig op een boodschappenlijst voorkomt, maar niet geleerd is, zoals het woord 
‘suiker’. Ook wordt verondersteld dat intrusies op geheugentaken gerelateerd zouden zijn 
aan uitgelokte confabulaties, maar niet aan spontane confabulaties. Kortom, een eenduidige 
definitie van het begrip “confabuleren” ontbreekt. 
 In de literatuur wordt het begrip confabuleren verschillend gedefinieerd en gemeten, 
bijvoorbeeld als intrusies op geheugentests of als uitgelokt confabuleren op de confabulatie 
batterij. De conclusies uit onderzoeken die gebruik hebben gemaakt van de ene uitkomst - 
maat, zijn wellicht niet te vergelijken met onderzoeken die andere uitkomstmaten gebruiken. 
Het gebruik van verschillende uitkomstmaten kan de communicatie over confabuleren 
bemoeilijken. 
 In Hoofdstuk 2 werd onderzocht of verschillen tussen twee veelgebruikte interviews 
het vinden van een temporele gradiënt in het autobiografisch geheugen zouden 
beïnvloeden bij patiënten met het syndroom van Korsakov. Er werd gekeken naar het 
Autobiografisch Geheugen Interview (AGI) en het Autobiografisch Interview (AI). De AI 
was nog niet eerder afgenomen bij deze patiëntengroep. Zowel de AGI als de AI lieten 
een temporele gradiënt zien, voor semantisch en episodisch autobiografisch geheugen. 
De temporele gradiënt lijkt dus geen resultaat van de gebruikte methode te zijn bij het 
syndroom van Korsakov. De resultaten komen overeen met voorgaande studies die 
gebruik maakten van de AGI bij patiënten met het syndroom van Korsakov (Kopelman, 
1989; Kopelman et al., 1999, 2009). 
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 Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een studie waarbij een observatieschaal is ontwikkeld en 
gevalideerd, die zowel uitgelokt als spontaan confabuleren inventariseert: de Nijmegen- 
Venray Confabulatie Lijst (NVCL-20). De NVCL-20 kon een onderscheid maken tussen 
patiënten met het syndroom van Korsakov (confabulerende patiënten) en een alcoholistische 
controlegroep (niet-confabulerende groep). De uitgelokt en spontaan confabuleren 
categorieën van de NVCL-20 hadden een “goede” tot “excellente” interne consistentie- en 
interbeoordelaarsbetrouwbaarheid. Patiënten met het syndroom van Korsakov die 
confabuleerden volgens de NVCL-20, confabuleerden ook op de UCT, wat de concurrente 
validiteit van de NVCL-20 bevestigt. De NVCL-20 is een praktisch, betrouwbaar en valide 
instrument om confabuleren te kwantificeren in de klinische praktijk. 
 De doelen van het onderzoek beschreven in Hoofdstuk 4 waren: (a) het onderzoeken 
van de relatie tussen (verschillende type) intrusies gemaakt op de VLGT en confabulaties 
gemeten met de NVCL-20 bij patiënten met het syndroom van Korsakov en (b) het 
onderzoeken of verschillende neuropsychologische maten van geheugenprestaties en 
executief functioneren gerelateerd waren aan uitgelokt en/of spontaan confabuleren. 
Wat betreft het eerste doel werd gevonden dat enkel ongerelateerde intrusies op de VLGT 
mogelijk gerelateerd zijn aan confabuleren. Geen andere VLGT intrusiescores, inclusief het 
totale aantal intrusies, waren gerelateerd aan zowel spontaan als uitgelokt confabuleren. 
Intrusies op een woordreproductietaak lijken een ander fenomeen te zijn dan confabuleren in 
de klinische praktijk. Wat betreft het tweede doel werd gevonden dat uitgelokt confabuleren 
significant gerelateerd is aan maten die geheugenfuncties reflecteren. Daarentegen 
werden er geen significante correlaties gevonden tussen executieve functiematen en 
confabulatiescores.  
 In Hoofdstuk 5 werd de relatie tussen (verschillende typen) intrusies op verschillende 
typen verhaalreproductietaken en confabuleren (op de NVCL-20 en de confabulatiebatterij) 
onderzocht bij patiënten met het syndroom van Korsakov. Patiënten met het syndroom 
van Korsakov maakten meer intrusies bij het reproduceren van een gewijzigd sprookje, 
in vergelijking met het reproduceren van een bekend, niet-gewijzigd, sprookje. Echter, 
deze intrusies correleerden niet significant met klinisch confabuleren. Enkel intrusies gemaakt 
bij het reproduceren van een nieuw geleerd verhaal en semantisch ongerelateerde intrusies 
waren gerelateerd aan confabuleren bij patiënten met het syndroom van Korsakov. 
 In Hoofdstuk 6 werd dezelfde taak als in het onderzoek beschreven in hoofdstuk 5 
afgenomen, maar dan bij gezonde jongeren en ouderen en patiënten met de ziekte van 
Alzheimer. Bovendien werden verkorte versies van de NVCL-20 en de confabulatie batterij 
afgenomen. Er werd gevonden dat gezonde ouderen gevoelig zijn voor de interferentie 
van sterk verankerde kennis wanneer bekende informatie gewijzigd is (noemen dat 
Roodkapje de boze wolf ontmoette, terwijl in het verhaaltje de blije wolf werd genoemd). 
Bovendien zijn ouderen bij het ophalen van bekende informatie meer geneigd om de 
essentie van het verhaal te noemen, waardoor meer semantische intrusies gemaakt worden 
dan bij jongeren en patiënten met de ziekte van Alzheimer. Bovendien zijn intrusies en 
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uitgelokt confabuleren bij gezonde veroudering gerelateerd. Uitgelokt confabuleren zou 
dus vergelijkbaar kunnen zijn met intrusies op geheugentests bij oudere, gezonde deel - 
nemers. Intrusies op verhaalreproductietaken zijn verder niet gerelateerd aan uitgelokt 
of spontaan confabuleren bij patiënten met de ziekte van Alzheimer, afgezien van de 
productie van ongerelateerde intrusies. Deze resultaten laten zien dat intrusies en klinisch 
confabuleren in patiëntgroepen niet hetzelfde zijn. 
 Tot slot wordt in Hoofdstuk 7 een algemene conclusie van de bevindingen van dit 
proefschrift beschreven. In de inleiding van het proefschrift werd aangekaart dat er alleen 
instrumenten bestaan om uitgelokt confabuleren vast te stellen (confabulatie batterij, 
UCT). Dit proefschrift beschrijft de ontwikkeling van de NVCL-20, die zowel uitgelokt als 
spontaan confabuleren kan vaststellen. Hoewel confabuleren een kenmerkend symptoom 
is van het syndroom van Korsakov, wordt dit nog weinig meegenomen in de diagnostiek. 
Op basis van de resultaten van dit proefschrift wordt geadviseerd de NVCL-20 mee te 
nemen bij neuropsychologisch onderzoek, om (de mate van) confabuleren te kunnen 
vaststellen bij het syndroom van Korsakov. 
 Daarnaast werd geconstateerd dat de concepten ‘intrusies’ en ‘confabuleren’ als 
synoniemen werden gebruikt, terwijl er weinig bewijs is dat dit gelijkwaardige concepten 
zijn. Op basis van de resultaten van dit proefschrift werden er drie conclusies getrokken. 
Als eerste werd geconcludeerd dat het totale aantal intrusies op geheugentaken (zowel 
woord- als verhaalreproductietaken) en klinisch confabuleren niet gerelateerd lijken te 
zijn bij patiënten met het syndroom van Korsakov en de ziekte van Alzheimer. Dit betekent 
dat conclusies uit studies die intrusies hebben onderzocht, niet direct gegeneraliseerd 
kunnen worden naar confabuleergedrag bij deze patiëntgroepen. Op basis van de 
resultaten van dit proefschrift werd de suggestie gedaan dat het belangrijk is om een 
onderscheid te maken tussen intrusies, oftewel, fouten gemaakt op geheugentaken, en 
uitgelokte confabulaties, oftewel, onjuiste responsen op vragen en situaties waarbij 
iemand zich genoodzaakt voelt te antwoorden. 
 Ten tweede werd geconcludeerd dat ongerelateerde intrusies wel lijken samen te 
hangen met klinisch confabuleren. Dit werd gevonden met zowel woord- als verhaal-
reproductietaken. Dit komt overeen met resultaten van eerdere onderzoeken naar dit 
onderwerp die uitgevoerd waren bij andere patiëntgroepen, zoals bij patiënten met 
een gescheurd aneurysma in de arteria communicans anterior. Deze bevindingen stroken 
met theorieën over confabuleren. Een overactief associatiesysteem, problemen met bron - 
monitoring en strategische ophaalmechanismen kunnen ten grondslag liggen aan zowel 
ongerelateerde intrusies als confabulaties. Het is dus belangrijk dat, wanneer men 
confabuleren wilt onderzoeken, er een onderscheid gemaakt wordt tussen verschillende 
typen intrusies, in plaats van enkel naar het totale aantal intrusies te kijken. 
 Als laatste werd gevonden dat uitgelokte confabulaties gerelateerd lijken te zijn aan 
verminderde geheugenprestaties, maar niet aan executieve functieproblematiek. Er zou 
dus gezegd kunnen worden dat klinisch confabuleren alleen kan optreden bij patiënt-
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groepen met amnesie. Dit komt overeen met moderne karakteriseringen van confabuleren, 
zoals ‘confabulations are a falsification of memory occurring in clear consciousness in 
association with an organically derived amnesia’ en ‘confabulations refers to false erroneous 
memories arising involuntarily in the context of a neurological amnesia’ . 
 Tezamen genomen werd gevonden dat intrusies op geheugentaken anders zijn dan 
klinisch confabuleren. Conclusies uit studies die intrusies hebben onderzocht kunnen niet 
direct gegeneraliseerd worden naar (uitgelokt) confabuleren bij patiëntgroepen. Het is 
belangrijk aandacht te hebben voor het type geheugenfout en het type geheugentest 
wanneer men confabuleren wil onderzoeken. Daarnaast werd een betrouwbare en valide 
observatieschaal ontwikkeld, welke gebruikt kan worden om confabuleren te meten in 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek en in de klinische praktijk.
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Appendix C
Stories used in the experiments of Chapters 5 and 6
Translated from the Dutch stories
Familiar well-known fairy tale - Little Red Riding Hood
Little Red Riding Hood, / a small girl / with a red cap, / visited / her sick / grandmother /. 
Along the way / she met / the bad wolf /. She told him / where she was heading /. The wolf 
rushed / to grandmother /. He arrived there / before Little Red Riding Hood /. The wolf ate 
grandmother /. Then he put on her clothes / and laid himself in grandmothers bed /. 
When Little Red Riding Hood arrived at grandmothers house / she did not notice / that 
the wolf was there /. The wolf also ate Little Red Riding Hood /. A huntsman / saw the wolf 
sleeping / in grandmothers bed /. He cut / the belly of the wolf / with scissors /. He freed / 
Little Red Riding Hood and grandmother /.
Familiar well-known fairy tale - Cinderella 
Cinderella, / a beautiful girl, / lived with her evil stepmother / and stepsisters / and had to 
do all the chores /. One day / the king organized / a ball /. Cinderella could not go, / 
because she only had rags / to wear /. Fairy godmother / conjured / a ball gown / with 
glass slippers / so Cinderella was able to go /. The prince / fell in love with her /. At midnight 
/ the spell / would be broken /. Therefore, Cinderella fled from / the palace /. On the stairs 
/ she lost slipper /. The prince found it / and looked for the girl / that fitted the flip-flop /. 
He wanted to marry her /. This was Cinderella /. 
Modified well-known fairy tale - Little Red Riding Hood
Little Red Riding Hood, / a big girl / with a red hat, / visited / her old / grandmother /. 
Along the way / she met / the happy wolf /. She told him / where she was heading /. The 
wolf rushed / to grandmother /. He arrived there / before Little Red Riding Hood /. The 
wolf locked up grandmother /. Then he put on her tracksuit / and stood atop of 
grandmothers bed /. When Little Red Riding Hood arrived at grandmothers house / she 
did not notice / that the wolf was there /. The wolf also locked up Little Red Riding Hood 
/. A mailman / saw the wolf sleeping / in grandmothers bed /. He stabbed / the belly of the 
wolf / with scissors /. He freed / Little Red Riding Hood and grandmother /.
Modified well-known fairy tale – Cinderella
Cinderella, / an ugly girl, / lived with her evil stepmother / and stepbrothers / and had to 
do all the chores /. One day / the king organized / a barbeque /. Cinderella could not go, / 
because she only had rags / to wear /. A pixie / sewed / a ball gown / with glass beads / so 
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Cinderella was able to go /. The prince / laughed at her /. At midnight / the spell / would 
be broken /. Therefore, Cinderella hid inside / the palace /. On the stairs / she lost a flip-flop 
/. The prince found it / and looked for the girl / that fitted the flip-flop /. He wanted to go 
traveling with her /. This was Cinderella /. 
Novel story
Bert / Koster / a surveillance employee / was shot / on Monday / during a bank robbery / 
in the city of Zwolle /. The four robbers / all wore / masks /. One of the robbers / had a 
sawed off / shotgun /. Last night / detectives / studied / eyewitnesses reports /. A police 
spokesman said / “He was a brave man. / He chased the robbers / and tried to stop them, 
/ risking his own life” /. To remember / this heroic act / his colleagues / cast / a bronze 
statue /. This statue / was exhibited / in the hall /.
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Life is not a fairytale
Understanding (the relation between)
intrusions and confabulations
Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience
For a successful research Institute, it is vital to train the next generation of young scientists. 
To achieve this goal, the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour established 
the Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience (DGCN), which was officially 
recognised as a national graduate school in 2009. The Graduate School covers training at 
both Master’s and PhD level and provides an excellent educational context fully aligned 
with the research programme of the Donders Institute. 
The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international students in 
biology, physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioral science, medicine and related 
disciplines. Selective admission and assessment centers guarantee the enrolment of the 
best and most motivated students.
The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% of PhD alumni 
show a continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top institutes worldwide, e.g. 
Stanford University, University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, UCL London, MPI Leipzig, 
Hanyang University in South Korea, NTNU Norway, University of Illinois, North Western 
University, Northeastern University in Boston, ETH Zürich, University of Vienna etc.. 
Positions outside academia spread among the following sectors: specialists in a medical 
environment, mainly in genetics, geriatrics, psychiatry and neurology. Specialists in a 
psychological environment, e.g. as specialist in neuropsychology, psychological diagnostics 
or therapy. Positions in higher education as coordinators or lecturers. A smaller percentage 
enters business as research consultants, analysts or head of research and development. 
Fewer graduates stay in a research environment as lab coordinators, technical support or 
policy advisors. Upcoming possibilities are positions in the IT sector and management 
position in pharmaceutical industry. In general, the PhDs graduates almost invariably continue 
with high-quality positions that play an important role in our knowledge economy.
For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defenses please visit: 
http://www.ru.nl/donders/graduate-school/donders-graduate/ 
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